Timilsina v. West Valley City
121 F. Supp. 3d 1205
D. Utah2015Background
- Timilsina challenged the City’s temporary sign ordinance (11-5-102) as unconstitutional; cross-motions for summary judgment were filed with the magistrate recommending denial of Timilsina and grant of the City’s cross-motion.
- Timilsina placed an off-premise A-frame sign advertising a $5 pizza; the City cited him under 11-5-102(14) which prohibits A-frame signs except in City Center Zone or Grand-Opening context.
- The City Center Zone and a 30-day post-business-license opening window create two exemptions to the A-frame ban; Timilsina argues these exemptions undermine aesthetics and traffic-safety goals.
- Timilsina asserted standing to challenge the A-frame prohibition under an underinclusiveness theory, contending exemptions create unequal treatment of speech.
- Magistrate Judge Furse recommended denying Timilsina’s summary judgment motion and granting the City’s cross-motion, adopting the report and recommendation, and dismissing the case with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Timilsina has standing to challenge 11-5-102(14) | Timilsina has injury-in-fact due to the $100 fine for the A-frame sign | Timilsina lacks standing beyond the A-frame prohibition | Timilsina has standing to challenge 11-5-102(14) but not the ordinance as a whole. |
| Whether the A-frame prohibition directly advances government interests | Exemptions undercut the ordinance’s aims | Exceptions do not destroy the direct link to traffic safety and aesthetics | Yes, the prohibition directly advances the City’s traffic-safety and aesthetic goals. |
| Whether the A-frame ban is narrowly tailored (Central Hudson)” | Regulation is overbroad and underinclusive | Regulation is narrowly tailored; exemptions do not render it invalid | The ban is narrowly tailored; it does not prohibit more speech than necessary. |
| Whether the ordinance passes Central Hudson’s final prong (speech not more than necessary) | Exemptions render the regulation overinclusive | Exemptions are limited and the regulation remains proper | Yes, the regulation is not overinclusive and passes Central Hudson’s final prong. |
| Whether the complaint presents a facial First Amendment challenge | Section 11-5-102(14) is facially invalid | Facial challenge abandoned; applied case-specific review | Facial challenge abandoned; dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014) (standing requires injury in fact, causation, redressability)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
- City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (exemptions can create underinclusiveness in speech regulations)
- Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (illustrates underinclusiveness and uneven regulation of speech)
- Greater New Orleans Broad. Assn. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (consideration of alternatives in tailoring regulation)
- Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (analysis of direct link between regulation and objectives; onsite/offsite distinctions)
- Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (test for regulation of commercial speech; directness, fit, and tailoring)
- Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (content vs. non-content distinctions in First Amendment scrutiny)
- Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (central Hudson framework remains applicable to commercial speech)