Tree of Life Christian Schools v. City of Upper Arlington
823 F.3d 365
6th Cir.2016Background
- Tree of Life Christian Schools (TOL) purchased a vacant 15.8-acre office complex in Upper Arlington zoned ORC (Office and Research). TOL sought to operate a religious K–12 school there.
- Upper Arlington’s Unified Development Ordinance (UDO) prohibits schools in ORC and favors office/medical/commercial uses to maximize municipal income-tax revenue per its Master Plan.
- TOL applied for rezoning to allow a school; the city denied the request, citing Master Plan goals to preserve ORC land for revenue-generating commercial uses.
- TOL sued under RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)), alleging the city treated religious assemblies less favorably than similarly situated nonreligious assemblies/institutions.
- District court granted summary judgment to the city; the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding genuine issues of material fact exist about whether secular comparators that would likewise fail to maximize income were treated more favorably.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Upper Arlington’s denial violated RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision | TOL: City treated religious school worse than secular uses (e.g., hospitals, offices, daycares) that would also fail to maximize income-tax revenue | City: Schools are dissimilar under accepted zoning criteria (traffic, size, ancillary role, revenue); TOL failed to ID a similarly situated secular comparator | Reversed district court: factual dispute exists whether secular uses similarly situated (revenue impact and other zoning criteria) were treated more favorably; summary judgment inappropriate |
| Proper comparator scope under RLUIPA | TOL: Comparators include nonreligious assemblies/institutions that are similarly situated with respect to regulatory purpose (or any nonreligious assembly under Eleventh Circuit approach) | City: Comparator must be similarly situated under objective zoning criteria; here secular schools (and not the other uses) are the proper comparator and are treated equally | Court: Declined to pick a single circuit test; under any test genuine factual disputes remain, so summary judgment improper |
| Relevance of city’s financial goal (maximizing income-tax revenue) as justification | City: Master Plan’s revenue goal justifies preserving ORC zoning; rezoning would reduce revenues and harm public welfare | TOL: Preserving revenue cannot justify unequal treatment of religious institutions under RLUIPA | Court: The revenue-maximization purpose is legally cognizable, but whether the city applied zoning in a discriminatory manner is a factual question for remand |
| Availability of other remedies (e.g., eminent domain) or alternative locations | City: TOL could locate elsewhere in predominantly residentially zoned land; eminent domain is an option | TOL: Alternatives are not realistic; unequal treatment remains unlawful even if other locations exist | Court: Noted eminent domain could be used but was not pursued; availability of alternatives does not defeat an Equal Terms claim at summary judgment stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (recognizing federal protection for religious exercise in institutional contexts)
- City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (limits on Congress’s enforcement power under RFRA; context for RLUIPA’s scope)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (interpreting statutory protection for religious exercise and noting RLUIPA’s distinct text and scope)
- Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004) (broad comparator rule under RLUIPA; strict scrutiny applied to discriminatory treatment)
- Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cty., 450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (comparator rules and burden to identify similarly situated secular comparator)
- Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Inv’rs, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984) (summary judgment improper where genuine factual disputes affect equitable relief)
- Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (eminent domain as a government tool to effect redevelopment)