56 F.4th 1048
6th Cir.2022Background
- David McCall pleaded guilty in 2015 to a heroin-distribution conspiracy and was sentenced as a career offender to 235 months’ imprisonment (Guidelines range 188–235 months).
- Years later McCall moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), citing three primary reasons: (1) the Sixth Circuit’s later decision in Havis would likely eliminate his career-offender predicate and reduce his guideline range; (2) COVID-19 risk while incarcerated; and (3) post‑sentencing rehabilitation.
- The district court denied relief, reasoning Havis is nonretroactive and that neither COVID risk nor rehabilitation (alone) established an extraordinary and compelling reason.
- A divided Sixth Circuit panel reversed and remanded for reconsideration of Havis’s impact; the court granted en banc review to resolve intra‑circuit disagreement.
- En banc majority held that nonretroactive changes in sentencing law cannot constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and affirmed denial of McCall’s motion; dissenters argued Concepcion and sentencing‑discretion principles allow case‑by‑case consideration of intervening legal changes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a nonretroactive change in sentencing law (e.g., Havis) can by itself qualify as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassionate release | Havis would meaningfully lower McCall’s Guidelines range today, so the intervening legal change alone is extraordinary and compelling | Nonretroactive changes are ordinary in the legal system and cannot justify reopening a final sentence; relief for such claims is through collateral processes | No — nonretroactive changes in sentencing law cannot serve as extraordinary and compelling reasons |
| Whether a nonretroactive change may count when combined with other factors (e.g., COVID risk, rehabilitation) | Combination of Havis plus other individual circumstances makes relief appropriate | Allowing combination would circumvent Congress’s retroactivity choices and post‑conviction scheme | No — nonretroactive legal developments cannot be aggregated with other factors to meet the threshold |
| Whether general COVID‑19 risk justifies compassionate release | McCall asserted COVID risk while incarcerated supports release | Government pointed to lack of individualized health risk and vaccine availability | No — general COVID risk without individualized medical vulnerability failed to show extraordinary and compelling reason |
| Whether rehabilitation alone qualifies | McCall relied on rehabilitative efforts since imprisonment | Statute and Sentencing Commission guidance preclude rehabilitation alone from qualifying | No — rehabilitation alone is statutorily inadequate (28 U.S.C. § 994(t)) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (interpreting “controlled substance offense” and undermining some career‑offender predicates)
- United States v. McCall, 20 F.4th 1108 (6th Cir. 2021) (panel decision reversing and remanding; prompted en banc review)
- United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2021) (held nonretroactive changes cannot constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons)
- United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2021) (held nonretroactive legal changes do not satisfy the threshold)
- United States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2021) (explained a combination of factors including intervening change might, in some circumstances, warrant relief)
- Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022) (Supreme Court: district courts may consider intervening changes when resentencing under certain First Step Act provisions)
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (discusses prospective application of new sentencing rules vs. nonretroactivity)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (explains general prohibition on modifying imposed sentences)