Texas v. Kleinert
855 F.3d 305
5th Cir.2017Background
- Charles Kleinert, an Austin police officer specially deputized to work full-time on an FBI Central Texas Violent Crimes Task Force, investigated a same-day bank robbery at Benchmark Bank.
- Kleinert confronted Larry Jackson at the bank after Jackson used a false identity and attempted to reenter a closed bank; Jackson fled and Kleinert chased him across a grassy area.
- During a physical struggle under a traffic bridge, Kleinert, who had his firearm drawn, struck Jackson and accidentally discharged his weapon, fatally wounding Jackson.
- A Travis County grand jury indicted Kleinert for manslaughter; Kleinert removed the state prosecution to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and asserted Supremacy Clause immunity as a federal officer acting under color of federal authority.
- The parties agreed the district court would resolve all factual issues related to immunity; after an evidentiary hearing the district court dismissed the indictment, finding Kleinert entitled to Supremacy Clause immunity.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding removal and dismissal proper because Kleinert was a federal officer, his asserted conduct arose under color of federal office, and his Supremacy Clause immunity defense was plausible and proved on the record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Kleinert) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal-officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 was proper | Kleinert acted outside federal authority and removal was improper | Kleinert was a federal officer acting under federal authority while investigating a bank robbery and thus removal is proper | Removal proper: Kleinert is a federal officer, conduct linked to federal duties, and he raised a colorable federal defense |
| Whether federal law authorized Kleinert to arrest Jackson | Task‑force MOU and FBI practice limited Kleinert’s federal authority; lacked probable cause | Task‑force authority covered arrest for federal felonies; facts (false identity, attempted entry, flight) gave probable cause to arrest for bank robbery/fraud | Federal law authorized the arrest; factual findings support probable cause and district court’s credibility choices are not clearly erroneous |
| Whether Kleinert subjectively believed his actions were necessary and proper | Inconsistent accounts show lack of honest belief | Kleinert credibly testified he believed the force used (drawing weapon, hammer‑fist strikes while armed) was necessary to effect the arrest and for officer safety | Subjective belief found credible by district court; finding not clearly erroneous |
| Whether Kleinert’s belief was objectively reasonable (Supremacy Clause element) | Using gun as impact weapon and failing to holster made his conduct unreasonable | Training and multiple officer witnesses endorsed such tactics in close‑quarters resistance; split‑second dynamics made accidental discharge plausible | Objective reasonableness satisfied; testimony supports that actions were within training and reasonable under circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (unanimous removal statute is not narrow; removal appropriate to test federal defenses)
- Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (federal‑officer removal requires a colorable federal defense)
- Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (officer must allege a colorable federal defense for removal)
- Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (credit officer’s version of events for removal jurisdiction; need not exclude possibility of private frolic)
- Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (Supremacy Clause immunity elements: authorized act and doing no more than necessary and proper)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (flight can contribute to probable cause)
- New York v. Tanella, 374 F.3d 141 (split‑second close‑quarters context relevant to objective reasonableness under Supremacy Clause)
- Wyoming v. Livingston, 443 F.3d 1211 (noting Supremacy Clause immunity is rarely litigated and articulating its standards)