United States v. Adrian Stock
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17737
3rd Cir.2013Background
- Stock was charged by one-count indictment with transmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another, based on a Craig's List posting about J.K.P.
- Indictment quoted explicit violent language and expressed intent to injure, including drowning and death wishes toward J.K.P.
- District Court denied Stock's Rule 12(b)(3)(B) motion to dismiss, ruling a threat may be present or future-oriented and a reasonable jury could find a threat.
- Stock pleaded guilty under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) while preserving appellate rights to challenge the denial, and was sentenced to 1 year and 1 day with two years’ supervised release.
- On appeal, the Third Circuit reviews Rule 12(b)(3)(B) challenges de novo for legal questions and with clear error for factual findings; the central question is whether §875(c)’s “threat” includes a temporal component.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §875(c) includes a temporal element in 'threat' | Stock asserts 'threat' requires present or future intent | Government argues no temporal limitation; broad interpretation permitted | Yes, threat encompasses present or future intent |
| Whether the indictment sufficiently states an offense under §875(c) given statutory interpretation | Indictment falls outside the statute’s scope as a matter of law | Indictment provides sufficient context and elements; not constitutionally invalid | Indictment can be sustained under statutory interpretation; district court did not err in context-based analysis |
| Whether the Craigslist posting, viewed in context, could be a 'threat' | The first sentence describes past conduct; others do not establish present/future threat | Context and totality show ongoing intent to injure; jury could find a threat | Yes; a reasonable jury could find the posting expressed an intent to injure in the present or future |
| Whether a court may dismiss an indictment as a matter of law if no reasonable jury could find a threat | Court should dismiss if facts fail to state an offense | Jury question should decide when context-supports a threat; not mandatory to dismiss | Court may dismiss as a matter of law where no reasonable jury could find a threat; not required here |
| Whether the District Court properly considered procedural constraints in evaluating a Rule 12 motion | Court relied on improper assumptions about the content of the statement | Overall analysis applied objective standard; content viewed in context remains key | District court properly exercised authority; judgment affirmed in light of context and objective standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (establishes true threats must be interpreted with First Amendment in mind)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true threats are not protected; need not show specific intent)
- Kosma, 951 F.2d 549 (1991) (applies objective test to determine true threats under § 875(c))
- Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130 (2004) (defines 'threat' and distinguishes true threats for § 875(c))
- Landham, 251 F.3d 1072 (2001) (indictment potentially fails if statement refers to past conduct only)
- Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (1997) (indictment dismissed where statements did not constitute threats under § 875(c))
- Huet, 665 F.3d 588 (2012) (controls Rule 12(b)(3)(B) review and need for facial sufficiency plus statutory interpretation)
- Panarella, 277 F.3d 678 (2002) (illustrates challenge to indictment beyond the statutory elements)
- Havelock, 664 F.3d 1284 (2012) (addressed timing and scope of threat communications under § 876(c))