997 F.3d 519
4th Cir.2021Background:
- Bryan Javon Williams pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
- The PSR listed two prior state drug convictions: Feb. 2003 (possession with intent to distribute crack under S.C. § 44-53-375(B)) and Aug. 2003 (distribution convictions).
- The district court applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), raising the base offense level to 24 based on two prior controlled-substance felonies.
- Williams objected that his Feb. 2003 conviction is not categorically a "controlled substance offense" because the South Carolina statute is divisible and the sentencing sheet contains a checked "lesser included offense" box.
- The indictment charged trafficking under § 44-53-375(C)(1)(A), but the sentencing sheet lists a plea to § 44-53-375(B); the government relied on the sentencing sheet as the operative Shepard document.
- The district court overruled Williams’s objection, imposed a 70‑month sentence (after minor variances), and Williams appealed.
Issues:
| Issue | Williams' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Williams’s Feb. 2003 conviction under S.C. § 44-53-375(B) is categorically a "controlled substance offense" for U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) | The statute is divisible and can encompass offenses that do not match the Guidelines definition; thus his conviction may not categorically qualify | The Shepard document (sentencing sheet) shows he pleaded to possession with intent to distribute, which fits the Guidelines definition | Conviction is categorically a controlled substance offense; district court affirmed |
| Whether the sentencing sheet’s checked "lesser included offense" box renders the Shepard record ambiguous | The checked box creates ambiguity as he pleaded to an offense not charged in the indictment | The sentencing sheet expressly lists § 44-53-375(B) and a clerical checkmark is not enough to overcome the plain statement of the plea | The sentencing sheet is reliable; the clerical checkmark does not defeat the government’s showing |
| Whether the statute’s "prima facie evidence" (one gram or more) permissive inference eliminates the intent-to-distribute element so the offense does not match the Guidelines | The permissive inference lets a jury infer intent from mere possession, making the conviction effectively one of possession (outside Guideline definition) | South Carolina’s language creates only a permissive inference, not a conclusive presumption; intent must still be proved beyond a reasonable doubt | The permissive inference does not remove the intent element; conviction matches the Guidelines definition |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Furlow, 928 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2019) (applies divisible-statute/modified categorical approach to S.C. § 44-53-375(B))
- United States v. Dozier, 848 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2017) (explains categorical approach principles)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishes divisible statutes and endorses modified categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limited Shepard-document inquiry under modified categorical approach)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (identifies permissible documents for establishing prior offense of conviction)
- United States v. McLeod, 808 F.3d 972 (4th Cir. 2015) (indictment irrelevant when plea is to an offense not charged)
- United States v. Andrews, 808 F.3d 964 (4th Cir. 2015) (government bears preponderance burden at sentencing to prove prior conviction)
- Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (distinguishes permissive inference from mandatory presumption)
- United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2001) (contrasts permissive inference with statutory presumption that can remove intent element)
- United States v. Mohamed, 920 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2019) (permissive inference does not eliminate the element; state must still prove intent)