United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319

Maurice Davis and Andre Glover committed multiple armed robberies and were charged with Hobbs Act robberies, conspiracy, and multiple counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using/brandishing a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence.”
§924(c)(3) defines “crime of violence” by (A) an elements clause and (B) a residual/substantial‑risk clause: an offense that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk” that force may be used.
A jury convicted both defendants on most counts, including two §924(c) counts that produced lengthy mandatory minimum sentences; the Fifth Circuit initially rejected vagueness challenges but later (after remand post‑Dimaya) held §924(c)(3)(B) void for vagueness.
The Fifth Circuit sustained the §924(c) conviction that could stand under the elements clause (robbery) but vacated the §924(c) conviction that relied on conspiracy as the predicate because it depended on the residual clause.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether §924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and whether it should be read categorically or case‑specifically.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (United States)	Defendant's Argument (Davis/Glover)	Held
Whether §924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague	The clause should be read case‑specifically (look to defendant’s actual conduct) to avoid vagueness	The clause, read categorically, is vague under Johnson/Dimaya and therefore invalid	§924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague (Court affirmed vagueness)
Whether §924(c)(3)(B) requires a categorical or case‑specific approach	Argues statute permits a case‑specific approach (defendant’s conduct)	Argues text, context, and history mandate the categorical approach (ordinary‑case/offense elements)	Text, context, and history require the categorical approach; government’s case‑specific reading rejected
Whether the canon of constitutional avoidance requires adopting the government’s alternative reading to save the clause	The Court should adopt any fairly possible (case‑specific) reading to preserve the statute	Even if possible, avoidance cannot be used to expand criminal statutes; rule of lenity and separation‑of‑powers counsel against saving by enlarging scope	The avoidance canon cannot be used to rewrite §924(c) to adopt a broader case‑specific construction; courts must treat vague criminal laws as nullities

Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (interprets §16(b) to require a categorical approach focusing on the nature of the offense)
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held void for vagueness; categorical ‘ordinary‑case’ analysis criticized)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. _ (2018) (plurality) (§16(b) residual clause held unconstitutionally vague using reasoning similar to Johnson)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (explains categorical approach for prior‑conviction statutes)
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (discusses when “offense” can mean generic crime versus particular acts)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (Sixth Amendment and procedural problems with case‑specific review of prior convictions)