United States v. Alejandro Verduzco-Rangel, 884 F.3d 918

Defendant Alejandro Verduzco-Rangel was removed from the U.S. in 2004 under INA § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on a California felony conviction for possession for sale under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11378 (methamphetamine).
He was later prosecuted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for attempting to reenter the U.S. after that removal.
Verduzco collaterally attacked the 2004 removal, conceding exhaustion and lack of judicial review; the sole dispute was whether the removal was "fundamentally unfair" because the § 11378 conviction was not an "aggravated felony."
The Ninth Circuit applies the categorical/divisible-offense framework (Shepard/Moncrieffe/Mellouli): if a statute is divisible courts may consult a limited set of conviction records to identify the actual offense.
The government relied on the removal ground that the state conviction was a "drug trafficking aggravated felony" under INA § 1101(a)(43)(B); the state statute is divisible as to the substance, and the plea/indictment showed methamphetamine.
The key legal question: whether a § 11378 conviction qualifies as a drug trafficking aggravated felony under the INA’s two-route definition when the record shows the trafficked substance is federally controlled.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a § 11378 conviction can be an "aggravated felony" under INA § 1101(a)(43)(B) when the conviction record shows a federally controlled substance	The government: § 11378 is divisible; where records show trafficking in a federally controlled drug (methamphetamine) it is a drug trafficking aggravated felony under the INA’s first route ("illicit trafficking")	Verduzco: § 11378 is broader than federal law because it allows conviction despite mistakes about the substance; thus it is not categorically an aggravated felony and the removal was unfair	The court affirmed: § 11378 is a drug trafficking aggravated felony under the first Rendon route when the record establishes the substance is federally controlled; removal not fundamentally unfair
Whether the "illicit trafficking" route requires incorporation of federal mens rea about the defendant's belief regarding the substance	Gov: mens rea requirement is satisfied by § 11378 (intent to possess for sale and actual possession of a controlled substance)	Verduzco: "illicit trafficking" should import federal scienter (e.g., McFadden) so § 11378’s broader mental-state rules preclude classification as an aggravated felony	Court: no implicit federal scienter requirement is needed for route one; § 11378 contains a trafficking element and adequate culpability, so it suffices when the substance is federally controlled

Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2008) (establishing two-route test for drug trafficking aggravated felony)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (divisible-offense approach and permissible Shepard documents)
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015) (categorical approach reaffirmed)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (permissible conviction-record documents for divisible statutes)
Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (discussing relationship between state crimes and federal "illicit trafficking")
McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298 (2015) (federal scienter requirement for certain drug-distribution offenses)
United States v. Valdivia-Flores, 876 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing statutes that criminalize less culpable mental states)
United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2014) (standard for collateral attack under 8 U.S.C. § 1326)