United States v. Batiz-Torres, 562 F.Supp.3d 28

Defendant Rafael Batiz-Torres pled guilty to four federal importation counts (cocaine, fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine) and probation prepared a PSR.
Probation classified him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. §4B1.1 based on two prior federal marijuana convictions (2010 conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute; 2013 possession with intent to distribute).
Defendant objected, arguing the 2018 Agriculture Improvement Act (Farm Bill) narrowed the CSA by excluding "hemp" from the federal definition of marijuana, so those prior convictions are no longer "controlled substance offenses" under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(b).
The government opposed but did not address the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Bautista.
The court applied the categorical approach and Ninth Circuit precedent and concluded that §4B1.2(b) must be read to reference the CSA as it exists at sentencing; because the CSA now excludes hemp, the prior federal marijuana convictions are overbroad and do not qualify as predicates.
The court sustained Defendant’s objection and removed the career-offender classification.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Defendant's 2010 and 2013 federal marijuana convictions qualify as "controlled substance offenses" for career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(b)	Gov't: Marijuana long has been a Schedule I controlled substance; prior convictions for marijuana trafficking qualify as predicates.	Batiz-Torres: 2018 amendment excluded hemp from the federal marijuana definition; under the categorical approach priors are overbroad and cannot count.	Court: Sustained Defendant. Because hemp is no longer a controlled substance, the prior convictions are overbroad and do not count.
Whether §4B1.2(b) references the CSA and whether the comparison uses the CSA as of conviction or as of sentencing	Gov't: Compare to earlier federal law or rely on plain statutory meaning (Rivera‑Constantino); the statute's historical scope supports predicate status.	Batiz-Torres: Ninth Circuit (Bautista) requires §4B1.2(b) to track the CSA and to apply the CSA as it exists at sentencing.	Court: Followed Bautista—§4B1.2(b) is informed by the CSA and courts must apply the CSA in effect at the time of federal sentencing.

United States v. Bautista, 989 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 2020) (§4B1.2(b) refers to CSA and court should apply current federal law at sentencing)
United States v. Leal‑Vega, 680 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (interpreting "controlled substance" in guideline provision to mean substances listed in the CSA)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (sets categorical‑approach standard)
Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (realistic‑probability test for categorical‑approach overbreadth)
United States v. Rivera‑Constantino, 798 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2015) (interpreting plain meaning of federal drug conspiracy in guideline context)
United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (textual breadth of statute can establish realistic probability of non‑generic applications)
United States v. Abdulaziz, 998 F.3d 519 (1st Cir. 2021) (concluding CSA definition should be applied as of sentencing for §4B1.2(b))