The People v. Wilson
219 Cal. App. 4th 500
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- In 1993 Wilson caused a drunk-driving crash that injured passenger Debra Horvat and killed rear-seat passenger John Haessly; he pleaded no contest to causing injury while driving intoxicated and to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated; plea colloquy transcript is not in the record.
- At the 1993 preliminary hearing, testimony included competing accounts (including statements suggesting Horvat grabbed the wheel) and Wilson’s denials; the preliminary hearing transcript was preserved.
- In 1999 Wilson was convicted of felony DUI; the prosecution alleged two prior "serious felony" strike priors based on the 1993 offenses (one for great bodily injury to Horvat, one for gross vehicular manslaughter as to Haessly).
- The trial court found both strike priors true based on the 1993 record and sentenced Wilson to 25 years to life (Three Strikes). On federal habeas review the Ninth Circuit held the trial court’s reliance on disputed facts violated Apprendi and the sentence was vacated.
- On remand the state court struck the Horvat-related strike but left the manslaughter-based strike, resentencing Wilson as a second-strike offender to six years; Wilson appealed the remaining enhancement.
- The Court of Appeal held the sentencing court erred: the record of the manslaughter plea did not admit or imply the specific fact of "personal infliction," the court impermissibly resolved disputed factual issues from the preliminary hearing (violating People v. McGee and Apprendi/Descamps), and the error was not harmless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court could find Wilson’s 1993 gross vehicular manslaughter conviction a "serious felony" (requiring "personal infliction" of great bodily injury) from the prior record | The People: the prior plea+record support finding "great bodily injury" and the court may examine the record of conviction to determine the nature of the prior | Wilson: the record does not establish "personal infliction," and the court impermissibly resolved disputed factual issues—requiring jury finding under Apprendi | Court: The court erred. "Personal infliction" was not admitted or implied by the plea; the sentencing court impermissibly resolved disputed facts from the preliminary hearing in violation of McGee and Apprendi/Descamps; the error was not harmless. |
| Whether the Apprendi prior-conviction exception allows judge factfinding about disputed prior-conduct facts from a plea record | The People: McGee permits limited record examination to determine the nature of a prior conviction | Wilson: Apprendi and Descamps prohibit judge resolution of disputed factual issues that increase punishment beyond statutory maximum | Court: Apprendi/Descamps prohibit imposing enhanced sentence based on disputed facts about prior conduct not admitted or implied by the conviction; McGee similarly limits court's inquiry. |
| Whether Wilson waived the claim by not raising it earlier | The People: claim was forfeited by failure to challenge the manslaughter strike earlier | Wilson: he raised related arguments and new controlling law (McGee, Descamps) arose after initial appeal; also sentence was unauthorized so cannot be waived | Court: No waiver. New law and unauthorized-sentence principle permit review. |
| Whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | The People: evidence (death + record) overwhelmingly supports the serious-felony finding | Wilson: preliminary hearing contained conflicting evidence (possible wheel-grab) creating reasonable doubt on "personal infliction" | Court: Not harmless. The record could rationally lead a jury to reasonable doubt about personal infliction; reversal required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (Facts that increase penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, except the fact of a prior conviction)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (U.S. 2013) (Sentencing courts cannot resolve disputed factual questions about prior convictions beyond what the record of conviction necessarily shows)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (U.S. 2005) (Limits the types of prior-conviction records a sentencing court may consult to determine generic offense elements)
- People v. McGee, 38 Cal.4th 682 (Cal. 2006) (Sentencing court’s inquiry into prior convictions is limited to the record of conviction and must not resolve disputed factual issues about defendant’s prior conduct)
- Wilson v. Knowles, 638 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2011) (Applying Apprendi to reverse and vacate Wilson’s Three Strikes sentence due to improper judicial factfinding)
- People v. Cole, 31 Cal.3d 568 (Cal. 1982) ("Personally inflict" means to directly cause injury; distinguishes personal infliction from proximate causation)