United States v. Darrel King, 24 F.4th 1226

Darrel King ran a heroin distribution ring in the 1970s and was convicted in state court (1981) and federal court (1982) for offenses committed before November 1, 1987.
King completed his state sentence and began serving his federal sentence in 2019; he filed a direct compassionate-release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) as amended by the First Step Act (FSA), citing age, COVID-19 vulnerability, and family circumstances.
The district court denied King’s motion as procedurally improper because § 3582(c)(1) does not permit pre-November 1, 1987 offenders to file directly; such inmates remain governed by 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g), under which only the BOP can seek compassionate release on their behalf.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, following the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Jackson, holding that the SRA transition language preserves a two-track regime: “old-law” prisoners (offenses on or before Oct. 31, 1987) are subject to § 4205(g); “new-law” prisoners (offenses on/after Nov. 1, 1987) may directly move under § 3582(c)(1).
The court relied on statutory text, the SRA amendment history, and Congress’s continued extensions of § 4205(g) (e.g., the Parole Commission Extension Act) to conclude the FSA did not eliminate the November 1, 1987 cut-off.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 3582(c)(1) as amended by the FSA allows pre-Nov. 1, 1987 offenders to file compassionate-release motions directly	King: the FSA’s insertion of “in any case” into § 3582(c)(1) makes the amendment universally applicable to all offenders	Government/district court: transition language in the SRA and later statutes preserves a two-track regime; pre-1987 offenders remain subject to § 4205(g) and cannot file personally	Held: § 3582(c)(1) does not apply to pre-Nov. 1, 1987 offenders; they are governed by § 4205(g) and must have the BOP move on their behalf
Whether extrinsic materials (OIG reports, Sentencing Commission reports, senators’ letters, draft bills) show FSA implicitly repealed the November 1, 1987 cut-off	King: post-FSA materials and reports show intent to expand compassionate release and implicitly repeal the cut-off	Government: statutory text is unambiguous; post-enactment materials and unenacted bills cannot override clear statutory language	Held: statutory scheme is unambiguous; extrinsic evidence not considered; no implicit repeal
Whether King’s direct motion was procedurally proper	King: he may file under amended § 3582(c)(1)	District court/Government: procedurally improper because King is an old-law prisoner	Held: motion was procedurally improper and denial affirmed

United States v. Jackson, 991 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 2021) (held pre-Nov. 1, 1987 offenders cannot file directly under § 3582(c)(1))
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (sentence-modification authority is statutory and limited)
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) (courts must enforce clear statutory text)
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (extratextual sources only used to resolve ambiguity)
Schroeder v. United States, 793 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2015) (courts must enforce statute according to its terms)
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (judges may not amend statutes based on extratextual considerations)
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (statutory text must be read in context)
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011) (post-enactment legislative history is not a legitimate interpretive tool)
United States v. Carey, 929 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2019) (statutory-construction issues reviewed de novo)