United States v. Derrick Ball
771 F.3d 964
6th Cir.2014Background
- Derrick Ball pleaded guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession of a firearm; the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on three prior Kentucky convictions (one drug trafficking, two fleeing/evading), producing a 15-year mandatory minimum and a 211-month sentence.
- Ball waived challenge to one Kentucky fleeing conviction (Boyle County) but contested that his 2008 Mercer County conviction for "Fleeing or Evading in the First Degree" did not qualify as an ACCA "violent felony."
- The Mercer indictment alleged Ball knowingly disobeyed a police officer while operating a vehicle and, by fleeing, "created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person."
- The Kentucky statute (Ky. Rev. Stat. § 520.095) is divisible into motor-vehicle flight (subsec. (1)(a)) and pedestrian flight (subsec. (1)(b)); (1)(a) contains a subpart (4) criminalizing flight that causes or creates a substantial risk of serious injury or death.
- The parties disputed whether the court should look only to the statutory elements/charging document under the modified categorical approach, and whether the Mercer conviction qualified under the ACCA residual clause as a violent felony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ball) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mercer County fleeing conviction is a "violent felony" under the ACCA | Ball: vehicle flight here is not a violent felony; record lacks facts showing serious risk | Gov't: indictment and statute show flight-by-vehicle inherently or specifically created substantial risk; applies under ACCA residual clause | Held: Conviction qualifies as a violent felony both because vehicle flight is categorically risky and because the indictment pleaded (1)(a)(4) element of creating substantial risk |
| Proper method: categorical vs. modified categorical approach | Ball: court should examine actual facts | Gov't: must use elements/charging document (Shepard materials) | Held: statute is divisible; court properly used the modified categorical approach and relied on indictment pleading to identify subsection (1)(a)(4) |
| Constitutionality of ACCA residual clause (vagueness) | Ball: residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, fails to give fair notice | Gov't: residual clause constitutional; precedent supports it | Held: Rejected; Sixth Circuit has upheld residual clause (did not revisit validity) |
| Whether Sixth Amendment requires jury finding of facts leading to ACCA enhancement | Ball: facts increasing mandatory minimum must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt | Gov't: prior convictions may be found by judge; precedent allows judicial finding of prior-conviction predicates | Held: Rejected; prior convictions can be relied on by court without jury finding (Almendarez-Torres line) |
| Whether government must give pre-plea notice of intent to seek ACCA enhancement | Ball: government failed to notify him before plea | Gov't: no notice required for ACCA in Title 18 cases (Title 21 notice statute inapplicable) | Held: Rejected; no statutory notice requirement for ACCA enhancement under Title 18 |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Martin, 378 F.3d 578 (6th Cir.) (vehicle flight creates conspicuous risk and qualifies as violent felony)
- Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011) (vehicle flight poses risk similar to enumerated offenses; informs residual-clause analysis)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (framework for comparing non-enumerated offenses to enumerated offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (modified categorical approach limits Shepard materials)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (permissible documents for modified categorical inquiry)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (ACCA is question of federal law; state-court statutory interpretation binding on element identification)
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (distinguishes prior-conviction exceptions to jury-trial rule)
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding nondelegation/constitutionality of sentencing structures)
- United States v. Doyle, 678 F.3d 429 (6th Cir.) (Tennessee vehicle-flight statute qualifies as violent felony)
- United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373 (6th Cir.) (Michigan vehicle-flight statute is categorically violent felony)