Timothy Spangler v. Alfred Perales
894 F.3d 818
7th Cir.2018Background
- Anthony Robinson (biracial) and Timothy Spangler, officers at UICPD, sued the University Board and individual supervisors alleging race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; most claims were dismissed at summary judgment.
- Robinson alleged his supervisor Lieutenant Alfred Perales used the racial slur “n‑word” multiple times (once quoted as denial/apophasis, once directed at Robinson) and thereafter subjected Robinson to heightened scrutiny and directives to others to harass/write him up.
- Internal Affairs recommended a 5‑day suspension for Perales; Chief Richardson imposed a 20‑day suspension; Perales was later reassigned. Robinson was passed over for promotion.
- Spangler (watch commander) refused Perales’s instruction to retaliate against Robinson; soon after he received unfounded notices of infraction and was demoted, allegedly with Perales’s involvement.
- At trial Robinson prevailed on a retaliation claim against Perales and recovered nominal damages ($1); the jury found for the Board. The district court denied attorneys’ fees; both plaintiffs and Perales appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether employer (Board) is liable for supervisor Perales’s retaliation | Robinson: employer is strictly liable for supervisor misconduct; a finding against Perales should impute liability to the Board | Defendants: liability should be assessed separately; no instruction requested to impute supervisor liability | Waived by Robinson (no jury instruction requested and counsel waived during deliberations); jury could find for Board and against Perales; court affirmed waiver |
| Whether Robinson’s hostile‑work‑environment claim should have survived summary judgment | Robinson: Perales’s multiple uses of the slur, targeted conduct, surveillance, and directives to retaliate create triable issue of severe or pervasive harassment | Defendants: isolated or quoted uses, plus scrutiny, are insufficient as a matter of law | Reversed summary judgment; hostile‑environment claim survives (triable issue: severe or pervasive; apophasis and later direct slur use material) |
| Whether Spangler’s retaliation claim should have survived summary judgment | Spangler: protected activity (refusing to retaliate) led to unfounded infractions and demotion; Perales was involved or caused demotion via cat’s‑paw | Defendants: decisionmaker (Cappitelli) unaware of protected activity; lack of causation; alleged admission is hearsay | Reversed summary judgment; Spangler presented sufficient evidence (admission by Perales admissible, cat’s‑paw theory, timing, pretext) |
| Whether Robinson was entitled to attorney’s fees after winning nominal damages | Robinson: nominal damages constitute prevailing party status and counsel’s closing did not seek a particular amount | Defendants: recovery was negligible; plaintiff effectively sought large sums in closing | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion denying fees given minimal success and counsel’s rhetorical monetary suggestions |
Key Cases Cited
- Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc., 842 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment / drawing inferences for nonmovant)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (standard for judgment as a matter of law and assessing evidence creditability)
- Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988) (employer strict liability for supervisory harassment creating tangible employment action)
- Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2011) (definition of "supervisor" for employer liability), aff’d, 570 U.S. 421 (Supreme Court)
- Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (elements of hostile‑work‑environment claim)
- Dandy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 2004) (impact of use of the n‑word by supervisors)
- Rodgers v. Western‑Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (supervisor’s use of racial epithet can alter employment conditions)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (definition of materially adverse action in retaliation context)
- University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (but‑for causation standard for retaliation)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (attorney’s fees and significance of degree of success for prevailing plaintiffs)