United States v. Bayron Bennett, 1:24-cr-20110

Defendant Clementa Johnson was charged in a superseding indictment with five counts arising from a murder-for-hire scheme targeting "Victim 1," including conspiracy, murder-for-hire, stalking, and firearms offenses.
Johnson moved to dismiss Count 16, which charges brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)), arguing that the predicate offenses (murder-for-hire, conspiracy, stalking) are not crimes of violence.
The charged predicate offenses for Count 16 are violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (stalking) and 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2) (travel in aid of racketeering), not murder-for-hire or conspiracy.
The court utilized a modified categorical approach to determine if the specific stalking provision charged is a crime of violence.
The court found that the statutory text, amendments, and authorities support finding stalking under § 2261A(2)(A) as a divisible statute that qualifies as a crime of violence.
Johnson also argued that § 924(c) requires a substantive conviction of the predicate offense, which the court rejected under controlling precedent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether murder-for-hire, conspiracy, or stalking are crimes of violence for § 924(c) purposes	Count 16 predicates are stalking and § 1952(a)(2), and stalking under § 2261A(2)(A) qualifies as a crime of violence	None of these are crimes of violence	Stalking under § 2261A(2)(A) is a crime of violence
Whether § 2261A (stalking) is a divisible statute and properly analyzed with the modified categorical approach	The statute is divisible (fear of death vs. emotional distress prongs) and only the first prong is charged	Statute is indivisible; requires categorical approach	Statute is divisible; modified categorical approach applies
Whether a § 924(c) conviction requires a substantive charge or conviction on the predicate offense	Predicate need not be a separate substantive count or conviction	Must be substantively charged with predicate offense	No substantive charge or conviction on predicate is required
Effect of prior case law interpreting older versions of the stalking statute	Recent statutory amendments make older case law inapplicable	Prior versions and cases show stalking is not a crime of violence	Older cases not controlling; current statute supports crime of violence holding

Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (establishes co-conspirator liability for foreseeable acts)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (sets out the categorical and modified categorical approaches)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (interprets "physical force" under the elements clause)
Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) (explains divisibility and element analysis for statutes)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing statutory maximum is an element)
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) ("nominal" force sufficient for crime of violence)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (residual clause of § 924(c)(3) unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022) (reaffirms use of categorical approach for § 924(c)(3))
United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton)
United States v. Frye, 402 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2005) (§ 924(c) does not require conviction or charge of predicate)