TJM 64, Inc v. Shelby County Mayor Lee Harris, 475 F.Supp.3d 828

Plaintiffs are owners of multiple Shelby County, TN bars/limited-service restaurants that the county ordered closed by Health Directive 8 (July 8, 2020) for 45 days (Directive 9 followed July 24, materially similar).
The county closure targeted “bars/limited service restaurants” using a 50% food-sales cutoff (a Tennessee licensing metric) and exempted certain historic-district venues (e.g., Beale Street) as licensed restaurants.
Plaintiffs sued asserting (1) a Fifth Amendment takings claim (categorical Lucas taking or Penn Central regulatory taking) and (2) a Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process claim (arbitrary and capricious), and moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin enforcement.
Defendants justified the Order as a public-health measure responding to a COVID-19 spike, relying on CDC guidance and practical enforcement limits (e.g., inability to audit every business’s sales mix during a pandemic).
The court held an evidentiary hearing with testimony from business owners and county health officials and denied the TRO, finding plaintiffs unlikely to succeed on the merits and that public-health and public-interest considerations weighed against injunctive relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Fourteenth Amendment — arbitrary and capricious?	Order irrationally targets a small class (bars/limited-service restaurants) and treats similar venues differently (e.g., Beale St.).	County acted under police power with rational basis tied to transmission risks (CDC input, alcohol-related behaviors, practical enforcement limits).	Denied: Court applies deferential review (Jacobson); county action not arbitrary and has conceivable support.
Fifth Amendment — categorical taking (Lucas) / regulatory taking (Penn Central)?	Closure completely deprives owners of economically beneficial use; alternatively, Penn Central factors favor a taking.	Order is a police-power public-health regulation, not a taking requiring compensation; public-health character weighs against finding a taking.	Denied likelihood of success: not a total Lucas taking; Penn Central balancing favors government given emergency public-health character.
TRO factors — irreparable harm / public interest?	Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable economic loss and likely business closures if TRO denied.	Injunction would risk public health and hinder county’s pandemic response; courts should defer to public-health officials.	Mixed: irreparable harm shown, but public-interest and likelihood-of-success factors weigh against TRO; motion denied.

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (states’ police power in public-health emergencies; deferential review)
Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981) (purpose of preliminary injunction/TRO is to preserve status quo pending trial)
S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (recognition that states have especially broad latitude in responding to COVID-19)
Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2020) (limits on emergency orders when fundamental rights implicated; standard varies by right)
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (multi-factor test for regulatory takings)
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (categorical taking where regulation deprives owner of all economically beneficial use)
Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (distinguishing total takings and regulatory-balancing analyses)
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (police-power regulations that reduce property value do not automatically require compensation)
FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (rational-basis review permits reliance on ‘rational speculation’ and conceivable support)
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (Takings Clause aims to prevent forcing some to bear public burdens alone)