United States v. Bennett, 868 F.3d 1

George Bennett was convicted in federal court, including of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); at sentencing the court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on at least three prior Maine convictions, resulting in a 25‑year sentence on the § 922(g) count and a total 30‑year term.
The PSR identified three prior Maine aggravated‑assault convictions (1978, 1979, 1986); Maine law allowed aggravated assault to be committed with a mens rea of intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct (recklessness = conscious disregard of a risk).
After Johnson v. United States invalidated ACCA’s residual clause, Bennett challenged his ACCA enhancement, arguing his Maine aggravated‑assault convictions could have been based on mere recklessness and therefore do not have as an element the “use … of physical force against the person of another” required by ACCA’s force clause.
The district court granted Bennett habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, concluding the aggravated‑assault convictions did not categorically qualify as ACCA predicates because they could be based on recklessness.
The government appealed; the First Circuit considered precedent (Leocal, Fish, Voisine, Begay, etc.), statutory text and purpose, and whether lenity applies.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Maine aggravated assault (which can be committed recklessly) categorically qualifies under ACCA’s force clause as a “violent felony” (i.e., has as an element the "use ... of physical force against the person of another").	Bennett: Because Maine permits conviction on mere recklessness, the offense lacks the mens rea required to amount to the use of force "against" another and therefore cannot be an ACCA predicate.	Government: Voisine shows that "use of physical force" can include reckless conduct; ACCA’s force clause should therefore encompass reckless aggravated assault.	Held: The court found a grievous ambiguity whether ACCA’s "use ... of physical force against the person of another" covers reckless offenses like Maine aggravated assault; applying the rule of lenity, the convictions do not qualify as ACCA predicates.
Whether Voisine compels treating recklessness as sufficient to satisfy ACCA’s force clause (overriding prior circuit precedent like Fish).	Bennett: Voisine does not resolve the effect of the modifying "against" language in ACCA; different statutory contexts and purposes matter.	Government: Voisine’s textual holding that "use" encompasses reckless volitional acts applies equally to ACCA.	Held: Voisine does not unambiguously control here because of contextual and purposive differences; ambiguity remains and lenity applies against expansion.

Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (ordinary meaning of "use ... of physical force against" excludes accidental or negligent conduct)
Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (reckless assault can satisfy statutory "use ... of physical force" in § 921(a)(33)(A) context)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (categorical approach: compare offense elements, not underlying conduct)
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (ACCA targets purposeful, violent, and aggressive crimes characteristic of armed career criminals)
United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (reckless offenses do not qualify as crimes of violence under § 16(b) as interpreted in Leocal)
United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing application of rule of lenity in statutory ambiguity)