24 N.Y.3d 674
NY2015Background
- In 2006 Nassau County enacted Local Law No. 4, prohibiting registered sex offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of a school (and 500 feet of a park).
- Michael Diack, a Level 1 registered sex offender not on parole/probation, was charged under Local Law 4 after moving within 500 feet of two schools.
- Diack moved to dismiss on the ground that Local Law 4 is preempted by State law; the Nassau County District Court granted the motion, the Appellate Term reversed, and this Court granted leave to appeal.
- New York has enacted a set of statewide laws and regulations governing sex offenders: SORA (registration/levels), SARA (mandatory "school grounds" condition for certain offenders), SOMTA (treatment/placement), and Chapter 568 (state placement rules/regulations).
- The State statutes and implementing regulations create a comprehensive, statewide scheme addressing identification, monitoring, placement, and housing factors for sex offenders, and include a 1,000-foot definition of "school grounds" used to restrict certain offenders’ movement and residence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Diack/Nassau) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Local Law 4 is preempted by state law (field preemption) | State statutes do not expressly occupy the field; piecemeal provisions do not constitute comprehensive preemption — localities may impose residency limits for offenders not under supervision | State's continuous and comprehensive regulatory scheme implies an intent to occupy the field, displacing local residency laws | Held: Field preemption — Local Law 4 is preempted and invalid |
| Whether SARA/SORA/etc. constitute a sufficiently comprehensive scheme to cover residency/placement | School-grounds provisions apply only to supervised categories; do not show intent to preclude local laws for unsupervised offenders | The statewide scheme (including placement regs and the 1,000-foot school definition) demonstrates a coordinated policy governing where offenders may live | Held: The statutes and regulations collectively are detailed and comprehensive enough to imply preemption |
| Whether state placement regulations and Chapter 568 reflect statewide control over housing decisions | Local residence restrictions address local safety concerns left unregulated at state level | Chapter 568 and implementing regs assign placement/housing factors to State agencies and require statewide coordination to avoid shifting burdens among localities | Held: State placement regime occupies the subject; local laws would frustrate statewide uniformity and State policy |
| Effect of preemption for low-risk (Level 1) offenders not subject to SARA mandatory conditions | Because Level 1 offenders aren’t subject to SARA’s mandatory condition, localities may regulate their residency | Even if Level 1 offenders are not directly addressed by every statute, the State’s top-down regulatory design covers housing and placement broadly enough to preempt local laws affecting all registered offenders | Held: Preemption applies despite Diack’s Level 1 status; Local Law 4 cannot stand |
Key Cases Cited
- Albany Area Bldrs. Assn. v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989) (preemption test; State primacy where Legislature occupies a field)
- New York State Club Assn. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211 (N.Y. 1987) (municipal power limited where Legislature has preempted area)
- Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Town of Red Hook, 60 N.Y.2d 99 (N.Y. 1983) (implied preemption from comprehensive regulatory scheme)
- Robin v. Inc. Village of Hempstead, 30 N.Y.2d 347 (N.Y. 1972) (legislative intent to occupy a field may be inferred from subject nature and need for statewide uniformity)
- Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 490 (N.Y. 1977) (affirming Legislature's primacy over local regulation)
- Terrance v. City of Geneva, 799 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (federal court recognizing that state "school grounds" definition can operate as a residency restriction)