United States v. Colon-Maldonado, 953 F.3d 1

Background

Colón completed a federal sentence and began six years of supervised release; six months later Puerto Rico police filed complaints accusing him of aggravated domestic abuse and abuse by threat.
A Puerto Rico magistrate found probable cause on the aggravated-abuse charge; Colón later pled guilty in Commonwealth court to attempted abuse (Article 3.1).
The probation officer reported the Commonwealth charges to the federal court and testified at a preliminary revocation hearing; the federal magistrate found probable cause and detained Colón pending a final revocation hearing.
At the final revocation/sentencing hearing Colón admitted violating the "no new crimes" condition (for Article 3.1) but the district judge treated the conduct as Grade A (aggravated abuse under Article 3.2) — a "crime of violence" — relying primarily on two sworn police complaints.
The district court imposed 30 months imprisonment (and 4 more years of supervised release); the First Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding the court clearly erred in treating the complaints as sufficiently reliable proof that Colón used violent physical force.

Issues

Issue	Colón's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the violation should be graded as a Grade A "crime of violence" (categorical vs. actual-conduct analysis)	The court must apply the categorical approach; Colón only admitted to attempted Article 3.1 (Grade B).	The court may rely on the defendant's actual conduct to find a Grade A violation.	The panel rejected the district court's Grade A finding because there was no reliable proof of violent force; it did not adopt the government's view that the categorical approach is inapplicable.
Whether the Commonwealth complaints could be credited without live witness testimony under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C)	The rule requires a balancing test and often live testimony; hearsay cannot be credited without showing reliability and the court's finding that live testimony was unnecessary.	Rule 32.1's limited confrontation right applies only to the violation phase; at sentencing the court may rely on hearsay in certain circumstances.	The court declined to resolve the rule's scope here but held that, even if admissible, the complaints still had to satisfy reliability by a preponderance and they did not.
Whether the police complaints provided sufficient indicia of reliability to prove Colón used violent physical force by a preponderance	The complaints were double hearsay, sworn only "on information and belief," lacked source, context, corroboration, and background about the declarant — thus unreliable.	The complaints, the magistrate's probable-cause finding, and the probation officer's prior testimony sufficed to establish the underlying conduct.	The panel found clear error: the complaints lacked minimal indicia of trustworthiness and could not prove use of violent force by a preponderance.
Whether a magistrate judge's probable-cause finding can substitute for the preponderance standard at sentencing	No — probable cause is a lower standard and the sentencing court must independently assess reliability and meet the preponderance standard.	The magistrate's probable-cause finding is probative and can be relied on in the subsequent federal proceeding.	Probable cause was insufficient; the sentencing court must independently determine reliability and preponderance, which was not done here.

Key Cases Cited

Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019) (describing nature and purpose of supervised release)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process protections at revocation hearings)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisible vs. indivisible statutes in categorical approach)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining "physical force" as violent force)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limitations on modified categorical approach)
United States v. Rondón-García, 886 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2018) (need for corroboration and reliability before relying on hearsay for sentencing)
United States v. Taveras, 380 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 2004) (vacating revocation based on unsworn, uncorroborated hearsay)
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (due process requires sentences be based on accurate reliable information)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (limitations of out-of-court statements and indicia of reliability)
United States v. Serrano-Mercado, 784 F.3d 838 (1st Cir. 2015) (prior, limited discussion of Article 3.1 divisibility)