United States v. Andres Sanchez-Espinal
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15163
| 5th Cir. | 2014Background
- Sanchez-Espinal was charged in the Southern District of Texas with being unlawfully present after deportation after a felony conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1).
- He pled guilty on March 14, 2013, without a plea agreement.
- The PSR set base offense level at 8 under § 2L1.2(a), added 8 levels for a prior aggravated felony conviction under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) due to a 2009 NY § 215.52 aggravated criminal contempt conviction, and subtracted 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility, yielding offense level 13.
- Criminal history score was 7 (Category IV), producing a Guidelines range of 24–30 months.
- The district court treated the NY § 215.52(1) conviction as an aggravated felony and a crime of violence, imposing 24 months plus 2 years of supervised release, which Sanchez-Espinal challenged on appeal.
- The appellate court affirmed, holding the conviction supported an eight-level enhancement under the Guidelines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the record shows Sanchez-Espinal was convicted under § 215.52(1). | Sanchez-Espinal argued the records did not establish § 215.52(1). | The district court and records indicate § 215.52(1) violation. | No reversible error; record supports § 215.52(1) conviction. |
| Whether a § 215.52(1) conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony for § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). | Sanchez-Espinal contends § 215.52(1) is not an aggravated felony nor a crime of violence. | The court should treat § 215.52(1) as an aggravated felony under § 16(b). | Affirmative; § 215.52(1) is a crime of violence and an aggravated felony for the enhancement. |
| Whether § 215.52(1) is a crime of violence under § 16(b). | Argues § 215.52(1) does not always entail a substantial risk of force. | § 215.52(1) inherently involves risk of physical force due to violating an order of protection and causing injury. | Yes; § 215.52(1) satisfies § 16(b) as a crime of violence. |
| Whether the conviction was preserved for appeal and reviewed for plain error. | Objected to PSR classification; arguments were not clearly preserved for § 215.52(1) interpretation. | Objections were not sufficiently specific at the time; plain error review applies. | Plain error review applied; no reversible error found. |
Key Cases Cited
- Larin-Ulloa v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2006) (concerning use of charging documents to identify conviction under a specific subsection)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (modified categorical approach for multiple-subsection statutes)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (guidance on reliance on documents to determine conviction subsections)
- Bonilla-Mungia v. United States, 422 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005) (identifying conviction under a particular subsection via charging document)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (defining crime of violence under § 16(b))
- Rodriguez v. Holder, 705 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2013) (example of applying Leocal to interpret § 16(b))
- Espinoza v. United States, 733 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2013) (Texas assault reckless conduct as violent felony under ACCA/§16(b))
- Sanchez-Ledezma v. United States, 630 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2011) (de novo review for § 2L1.2 enhancements)