Theaola Robinson v. KTRK Television, Inc., 01-14-00880-CV

Background

Plaintiff Theaola Robinson (pro se) sued KTRK and other media/parent companies alleging defamation arising from televised/newspaper reports about alleged financial mismanagement at Benji’s Special Educational Academy (a charter school she founded). The suit traces to events and TEA oversight actions in 2010.
Defendants moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA / “Anti‑SLAPP”) and sought fees/sanctions; they also sought to have Robinson declared a vexatious litigant.
Robinson contends her claims pre‑date or fall outside the TCPA’s scope and asserts First Amendment and due‑process challenges to application of the statute and to attorney‑fee awards under it. She also argues the trial court’s prior 2012 interlocutory order was erroneously treated as appealable in earlier appellate proceedings.
Defendants argued the broadcasts addressed matters of public concern (TEA investigation, public funds) and thus triggered the TCPA; they urged dismissal unless Robinson could produce clear and specific evidence of a prima facie defamation case. They emphasized substantial‑truth and privilege defenses, and contended Robinson was a limited‑purpose public figure or, alternatively, could not meet the TCPA’s heightened prima facie standard.
At the hearing reproduced in the record, defendants pressed that most complained‑of statements concerned the school (not Robinson personally) and that the gist/substance of reporting (financial mismanagement, state investigation) was substantially true; plaintiff relied on viewer responses and other record evidence to show the broadcasts were understood to target her personally.
The Court of Appeals considered the parties’ briefs and the hearing record and entered an order denying appellees’ motion to dismiss and retaining the case on the appellate docket (i.e., the motion to dismiss was denied and the appeal was not dismissed at that time).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the TCPA (Anti‑SLAPP) requires dismissal of Robinson’s defamation claims	Robinson: her legal proceeding was filed before/around TCPA enactment or otherwise falls outside/should not be applied to strip appellate jurisdiction; TCPA construction cannot defeat her constitutional rights	Defendants: broadcasts addressed public‑concern matters; TCPA applies and shifts to plaintiff the burden to prove a prima facie case by clear and specific evidence	Court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss and retained the appeal docket (motion to dismiss under TCPA not granted at that time)
Whether the complained‑of statements were "of and concerning" Robinson (identity/standing to sue)	Robinson: broadcasts and public reaction identified her personally (founder/superintendent), so statements are of and concerning her	Defendants: most complained statements referred to the school and TEA investigation, not Robinson by name; viewer comments are not competent proof	Not finally resolved on the merits in the transcript; court retained the case (no dismissal)
Whether plaintiff must show falsity/actual malice and meet heightened TCPA proof standard	Robinson: factual disputes (including viewer reaction, TEA conduct) create triable issues; TCPA should not bar appeal or access to courts	Defendants: Robinson is at least a limited‑purpose public figure and/or privileges apply; plaintiff must show material falsity and actual malice with clear and specific evidence (heightened standard)	Court did not grant dismissal and left issues for further litigation (no final ruling on actual malice/material falsity)
Whether defendants are entitled to attorney’s fees / sanctions under TCPA	Robinson: awarding fees/sanctions under TCPA here would be unconstitutional as applied and would chill petitioning; she asserts she is prevailing party in earlier proceedings	Defendants: TCPA authorizes fees and sanctions where motion is meritorious; they seek fees if dismissal granted	Court denied motion to dismiss; fee/sanction requests under TCPA therefore were not resolved in the court’s dismissal order (reserved for later)

Key Cases Cited

Wall v. Wall, 186 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. 1945) (principles cited by appellant regarding appellate relief and remand)
State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. 2006) (statutory‑construction is a question of law)
Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. 2011) (plain meaning of statutory text is primary in construction)
Park Place Hosp. v. Estate of Milo, 909 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. 1995) (final‑judgment rule / finality principles)
Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. 2003) (law‑of‑the‑case and revisiting prior appellate jurisdictional rulings)
Hahn v. Love, 394 S.W.3d 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012) (context on TCPA motion practice and standards)
Scherr v. Oyedokun, 889 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994) (interlocutory‑order jurisdictional limits in appeals)
Trevino v. Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1978) (law‑of‑the‑case discussion and re‑consideration of jurisdictional questions)