United States v. Carter
752 F.3d 8
1st Cir.2014Background
- In 2010 Wayne Carter attempted to retrieve a pawned rifle but was denied after an ATF records check revealed prior convictions, including a 1997 Maine misdemeanor assault conviction for spitting on and shoving his then-girlfriend.
- Carter was indicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9) and 924(a) for possession of a firearm after conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; he entered a conditional guilty plea reserving appellate rights.
- Carter raised three issues: (1) a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9); (2) a statutory challenge that his Maine assault (which may encompass reckless offensive physical contact) does not meet § 921(a)(33)(A)’s requirement of the "use or attempted use of physical force"; and (3) a sentencing-guidelines claim that he qualified for the sporting/collection exception.
- First Circuit precedent (Booker, Nason, Armstrong) had previously treated Maine’s assault statute (including offensive physical contact and recklessness) as qualifying under § 922(g)(9), but the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman cast doubt on whether reckless causation suffices.
- The record lacked "Shepard-approved" documents (indictment/plea colloquy/plea agreement/finding of facts) showing which mens rea variant (intentional/knowing/reckless) formed the basis of Carter’s Maine conviction; available police reports were not admissible for that purpose.
- The First Circuit affirmed rejection of Carter’s Second Amendment claim, vacated his conviction on statutory grounds, and remanded so the government and court could develop the Shepard record to determine which statutory variant supported the prior conviction; sentencing issues were not reached.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Carter) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether § 922(g)(9) violates the Second Amendment | § 922(g)(9) impermissibly and not narrowly tailoredly strips non-violent misdemeanants of core Second Amendment rights | Circuit precedent and statistics show substantial relation between disqualification and prevention of domestic gun violence | Denied — claim foreclosed by First Circuit precedent (Booker/Armstrong); constitutional challenge rejected |
| 2. Whether Carter’s Maine assault conviction qualifies as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" (i.e., requires "use or attempted use of physical force") | Reckless offensive physical contact does not amount to "use of physical force"; ambiguity favors Carter under rule of lenity and constitutional avoidance | Prior First Circuit cases hold Maine assault (including offensive contact) satisfies § 921(a)(33)(A); Castleman supports broader reading but left recklessness question open | Vacated and remanded — record lacks Shepard-approved documents to determine which mens rea variant supported the conviction; remand for development of conviction record in light of Castleman |
| 3. Whether Carter qualified for the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(2) sporting/collection exception | Carter asserted possession solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, warranting lower guideline range | District court found Carter failed to prove either prong (and noted repeated pawning/redeeming and no recent hunting/target use) | Not reached — sentencing argument reserved because conviction vacated and case remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (recognizes individual right to bear arms under Second Amendment)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) ("physical force" includes offensive touching; applied modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (First Circuit held Maine assault variants, including recklessness, could qualify under § 922(g)(9))
- United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001) (held Maine assault actus reus variants involve "use of physical force")
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explains categorical and modified categorical approaches for divisible statutes)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits documents courts may consult to charging/plea/colloquy records when applying modified categorical approach)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (addresses interpretation issues for "physical force" language; noted context matters)