United States v. Deon Dinkins
714 F. App'x 240
4th Cir.2017Background
- Deon Dinkins pled guilty in 2012 to being a felon in possession of a firearm; his Presentence Report treated a prior South Carolina assault and battery with intent to kill (ABIK) as an ACCA predicate and recommended an enhanced sentence.
- District court initially imposed a 180-month ACCA-enhanced sentence; after Johnson II struck the ACCA residual clause, Dinkins sought collateral relief challenging whether ABIK qualified under the force clause.
- Dinkins obtained authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion based on Johnson II and Welch, and the district court on collateral review concluded ABIK did not categorically qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA force clause.
- The Government appealed the district court’s holding that ABIK was not a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
- South Carolina common-law ABIK (pre-2010 repeal) is defined as assault and battery with malice aforethought (general intent to kill or to cause grievous bodily injury), and courts have said that if the victim died the offense would be murder.
- The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that ABIK’s mens rea (intent to kill/grievous bodily injury) means the offense categorically involves attempted, threatened, or used violent force under the ACCA force clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether South Carolina common-law ABIK is an ACCA "violent felony" under the force clause | Dinkins: intent alone does not equal use/attempted/threatened use of violent physical force | Government: ABIK requires an act done with intent to kill or cause grievous injury, which is violent force or an attempt/threat to use it | ABIK is categorically a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) |
| Whether the categorical approach permits treating ABIK’s mens rea as showing attempted/threatened use of force | Dinkins: mens rea without requisite force element is insufficient | Government: the mens rea plus the required act capable of causing death means the minimum conduct involves attempted/threatened violent force | Court: under the categorical approach ABIK’s elements require conduct that necessarily involves attempted/threatened violent force |
| Whether a conviction for ABIK could rest on only minor touching that avoids ACCA’s "violent force" | Dinkins: ABIK can criminalize mere offensive touching | Government: conviction also requires intent to cause death/grievous injury; even minimal actual injury requires proof of intent to commit lethal harm | Court: even where actual touching is minor, the offense’s mens rea and element structure make a realistic probability that conviction requires attempted/threatened violent force, so it is categorical violent felony |
| Whether precedent supports treating intent-to-kill assaults as ACCA violent felonies | Dinkins: distinguishes intent from use of force | Government: analogous federal and circuit precedent treats intent-to-kill assaults as attempted/threatened violent force | Court: aligns with other circuits and Supreme Court precedent; ABIK qualifies |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines "physical force" as violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating the ACCA residual clause)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson II applies retroactively on collateral review)
- United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing South Carolina assault and battery with high and aggravated nature as non-ACCA predicate)
- United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2016) (categorical approach standard for ACCA predicate analysis)
- United States v. Edwards, 857 F.3d 420 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding intent-to-murder assault is an ACCA violent felony)
- Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2017) (similar holding for state assault with intent to do great bodily harm)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (poisoning to cause physical harm qualifies as violent force)
- Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (requirement of realistic probability, not theoretical possibility, in categorical analysis)