181 Conn. App. 743
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- In 2007 Turner was convicted of murder after a jury trial; conviction affirmed on direct appeal and he was sentenced to 60 years. Turner later filed a habeas petition alleging Brady/Napue violations and ineffective assistance of counsel.
- Key prosecution witness Alice Philips traveled from Michigan on state-purchased plane fare to testify about a pre-shooting dispute; she initially told police McGill (not Turner) said “somebody was going to die within forty-eight hours.”
- Before trial, prosecutor Gravelec‑Pannone told Philips he would notify the prosecutor handling her pending Connecticut charges if she testified truthfully; the State also paid her travel.
- At trial Philips changed her account to identify Turner as the speaker and, when asked, testified she was not expecting any consideration beyond plane fare; the prosecutor did not correct this statement.
- After testifying, Philips pleaded guilty to her outstanding charges and received a fully suspended sentence with conditional discharge; prosecutors acknowledged post‑testimony communications about her cooperation.
- The habeas court found no Brady violation (reasoning there was no formal plea agreement and Philips did not testify falsely) and denied certification to appeal; the Appellate Court reversed and ordered a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Turner) | Defendant's Argument (Commissioner) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Did the prosecutor’s failure to correct Philips’ false testimony violate due process (Napue/Giglio/Brady)? | The prosecutor allowed Philips to falsely deny she expected consideration; that impeachment evidence was material and could have affected the verdict. | Even if false, there was no reasonable likelihood the misstatement affected the jury given other evidence (video). | Reversed: failure to correct was material; false testimony could reasonably have affected the verdict because Philips was a crucial witness and the state’s case was not overwhelming. |
| 2. Did the prosecution violate Brady by not disclosing Philips’ informal agreement/consideration? | The prosecutor’s promise to notify the other prosecutor and the State’s payment of travel constituted consideration/implied agreement and was impeachment evidence that must be disclosed even if informal. | Philips’ pending charges were disclosed; no formal plea deal existed, so nothing material was withheld. | Reversed: habeas court applied incorrect standard by requiring a formal plea; informal understandings can constitute Brady impeachment evidence and nondisclosure warrants a new trial. |
| 3. Whether the habeas court abused discretion by denying certification to appeal | The underlying Brady/Napue issues are debatable among jurists and warrant appellate review. | The habeas court reasonably found claims meritless. | Reversed: denial of certification was an abuse of discretion because the merits were debatable and meritorious. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (conviction obtained by use of known false testimony violates due process)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecutor must disclose promises or inducements to witnesses that affect credibility)
- State v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 354 (2014) (materiality standard and review framework for false testimony/Brady claims)
- Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 174 Conn. App. 776 (2017) (informal understandings may constitute Brady impeachment evidence)
- Hines v. Commissioner of Correction, 164 Conn. App. 712 (2016) (prosecutor’s agreement to bring witness cooperation to sentencing court is disclosable impeachment evidence)
- Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178 (1994) (standard for appellate review when habeas court denies certification to appeal)
- Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608 (1994) (same)