United States v. Airrington Sykes
914 F.3d 615
8th Cir.2019Background
- Police were dispatched to a 24-hour laundromat after a woman reported finding a loaded handgun magazine in her laundry basket and identified two men in the laundromat who had stood near the basket.
- An officer entered, approached the two men; Sykes began to walk away, went into a restroom, and was taken out after the officer asked for "one second."
- The officer frisked Sykes and discovered a handgun in his pants pocket; Sykes was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- Sykes moved to suppress the gun, arguing the stop and frisk lacked reasonable suspicion and that the officer had no particularized reason to suspect Sykes (as opposed to his companion) possessed the firearm.
- The district court denied suppression; Sykes pleaded guilty reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling and also contested the sentencing enhancement classifying a prior Illinois aggravated vehicular hijacking conviction as a crime of violence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Sykes | Officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe Sykes was committing a crime | Iowa statute making concealed carrying without a permit an aggravated misdemeanor gave officers reasonable suspicion | Officer had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Sykes based on the tip and circumstances (affirmed) |
| Whether suspicion was particularized to Sykes rather than his companion | No particularized basis to single out Sykes; suspicion could have pointed to either man | Officer could reasonably suspect one or both persons had a concealed firearm given location of magazine | Stopping Sykes was reasonable even though suspicion could extend to both individuals; particularity satisfied in context |
| Whether officer had reasonable suspicion to frisk (Terry frisk) | Frisk was unjustified; carrying a concealed weapon (possible legal) does not alone make one dangerous | Under precedent an officer may frisk if he reasonably believes the person is armed, regardless of legality of possession | Frisk was permissible because officer reasonably believed Sykes was armed and thus potentially dangerous (affirmed) |
| Whether prior Illinois aggravated vehicular hijacking is a "crime of violence" for Guidelines | The Illinois offense does not require violent force as defined in Johnson and thus is not a crime of violence | The statute requires actual or threatened use of force; Illinois robbery/vehicular hijacking aligns with common-law robbery as violent | Following Stokeling and related precedent, the Illinois offense qualifies as a crime of violence for sentencing enhancement (affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Pope, 910 F.3d 413 (8th Cir.) (officer may briefly detain someone reasonably believed to possess a concealed weapon)
- United States v. Polite, 910 F.3d 384 (8th Cir.) (discussion of officers' observations and concealed-carry in reasonable-suspicion analysis)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (flight can be considered in reasonable-suspicion calculus but limited in consensual encounters)
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (Fourth Amendment requires particularized, objective basis to suspect person stopped)
- United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304 (3d Cir.) (simultaneous stops of multiple suspects can be justified when perpetrator is likely a member of the group)
- Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (common-law robbery involves force sufficient to overcome resistance and is a violent felony)
- City of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017) (reasonableness is the touchstone of Fourth Amendment inquiries)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (definition of "physical force" in violent-felony context)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer may frisk a stopped suspect when reasonably believing the person is armed and dangerous)