United States v. Anthony Robinson
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22458
3rd Cir.2016Background
- Anthony Robinson robbed two Philadelphia stores on Dec. 1, 2012, brandishing a handgun in each robbery; both acts were captured on surveillance video.
- A grand jury indicted Robinson on two Hobbs Act robbery counts (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) and two § 924(c) counts for using/carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence; at trial he was convicted of both robberies and of brandishing a firearm during the Subway robbery.
- At sentencing Robinson was classified as a career offender based on two prior violent convictions; he did not object to that classification at sentencing.
- On appeal Robinson challenged his § 924(c) conviction (arguing Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence”), the denial of his motion to suppress a photo-array ID, the district court’s handling of his Faretta (self-representation) requests, and his career-offender status.
- The Third Circuit affirmed the § 924(c) and Hobbs Act robbery convictions, rejected the suppression and Faretta claims, but remanded for the district court to determine whether Robinson properly qualified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3) | Robinson: Hobbs Act robbery should be analyzed categorically and its minimum conduct may not always involve "physical force," so it may not qualify. | Govt/majority: Where robbery and § 924(c) were tried together and jury convicted both, the record shows robbery was committed by threatened/actual force (brandishing a gun), so it qualifies under the elements clause. | Affirmed § 924(c): Hobbs Act robbery committed while brandishing a firearm is a crime of violence under the elements clause. |
| Validity of photo-array identification | Robinson: Array was unduly suggestive (lighting, collar, complexion differences). | Govt: Differences were slight; array not unnecessarily suggestive. | Affirmed denial of suppression; district court did not clearly err; additional array arguments waived on appeal. |
| Faretta/self-representation inquiry | Robinson: District court failed to conduct required Faretta inquiry after he requested to proceed pro se. | Govt: Robinson never made a clear, unequivocal request the second time; earlier hearing satisfied Faretta, and he withdrew request. | No Faretta violation: first request was addressed; second was not clear and unequivocal, so no further inquiry required. |
| Career-offender classification under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 | Robinson: (on appeal) prior convictions may not qualify as crimes of violence under the Guidelines. | Govt: Concedes remand appropriate to resolve whether prior convictions qualify. | Remanded: district court to determine whether prior convictions qualify as crimes of violence for career-offender status. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishing the categorical approach for predicate-offense analysis)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (facts increasing penalty must comport with Sixth Amendment jury-trial principles)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (residual-clause vagueness principle relied on in related challenges)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (right to self-representation and requirement of knowing/intelligent waiver)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (distinguishing elements from means; guidance on divisible statutes and the modified categorical approach)