United States v. Carlos Perez-Perez
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 25088
| 4th Cir. | 2013Background
- Defendant Carlos Perez-Perez (Mexican citizen) had a 2001 North Carolina conviction for taking indecent liberties with a minor (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1(a)) based on sex with a 15-year-old when he was 24.
- Perez-Perez was deported, unlawfully reentered, and pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).
- The district court applied a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because the North Carolina conviction was treated as a prior felony ‘‘crime of violence’’—specifically, ‘‘sexual abuse of a minor’’ under the Guideline commentary.
- Perez-Perez objected, arguing the North Carolina statute does not categorically match the Guideline’s generic definition of ‘‘sexual abuse of a minor.’n
- The Fourth Circuit, constrained by precedent (United States v. Diaz-Ibarra), reviewed de novo and affirmed the enhancement, holding the state statute categorically qualifies as sexual abuse of a minor.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a North Carolina conviction for taking indecent liberties with a minor (N.C. § 14-202.1(a)) categorically qualifies as "sexual abuse of a minor" and thus a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) | Government: statute’s elements correspond to the Guideline’s generic definition; qualifies categorically | Perez-Perez: statute is broader (e.g., allows constructive presence, nonphysical acts); Vann and other authorities show it may not be a crime of violence | Affirmed: under Fourth Circuit precedent (Diaz-Ibarra) the statute’s elements correspond in substance to the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor and thus qualify categorically as a crime of violence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Diaz-Ibarra, 522 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2008) (defined "sexual abuse of a minor" broadly as physical or nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of a minor for sexual gratification)
- United States v. Rangel-Castaneda, 709 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2013) (applied categorical analysis and held a Tennessee statutory-rape statute broader than generic definitions)
- United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (addressed North Carolina indecent-liberties convictions under ACCA; plurality/concurrences debated categorical vs. modified approach)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (categorical approach requires realistic probability, not mere possibility, of broader application)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (interpreting "physical force" in defining violent crimes as force capable of causing physical pain or injury)