Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4

Appellant, a registered sex offender, was living at 1900 South Green Street, Apt. 210, with his girlfriend’s daughter’s apartment complex, though he and his girlfriend stayed there only intermittently.
On April 3, 2012, the manager learned Appellant was residing on the premises and obtained a criminal-trespass warning; Appellant was arrested on other warrants and told officers he lived at 1703 Houston Street.
Detective Brownlee learned on June 25, 2012 that Appellant’s registration address still showed South Green; he went to 1703 Houston Street, where Appellant claimed to be staying, and questioned whether Appellant had updated his registration.
Testimony from Appellant and witnesses established that Appellant remained at the South Green address through October 2012, and Appellant testified he lied about moving to protect his family.
Appellant was convicted of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements; the Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed, finding a fatal variance between indictment and proof, and remanded; this Court held the evidence sufficient but remanded to address jury-charge error.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence under 62.055(a)	State argues the date and intent could be inferred from June 25 admission.	Appellant contends there is a fatal variance and no proof of intent to move seven days prior.	Evidence sufficient to support conviction under the indictment.
Indictment vs. proof regarding intended move date	State asserts on-or-about date allowed because before presentment and within limitations.	Appellant argues the indictment limited the charge to a specific seven-day-before move.	No fatal variance; on-or-about date permissible within Article 21.02/62.055 framework.
Hypothetically correct jury charge vs. indictment scope	State contends charge could include alternative manners and means; evidence supports one alleged method.	Appellant asserts indictment’s narrower scope required by Cada and cannot rely on uncharged conduct.	Charge narrowed by indictment; hypothetically correct charge would be limited to seven days before the intended change.
Harm from jury-charge error	State believes remand for harm review appropriate if error occurred.	Appellant seeks affirmance of acquittal due to reversible error in jury charge.	Remand to court of appeals to determine whether Appellant was harmed by jury-charge error.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1989) (standard for evidentiary sufficiency after viewing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution)
Cada v. State, 334 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (if offense has various statutory alternatives, jury must be charged with elements alleged; sufficiency measured against asserted elements)
Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (on-or-about language not a fatal variance if date proven precedes indictment and within limitations)
Thomas v. State, 753 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (on-or-about date not a variance when proven before presentment and within limitations)
Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (unit of prosecution for address-change offenses; alternative manners and means permitted)
Geick v. State, 349 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (immaterial variances do not defeat conviction)
Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (immaterial variances doctrine; not reversible where not prejudicial)
Wooley v. State, 273 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (remand to assess injury from jury-charge error)
Thomas v. State, 411 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2014) (example regarding indictment vs. verdict for intended move; cited in discussion)