United States v. Daniel Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360

Background

Daniel Rutherford was sentenced to nearly 42.5 years for two armed robberies, including convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using a firearm in crimes of violence.
The First Step Act of 2018 amended § 924(c) to reduce certain mandatory minimum sentences, but made those changes nonretroactive.
Rutherford filed a motion for compassionate release, arguing that changes in law since his conviction, if applied, would substantially reduce his sentence.
The District Court denied his motion, relying on Third Circuit precedent (United States v. Andrews) that nonretroactive changes to § 924(c) cannot be considered “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release.
After the District Court’s decision, the Sentencing Commission amended its policy statement to allow nonretroactive changes in law to be considered for compassionate release in certain circumstances under § 1B1.13(b)(6).
On appeal, Rutherford argued that the new policy statement abrogates Andrews and should allow consideration of the First Step Act’s changes.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Can nonretroactive changes to § 924(c) be considered “extraordinary and compelling” for compassionate release eligibility?	Rutherford: Yes, under amended USSC policy statement, court should consider nonretroactive changes.	Government: No, Andrews controls; such changes cannot be considered for eligibility.	No. Third Circuit precedent (Andrews) remains binding and bars consideration of nonretroactive § 924(c) changes.
Does the amended USSC policy statement abrogate the Andrews precedent regarding § 924(c)?	Rutherford: Policy statement supersedes Andrews and must guide court’s decision.	Government: Policy statement conflicts with congressional intent and statutory limits.	No. Policy statement cannot override clear statutory directives or binding prior circuit precedent.
Should the substantive/clarifying amendment test bar application of the new policy to pending appeals?	Rutherford: The test does not apply to sentence modifications like compassionate release.	Government: The test applies; statement shouldn’t be given retroactive effect to pending cases.	The test does not apply to sentence-reduction proceedings; but the policy still can't override Andrews.
Can courts consider § 924(c) sentencing disparity at the § 3553(a) sentencing factors stage even if not at the eligibility threshold?	Rutherford: Yes, consider at eligibility and later stages.	Government: No to eligibility, though may be relevant at later discretionary stage.	Yes, post-eligibility, courts may consider disparities under § 3553(a), but not for threshold eligibility.

Key Cases Cited

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (upholds constitutionality of Sentencing Commission)
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (explains sentencing law reform and parole elimination)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (explains limitations on sentence modifications)
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (statutory construction principles)
Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (explains role of policy statements in sentence reduction)
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (explains statutory intent and sentencing guideline limits)
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (abolishes Chevron deference, reaffirms judicial interpretation supremacy)
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (plain meaning in statutory construction)