981 F.3d 1171
11th Cir.2020Background
- In 2010 Deangelo Johnson was charged with felony domestic violence by strangulation and assault in Florida but pled guilty, with counsel, to misdemeanor domestic battery (Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)); he later served six months in jail.
- In 2018 police found a pistol in Johnson’s car; a federal grand jury indicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence."
- The indictment and the stipulated-facts bench trial did not allege or expressly prove that Johnson knew, when possessing the firearm, that he had the disqualifying status (knowledge-of-status).
- After the Supreme Court decided Rehaif (requiring proof that a defendant knew his forbidden status), Johnson appealed, arguing the indictment and stipulation were insufficient under Rehaif and also raising equal-protection and Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(9).
- The Eleventh Circuit held that Rehaif error (omission of status-knowledge) occurred but that the record nonetheless established Johnson knew: (1) he had a misdemeanor conviction, (2) the conviction necessarily involved at least the “slightest offensive touching” (Castleman), and (3) the victim was his wife; therefore any Rehaif error did not affect his substantial rights.
- The court rejected Johnson’s equal-protection and Commerce Clause challenges based on circuit and Supreme Court precedent and affirmed his conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of indictment under Rehaif (knowledge-of-status) | Johnson: indictment failed to allege he knew his status as a domestic-violence misdemeanant, so it did not charge an element post-Rehaif. | Government: indictment tracked statutory language and sufficed. | Court: omission was plain Rehaif error, but harmless because record showed Johnson knew his status. |
| Sufficiency of stipulated facts at bench trial to prove Rehaif knowledge | Johnson: stipulated facts did not prove he knew his status when he possessed the gun. | Government: stipulation and PSR establish requisite knowledge. | Court: stipulation lacked explicit Rehaif proof (plain error) but other record evidence showed he knew, so no substantial-rights prejudice. |
| Nature and burden of § 921(a)(33)(B) provisions (elements vs affirmative defenses) | Johnson: (implicitly) relied on § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (civil-rights-restoration) to argue non-qualification. | Government: the elements in § 921(a)(33)(A) define status; (B) contains exceptions the defendant must raise. | Court: (A) sets the elements for status; (B) operates as statutory exceptions/affirmative defenses—defendant must raise them; prosecution need not disprove them unless defendant introduces evidence. |
| Constitutional challenges (equal protection; Commerce Clause) | Johnson: § 922(g)(9) treats those who never lost civil rights worse than similarly situated people whose rights were restored (equal protection); § 922(g) exceeds Commerce Clause power for intrastate possession. | Government: binding precedent forecloses both challenges. | Court: Plain-error review fails for equal-protection claim (no controlling Eleventh/Supreme Court authority to show plain error); Commerce-Clause challenge rejected under circuit precedent (McAllister). |
Key Cases Cited
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (knowledge-of-status is an element under § 922(g))
- United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (definition of "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence"—victim need only have actually been a covered relation)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) ("physical force" for § 921(a)(33) includes the "slightest offensive touching")
- Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007) (rights-restoration exception applies only where rights were actually lost and then restored)
- Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (knowledge requirement pertains to facts that make the conduct unlawful, not knowledge of legal label)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (government must prove defendant knew facts making the conduct fall within statutory definition)
- United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (11th Cir. 1996) (§ 922(g) constitutional under Commerce Clause when firearm traveled in interstate commerce)
- United States v. Jackson, 120 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1997) (pre-Rehaif precedent that § 922(g) did not require knowledge of status; cited for context)