United States v. Benjamin Foreman, 958 F.3d 506

In 2006 Foreman pled guilty to two drug-possession-with-intent counts (crack and powder cocaine) and one § 924(c) firearms count; PSR attributed ~135g crack and 250g powder to him.
Under the 2006 Guidelines Foreman was treated as a career offender, producing a Guidelines range that, with a mandatory consecutive 60-month § 924(c) term, yielded a combined sentence of 322–387 months; the district court varied downward and imposed 300 months plus five years supervised release.
The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) raised the crack thresholds, which would have reduced Foreman’s statutory exposure; those changes were later made retroactive by the First Step Act § 404 (2018), allowing a district court to "impose a reduced sentence as if" the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect.
Foreman moved under § 404 for a reduced sentence; the parties agreed he was eligible but disputed procedure: Foreman sought a plenary resentencing (in‑person hearing, de novo career‑offender reconsideration), the government opposed.
The district court granted a reduction to 232 months, declined to hold a plenary resentencing or revisit career‑offender status, and left the five‑year supervised‑release term unchanged; Foreman appealed arguing (1) plenary resentencing was required and (2) the reduced sentence was unreasonable and the supervised‑release minimum should be reduced.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the First Step Act §404 requires a plenary resentencing (in‑person hearing, de novo law application, reconsider career‑offender status)	Foreman: §404’s use of "impose" requires a plenary resentencing with in‑person proceedings and full reconsideration of Guidelines issues.	Govt: §404 does not require plenary resentencing; district courts have discretion to proceed via limited §404 proceedings.	Court: No plenary resentencing is required; Alexander controlling. §404 permits but does not compel a plenary proceeding.
Whether the reduced sentence (and retention of five‑year supervised release) was unreasonable	Foreman: Retention of career‑offender status produced a de facto upward variance from his true Guidelines range; district court also erred by not reducing supervised‑release minimum from 5 to 4 years.	Govt: District court properly calculated ranges "as if" Fair Sentencing Act applied, exercised discretion under §3553(a), and could decline to reduce supervised release because the statutory range still permitted five years.	Court: Appellate reasonableness review applies to §404 grants; nonetheless the district court’s reduction to 232 months and decision to leave supervised release unchanged were reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act does not entitle defendants to plenary resentencing)
United States v. Bowers, 615 F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2010) (held certain sentence‑reduction proceedings are not subject to reasonableness review)
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (§ 3582(c)(2) does not permit plenary resentencing)
United States v. Marshall, 954 F.3d 823 (6th Cir. 2020) (§ 3742(a) is a statutory limit on appellate power, not a jurisdictional bar)
United States v. Nichols, 897 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2018) (corrected sentences are subject to reasonableness review, with adjusted contours)
United States v. Rodriguez, 855 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 2017) (declining to follow Bowers; reasonableness review applied to §3582(c)(2) reductions)
Chavez‑Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018) (assumed without deciding that §3582(c)(2) reductions may be reviewed for procedural reasonableness)
United States v. Grant, 636 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2011) (Rule 35(b) limits what a district court may consider in sentence reductions)