United States v. Darnell Mitchell
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3816
| 6th Cir. | 2014Background
- Darnell Mitchell was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in 2012; a PSR classified him as an Armed Career Criminal based on three prior violent felonies, including two Tennessee robbery convictions (1988 and 2003).
- Mitchell objected, arguing his Tennessee robbery convictions did not categorically qualify as ACCA "violent felonies."
- District court rejected the objection and sentenced Mitchell to 300 months’ imprisonment under the ACCA mandatory minimum.
- Tennessee robbery statutes (former Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-501(a) and current Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401) define robbery as taking from the person "by violence or putting the person in fear."
- The panel applied the categorical approach (and considered the modified categorical approach/Descamps framework) to determine whether those statutes categorically meet the ACCA’s "use of physical force" clause and the residual clause.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding both Tennessee robbery provisions are categorically "violent felonies" under § 924(e)(2)(B).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tennessee robbery qualifies under ACCA §924(e)(2)(B)(i) (use of physical force) | Mitchell: statute can be violated by non-physical "fear," so not categorically use of physical force | Government: Tennessee law defines "fear" as fear of bodily injury from physical force, so element meets use-of-force | Held: Robbery under both Tennessee statutes categorically satisfies the use-of-physical-force clause |
| Whether Tennessee robbery qualifies under the residual clause §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) | Mitchell: residual-clause comparison may show statute isn’t similar to enumerated offenses | Government: robbery necessarily poses serious risk and is similar in kind and degree to enumerated offenses (e.g., burglary) | Held: Tennessee robbery categorically satisfies the residual clause (purposeful, violent, aggressive; similar to burglary) |
| Whether Descamps/modified categorical approach precludes treating Tennessee robbery as an ACCA predicate | Mitchell: statute is indivisible/overbroad so modified categorical approach cannot rescue it | Government: statute is divisible (“by violence or putting in fear” are alternatives) and, in any event, both alternatives qualify under ACCA; even if indivisible, categorical analysis shows convictions qualify | Held: Tennessee robbery is divisible but not necessary to apply modified approach because both alternatives categorically qualify; Descamps does not prevent using convictions as ACCA predicates |
| Effect of Alford plea and whether 1988 conviction was a juvenile act | Mitchell: Alford plea means facts not admitted; 1988 conviction committed at 17 may be an act of juvenile delinquency requiring different treatment | Government: Alford plea does not bar using the conviction as a predicate if the statute is categorically a violent felony; the 1988 conviction was an adult conviction and punishable by >1 year | Held: Alford plea does not prevent enhancement; 1988 robbery was an adult conviction and qualifies as an ACCA predicate |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (categorical approach for ACCA predicates)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (definition of "physical force" and interpretive principles)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (residual-clause similarity requirement)
- Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (clarified Begay and comparative-risk inquiry)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (limits and explains the modified categorical approach)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (documents permissible under modified categorical approach)