United States v. Brown
249 F. Supp. 3d 287
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Kedrick Brown pleaded guilty in 2010 to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and was sentenced under the ACCA to a mandatory 15-year term based on three prior predicate convictions (two DC serious drug offenses and a North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill (AWDWIK), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32(c)).
- Brown appealed; the D.C. Circuit dismissed his appeal in 2011. In 2016 Brown moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, invoking Johnson v. United States (2015) and Welch (2016) to challenge ACCA’s residual clause and his ACCA status.
- The government argued Brown’s § 2255 was untimely or procedurally defaulted and, on the merits, that North Carolina AWDWIK qualifies as an ACCA violent felony under the elements clause.
- The court addressed timeliness and procedural-default defenses, concluding Brown’s claim is timely under § 2255(f)(3) (Johnson (2015) created a new, retroactive rule) and that cause and prejudice excuse any procedural default.
- On the merits the court applied the categorical/modified categorical approaches and concluded North Carolina AWDWIK neither necessarily involves the Johnson (2010) definition of "violent force" nor requires a mens rea of intent (it can be satisfied by culpable/criminal negligence). Thus AWDWIK is not an ACCA "violent felony."
- The court granted Brown’s § 2255 motion, finding his 15-year ACCA sentence exceeds the applicable 10-year statutory maximum and ordered resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Brown's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) | Claim is predicated on Johnson (2015); therefore within one-year window under § 2255(f)(3) | Brown’s claim is effectively based on earlier Johnson (2010) and thus untimely | Court: Timely — Johnson (2015) triggered § 2255(f)(3); Brown need only show sentencing may have relied on the residual clause |
| Procedural default | Excused: Johnson (2015) was not reasonably available at sentencing/direct appeal (cause); potential sentence reduction shows prejudice | Brown failed to raise ACCA residual-clause challenge on direct appeal; no cause or prejudice | Court: Default excused — novelty of Johnson (2015) supplies cause and possibility of reduced sentence supplies prejudice |
| Whether NC AWDWIK is an ACCA "violent felony" under the elements clause | AWDWIK does not categorically require Johnson (2010) "violent force" (e.g., convictions based on secret poisoning) and can be satisfied by culpable/criminal negligence, not intent | Relies on D.C. Circuit precedent finding weapon-based offenses supply violent force (e.g., Redrick); AWDWIK’s "deadly weapon" element implies violent force and intent | Court: AWDWIK is not a violent felony — it can be committed without the Johnson (2010) form of violent force and may be satisfied by culpable negligence, so it fails ACCA’s elements clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson (2015) rule is retroactive on collateral review)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical and modified categorical approaches for predicate offenses)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (statutory phrase "use of physical force" suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent conduct)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (interpreting "force" in a different statutory context as encompassing common-law offensive touching)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (reckless misdemeanor assaults qualify under the misdemeanor domestic-violence firearm prohibition)
- United States v. Redrick, 841 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (held Maryland armed robbery involves the use/threat of violent force for ACCA purposes)