United States v. Crisp, 2:13-cr-20050

Background

David L. Crisp pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 41.4 grams of crack; statute mandated an eight‑year term of supervised release after imprisonment.
Originally sentenced to 240 months, then resentenced to 168 months; supervised release term remained the statutory minimum eight years.
While incarcerated and after release, Crisp completed extensive educational and treatment programs, earned his GED, incurred no disciplinary violations in prison, gained steady employment, and—over ~18 months on supervision—fully complied with all conditions (no positive drug tests; routine testing terminated).
Crisp filed a counseled motion for early termination of supervised release after ~17 months on supervision, citing rehabilitation and AO research showing early termination does not increase recidivism.
The Government opposed based on Crisp’s extensive criminal history, the seriousness of the offense, prior supervision failures, the short portion of the eight‑year term served, and concerns about disparities.
The Court granted early termination, finding the statutory and § 3553(a) factors listed in § 3583(e) favor termination and declining to rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) retributive considerations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court may consider and grant early termination after one year of supervision	Early termination is permissible after one year under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); Crisp has shown rehabilitation and low risk	Govt: Oppose because Crisp served only ~18 months (<20% of originally imposed 8 years) and has a serious criminal history and mandatory minimum	Court: Statute permits consideration after one year; courts may not impose extra arbitrary time bars; Crisp’s ~18 months of flawless supervision weighs in favor of termination
Whether § 3553(a)(2)(A) (retribution/seriousness) must or may be applied in early‑termination decisions	Crisp: Focus on rehabilitative factors and empirical evidence that early termination does not increase recidivism	Govt: Argues seriousness of offense and statutory maximum/minimum support continuing supervision	Court: Although Seventh Circuit precedent permits consideration of (a)(2)(A) in some contexts, the Court exercises discretion not to apply (a)(2)(A) here because supervised release is rehabilitative and Congress omitted (a)(2)(A) from § 3583(e)
Whether the § 3553(a) factors required by § 3583(e) support early termination	Crisp: History and characteristics, post‑release conduct, deterrence, public protection, and lack of need for services favor termination; AO study supports safety	Govt: Criminal history and prior supervision failures counsel against early termination	Court: Considering § 3553(a)(1),(2)(B)-(D),(a)(4)-(7) as applicable, the factors (rehabilitation, deterrence, public safety, lack of need for services) weigh heavily for termination
Whether granting early termination creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity because the sentence included a statutory 8‑year supervised release term	Govt: Early termination after 18 months would create disparity with others required to serve the full 8 years	Crisp: Congress expressly permits early termination; disparities inherent to lawful early terminations are not "unwarranted"	Court: A disparity produced by lawful, individualized early termination is not an "unwarranted disparity" under § 3553(a)(6); arbitrary local rules denying early termination would create unwarranted disparities but are not present here

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Lowe, 632 F.3d 996 (7th Cir. 2011) (district courts may not impose arbitrary time bars beyond § 3583(e)(1)’s one‑year threshold)
United States v. Clay, 752 F.3d 1106 (7th Cir. 2014) (circuit permits consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in certain supervised‑release revocation contexts)
United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 1997) (language often cited regarding modification authority, but court distinguished its context from early‑termination motions)
United States v. Vargas‑Davila, 649 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2011) (one of several circuits permitting consideration of retributive factors in revocation decisions)
United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2006) (similar treatment of (a)(2)(A) in revocation analysis)
United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2011) (same)
United States v. Esteras, 88 F.4th 1163 (6th Cir. 2023) (addressing whether courts may rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release; certiorari granted)
Gozlon‑Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395 (1991) (supervised release is a distinct, post‑confinement supervisory tool focused on rehabilitation)
Haymond v. United States, 588 U.S. 634 (2019) (discusses supervised release’s rehabilitative role)
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 53 (2000) (supervised release assists transition to community life)
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988) (statutory text must be given meaning; provisions should not be rendered redundant)