United States v. Cordell Felix
16-16457
11th Cir.Nov 8, 2017Background
- Around 12:30 AM on June 20, 2015, Officer Ursitti responded to a dispatch about an armed robbery describing two young black males in black shirts last seen heading toward Redbone’s Bar and Grill.
- While en route, Ursitti saw Cordell Felix — a black male wearing all black about a half mile from the robbery location within minutes of the incident — and stopped his patrol car and approached Felix.
- Felix provided ID, called someone, acted nervously, squatted and appeared to try to conceal something; officers then restrained him after he refused to lift his shirt and found a firearm in his waistband.
- A grand jury charged Felix with felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) and simple possession of cocaine; the possession count was later dismissed and the § 922(g) count was tried on stipulated facts.
- The district court denied Felix’s suppression motion (finding reasonable suspicion) and adjudicated him guilty; at sentencing the court applied the ACCA armed-career-criminal enhancement based on three prior serious drug offenses and an armed-robbery conviction and imposed 180 months’ imprisonment.
Issues
| Issue | Felix's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Was the Terry stop/seizure supported by reasonable suspicion? | Stop was invalid because matching a broad description is not sufficiently particularized; nervousness after encounter cannot supply suspicion if seizure had already occurred. | Officer had reasonable suspicion based on matching description, proximity in time/place, neighborhood crime patterns, and suspicious conduct. | Affirmed: totality of circumstances (match, close proximity, timing, behavior, high-crime area) gave reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk. |
| 2) Does § 922(g) violate the Commerce Clause? | § 922(g) exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause power. | Precedent holds § 922(g) is constitutional under Commerce Clause. | Rejected: argument foreclosed by binding precedent; § 922(g) upheld. |
| 3) Did the government prove three prior serious drug offenses occurred on separate occasions for ACCA? | 2007 drug convictions were not proven to be on separate occasions. | Shepard-approved charging documents show distinct dates (May 31 and June 1, 2006) supporting separate occasions. | Affirmed: distinct dates in Shepard documents suffice to show separate occasions by preponderance. |
| 4) Do the Florida drug convictions qualify as ACCA "serious drug offenses" and did prior-conviction facts violate Jury/Indictment rules? | Florida § 893.13(1) offenses are not serious drug offenses; enhancing on prior-conviction facts violated Fifth and Sixth Amendments. | Binding Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent treat those Florida offenses as serious drug offenses; prior convictions need not be charged to a jury (Almendarez-Torres). | Rejected: Florida offenses qualify; Almendarez-Torres forecloses the jury/indictment claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes investigatory stop/frisk reasonableness standard)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (presence in high-crime area and unprovoked flight relevant to reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (totality of circumstances supports reasonable suspicion)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits sentencing courts to certain documents when examining prior convictions)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (limits use of modified categorical approach to identify elements of prior offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (addresses when modified categorical approach applies)
- Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (prior convictions exception to jury/verdict requirement)
- United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (11th Cir. 1996) (Eleventh Circuit precedent upholding § 922(g) under Commerce Clause)