United States v. Dereck Jerome Brown
805 F.3d 1325
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- Officers executed a search warrant at Dereck Brown’s home after a confidential informant bought crack cocaine from him; they found Brown, a loaded handgun, ammunition, cash, and suspected drugs.
- Brown pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); other charges were dismissed under a plea agreement.
- The PSR classified Brown as an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) based on: two prior cocaine-sale convictions (treated as separate) and two Georgia felony-obstruction convictions (treated as violent felonies).
- The ACCA classification raised Brown’s offense level and criminal-history category, producing an advisory guidelines range of 210–262 months; the district court imposed 210 months.
- Brown appealed, arguing (1) Georgia felony obstruction is not a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause, (2) his two cocaine-sale convictions were not separate offenses, and (3) the 210-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Brown’s Argument | Government’s / District Court’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Georgia felony obstruction is a violent felony under the ACCA elements clause | Obstruction does not necessarily involve the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force" | Georgia felony obstruction requires "offering or doing violence" against an officer and thus meets the elements clause | Yes; felony obstruction categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause |
| Whether two prior cocaine-sale convictions (six minutes apart, same buyer) count as separate predicate offenses for ACCA | The sales were effectively simultaneous and not separate criminal episodes | Sales were successive and can be treated as separate; alternatively, classification as ACCA still stands even if counted as one | Any error was harmless — Brown still had three qualifying predicates (two obstruction + one cocaine sale) |
| Whether the 210-month sentence was substantively unreasonable | Sentence greatly exceeded what guidelines would be without ACCA and was disproportionate | Court properly applied ACCA, considered § 3553(a) factors, imposed bottom-of-guidelines sentence well below statutory maximum | Not unreasonable; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines "physical force" in ACCA elements clause as violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- United States v. Romo-Villalobos, 674 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2012) (attempted physical force by pushing/kicking satisfies the ACCA elements clause)
- Jones v. State, 622 S.E.2d 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (Georgia felony obstruction requires proof of "offering or doing violence" to an officer)
- United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (harmless-error principle where ACCA status unaffected by one contested predicate)
- United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (standard for vacating sentence as substantively unreasonable)