United States v. Campbell, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13825

Defendant Jerry Campbell (age 64 at offense; later 69) committed bank robbery by intimidation in May 2012 while on release from a halfway house; he used a plastic squirt gun and verbal threats to obtain $1,495 from bank tellers.
Campbell was arrested immediately, indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), found initially incompetent and hospitalized, then restored and pleaded guilty in 2015.
At plea, Campbell agreed the offense made him a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s elements clause.
Defense argued bank robbery by intimidation is a general-intent offense and therefore cannot satisfy the elements clause (which the defense read as requiring specific intent to use/threaten force).
The district court applied the career-offender enhancement, producing a Guidelines range of 151–188 months (vs. 57–71 without enhancement), but imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 100 months.
On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that bank robbery by intimidation is a "crime of violence" under the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether bank robbery by intimidation under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a "crime of violence" under the elements clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)	Campbell: § 2113(a) is a general-intent crime and therefore lacks the specific intent required by the elements clause	Government: Intimidation involves intentional threats of force and satisfies the elements clause; prior Seventh Circuit precedent so holds	Court: Affirmed — bank robbery by intimidation qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause
Whether Rutherford and similar cases require specific intent (excluding general-intent offenses) from the elements clause	Campbell: Rutherford means only specific-intent crimes qualify; general-intent crimes like § 2113(a) fail	Government: Rutherford bars reckless/negligent crimes, not general-intent crimes; precedents treat elements clauses interchangeably	Court: Rutherford does not bar general-intent crimes; only excludes reckless/negligent mens rea; bank robbery remains covered

United States v. Williams, 864 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2017) (held bank robbery by intimidation satisfies elements clause of § 924(c))
United States v. Armour, 840 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2016) (intimidation in § 2113(a) means threat of force and can satisfy crime-of-violence elements clause)
United States v. Edwards, 836 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2016) (categorical-approach standard for crimes-of-violence analysis)
United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing purpose of enhancements to focus on purposeful, violent, aggressive crimes)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (describing categorical approach and reliance on statutory elements)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (presumption that conviction rests on least culpable conduct satisfying statute)
United States v. Durham, 645 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011) (recognizing § 2113(a) as a general-intent offense)
United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (use-of-force requirement requires more than negligent or accidental conduct; did not hold general-intent crimes categorically excluded)
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (discussing mens rea limits for crimes of violence in related contexts)
United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995) (distinguishes negligent/reckless crimes as outside the elements clause)