United States v. Brian Boykin
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4514
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Boykin pleaded guilty to one count possession with intent to distribute and two counts distribution of a controlled substance (heroin/crack) in federal court.
- He admitted dealing about 10–20 grams of heroin per week for five months (probation office attributed at least 160 grams).
- PSR: base offense level 24, three-level acceptance reduction, criminal history category V, resulting Guidelines range 70–87 months (uncontested by Boykin).
- At sentencing the government sought an upward variance to 120 months based on Boykin’s extensive prior convictions and repeated failures of earlier state sentences/parole.
- The district court varied upward and imposed 98 months, crediting 2 months’ time served; Boykin challenged the substantive reasonableness of the sentence on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Boykin) | Defendant's Argument (Government/District Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 98‑month sentence is substantively unreasonable | Sentence is excessive; should be at low end of Guidelines (drug quantity 160 g fits 100–400 g bracket) and should receive 14 months credit for related custody | Sentence justified by Boykin’s repetitive distribution, criminal history, and need for deterrence/protection of public | Affirmed — no abuse of discretion; sentence substantively reasonable |
| Whether the court improperly gave undue weight to Boykin’s criminal history over drug quantity | Court should have emphasized drug quantity and treated Boykin as a lower‑level offender | Court permissibly weighed repeated distribution and criminal history more heavily than quantity alone | Affirmed — court did not abuse discretion in weighing factors |
| Whether the court relied on an improper/irrelevant factor (comment about the “rush” of selling) | The court’s “rush” remark shows it relied on improper speculation about motive | Remark was a brief admonition, not a basis for sentencing; court relied on concrete facts and history | Affirmed — no significant weight given to improper factor |
| Whether sentencing improperly rested solely on specific deterrence | Court impermissibly focused on punishing/deterring Boykin specifically rather than balancing §3553(a) factors | Consideration of deterrence, public protection, offense nature, and history is proper; district court has wide latitude | Affirmed — court properly considered deterrence among §3553(a) factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Goodale v. United States, 738 F.3d 917 (8th Cir.) (standard of review: abuse of discretion)
- Feemster v. United States, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir.) (procedural then substantive sentence review framework)
- Vanhorn v. United States, 740 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir.) (substantive reasonableness review)
- Boneshirt v. United States, 662 F.3d 509 (8th Cir.) (upward variance affirmed where history showed repetitive threat)
- Edwards v. United States, 820 F.3d 362 (8th Cir.) (discussion of §3553(a) factors suffices to show improper factors not weighted)
- David v. United States, 682 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir.) (district court wide latitude in weighing §3553(a) factors)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (district courts to consider §3553(a) factors in individualized sentencing)