Lead Opinion
after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
If it be true, as stated in the order of the court discharging the prisoner, that he was held “ in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States, and in custody in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States,” there does not seem to be any doubt that, under the statute on that subject, he was properly discharged by the Circuit Court.
Section 753 o’ the Revised .Statutes reads as follows:
“The writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a prisoner in jail, unless where he is in custody under or by color*41 of the authority of the^ United States; or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge- thereof; or is in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States; or, being a subject or citizen of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign State, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations ; or unless it is necessary to bring the prisoner into court to testify.”-
And section 761 declares that when by the writ of habeas corpus the petitioner is brought up for a hearing the “ court or justice or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the party as law and justice require.” This of course means that if he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution or a law of the United States, or' for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, he must be discharged.
By the law, as it existed at the time of .the enactment of the Be vised Statutes,- an appéal could be taken to the Circuit Court from any court of justice or judge inferior to the Circuit Court in a certain class of habeas corpus cases. ' But there was no appeal to the Supreme Court in any case except where the prisoner was the subject or citizen of a foreign- State, and was committed or confined under tbe authority or law of the United States or of any State, on account of any act done' or omitted to be done under the commission or authority of a foreign State, the validity of which depended upon the law of nations. But afterwards, by the act. of Congress of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 437, this was extended by amendment as follows:
“ That section seven hundred and sixty-four of the Revised Statutes be amended so that the same shall read as follows: ‘ From' the final decision of such Circuit Court an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court in the cases described in the preceding section.’ ”
It will be observed that in both the provisions of the Revised Statutes and of this latter act of Congress the mode of review, whether by the Circuit Court of the judgment of an inferior court or justice or judge, or by this court of the judgment of a Circuit Court, the word “appeal,” and not “writ of error,” is used, and as Congress has always used these words with a clear understanding of what is meant by them, namely, that by a writ of error only questions of law are brought up for review, as in actions at common law, while by an appeal, except when specially provided otherwise, the entire case qn both law and facts is to be reconsidered, there seems to - be little doubt that, so far as it is essential to a proper decision of this case, the appeal requires us to. examine into the evidence brought to sustain or defeat the right of the petitioner to his discharge.
The history of the incidents which led to the tragic event of the killing of Terry by the prisoner Neagle had its origin in a suit brought by William Sharon of Nevada, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California, against Sarah Althea ITill, alleged to be a citizen of California, for the purpose of obtaining a decree adjudging a certain instrument in writing, possessed and exhibited by her, purporting to be a declaration of marriage between them, under the code of California, to be a forgery, and to have it set aside and annulled. This suit, which was commenced October 3, 1883, was finally heard before Judge Sawyer, the Circuit Judge for that cii’cuit, and Judge Deady, United States District Judge for Oregon, who had been duly appointed to assist in holding the Circuit Court for the District of California. The hearing was on September 29, 1885, and on the 15th of January, 1886, a decree was rendered granting the prayer of the bill. In that decree it Avas declared that the instrument purporting to be a declaration of marriage, set out and described in the bill of complaint, “ Avas not signed or executed at any time by William Sharon, the complainant; that it is not
The rendition of this decree was accompanied by two opinions, the principal one being written by Judge Heady and a concurring one by. Judge Sawyer. They were very full in their statement of the fraud and forgery practised by Miss Hill, and stated that it was also accompanied by perjury. And inasmuch as Mr. Sharon had died between the hearing of the argument of the case on the 29th of September, 1885, and the time of rendering this decision, January 15, 1886, an order was made setting forth that fact, and declaring that the decree was entered as of the date of the hearing, nunc fro tuno.
Nothing was done under this decree. The defendant, Sarah Althea Hill, did not deliver up the instrument to the clerk to be cancelled, but she continued to insist upon its use in the state court. Under these circumstances, Frederick W. Sharon,, as the executor of the will of his father, "William Sharon, filed in the Circuit Court for the Northérn District of California, on March 12, 1888, a bill of revivor, stating the circumstances of the decree, the death of his father, and that the decree-had not been performed; alleging also the intermarriage of Miss Hill with David S. Terry, of the city of Stockton in" California, and making the said Terry and wife parties to this bill of' revivor. The defendants both demurred and answered, resisting .the prayer of the plaintiff, and denying that the petitioner was entitled to any relief.
This case was argued in the Circuit Court before Field, Circuit Justice, Sawyer, Circuit Judge, and Sabin, District Judge. While, the matter was held under advisement, Judge Sawyer, on returning from Los Angeles, in the Southern District of California, where he had' been holding court, found himself on the train as it left Fresno, Which is understood to.
This was-August 14, 1888. On the 3d of September, the court' rendered its decision granting the prayer of the bill of revivor in the name of Frederick W. Sharon and against Sarah Althea Terry and her husband, David S. Terry. The opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Field, and during its delivery a scene of great violence occurred in the court-room. It appears that shortly before the court opened on that day, both the defendants in the case came into the court-room, and took seats within the bar at the table next the clerk’s desk, and almost immediately in front of the judges. Besides Mr. Justice Field there were present on the bench Judge Sawyer, and Judge Sabin of the District Court of -the United States for the District of Nevada. The defendants had denied the jurisdiction of the court originally to render the decree sought to be revived, and the opinion of-, the court necessarily discussed this question without reaching the merits of the controversy. When allusion was. made to this question Mrs. Terry rose from her seat, and addressing the .justice who was delivering tí-3 opinion, asked in an excited manner whether he was going to order her to give up the marriage contract to be cancelled. Mr. Justice Field.said: “Be seated, madam.” She repeated ■ he question, and was again told to be seated. She then said,
Marshal Franks proceeded to carry out the order of the court by attempting to compel her to leave, when Terry* her: husband, rose from his seat under great excitement, exclaiming that no man living should touch his wife, and struck the marshal a blow in his face, so violent as to knock out a.'tooth - He .then unbuttoned his coat, thrust his hand under his jest, apparently for the purpose of drawing a bowie-knife, when he was seized by persons present and forced down on hi_s back. In the meantime Mrs. Terry was removed from the courtroom by the marshal, and Terry was showed to rise and was accompanied by officers to the door leading to the marshal’s office. As he was about leaving the room,- or immediately' after being out of it, he succeeded in drawing a bowie-knife,' when his arms were seized by a deputy marshal and others present to prevent him from using it, and they were able to wrench it from him only after a severe struggle. The most • prominent person engaged in wresting the knife from Terry was Neagle, the prisoner now in'court. '
For this conduct both Terry ánd his wife were sentenced by. the court to. .imprisonment for contempt, Mrs. Terry for one' month and Terry for six months, and these sentences were .immediately carried into effect. Both the judgment of the court on. the petition for the revival of the decree in the case of Sharon against Hill and the judgment of the Circuit Court imprisoning .Terry and wife for contempt have been brought to this court for review, and in both cases the judgments have been affirmed. The report of the cases may be found in Ex parte Terry,
Terry and Mrs. Terry were separately indicted by the grand jury of the Circuit Court of the United States during the same term for their part in these transactions, and the cases were
From that time until his death the denunciations by Terry and his wife of Mr. Justice Field were \open,\ frequent, and of the most vindictive and malevolent character. While being transported from San Francisco to Alameda, where they were imprisoned, Mrs. Terry repeated a number of times that she wouldvkill both Judge Field and Judge Sawyer. Terry, who was-present, said nothing to restrain her, but added that he was not through with Judge Field yet; and, while in jail at Alameda, Terry said that after he got out of jail he would horsewhip Judge Field; and that he did not believe he would ever return to California, but this earth was not large enough to keep him from finding Judge Field and horsewhipping him; and,- in reply to a remark that this would be a dangerous thing to do, and that Judge Field would resent it, he said: “If Judge Field resents it I will kill him.” And while, in jail Mrs. Terry exhibited to a witness Terry’s knife, at which he laughed, and said, “Yes, I always carry that,” and made a remark about judges and marshals, that “ they were all. a lot of- cowardly curs,” and he would (“ see, some of. them in their graves yet.” Mrs. Terry also said that she expected. to kill Judge Field some day.
Perhaps the clearest expression of Terry’s feelings and intentions in the matter was in a conversation with Mr: Thomas T. Williams, editor of one of the daily newspapers of. California. This interview was brought about by a message from Terry requesting Williams to. call and see him. In speaking of the occurrences in the court, he said that Justice Field had put a lie in the record about him, and when he met Field he would have to take that back, “ and if he did not take it back and apologize for having lied about him, he would slap his face, or pull his.nose.” “I said to him,” said the witness, “ f Judge Terry, would not that be a dangerous thing to do'(
It is useless to go over the testimony on this subject more particularly. It is sufficient to say that the evidence is abundant that both Terry and Avife contemplatedL some attack upon Judge Field during his official visit to California in the summer of 1889, which they intended should result in his death. Many of these matters Avere published in the newspapers, and the .press of California was filled Avith the conjectures of a probable attack by Terry on Justice Field, as soon as it became known that he was going to attend the Circuit Court in that year.
So much impressed Avere the friends of Judge Field, and of public justice, both in California arid in Washington, with the fear that he Avould fall a sacrifice to the resentment of Terry and his wife, that application was made to the Attorney General of the United States suggesting the propriety of his furnishing some protection to the judge while in California. This resulted in a correspondence between the Attorney General of the United States, the District Attorney, and the marshal- of the Northern District of California on that subject. This correspondence is here set out:
*48 , “ Department of Justice,
“ Washington, April 27th, 1889.
“ John C. Franks, United States Marshal, San Francisco, Cal.
“. Sir : The proceedings which have heretofore been had in connection with the case of Mr. and Mrs. Terry in your United States' Circuit Court have become matter of public notoriety, and I deem it my duty to call your attention to the propriety of exercising unusual caution, in case further proceedings shall be had in that case, for the protection of his Honor Justice Field or whoever may be called upon to hear and determine .the • matterj Of course, I do not know what may be the feelings or purpose of Mr. and Mrs. Terry in the premises, but many things which have happened indicate that violence on their part is not impossible. It is due to the dignity and independence of the court and the character of its judge that no effort on the part of the government shall be spared to make .them feel entirely safe and free from anxiety in the discharge of their high duties.
“ You will understand, of course, that this letter is not for the public, but to put you upon your guard. It will be proper for you to show it to the district attorney, if deemed best.
“Tours truly, W. H. H. Miller. ,
“Attorney General.”
“ United States Marshal’s Office,
“Northern District' of California,
“San Francisco, May 6, 1889.
“ Hon. W. H. H. Miller, Attorney General, Washington, D. C.
“ Sir: Yours of the 27th ultimo, at hand.
“ When the Hon. Judge Lorenzo Sawyer, our Circuit Judge, returned from Los Angeles-(some time before the celebrated court scene) and informed me of the disgraceful action of Mrs. Terry towards him on the cars, while her husband sat in front smilingly approving it, I resolved to watch the Terrys (and so notified my deputies) whenever, they should enter the courtroom, and be ready to suppress the very first indignity offered, by. either of them to the judges.' After, this, at the time of their ejectment from the court-room, when I held Judge Terry*49 and his wife as prisoners in my private office and heard his threats against Justice Field, I was more fully determined than ever to throw around the Justice and Judge Sawyer every safeguard I could.
“I have given the matter careful consideration, with the determination to fully protect the federal judges at this time,trusting that the department will reimburse me for any reasonable expenditure.
“ I have always, whenever there is- any likelihood of either Judge or Mrs. Terry appearing in court, had a forcé of deputies with myself on hand to watch their every-action. You can rest assured that when Justice Field arrives, he, as well as all the federal judges, will be protected from insults, and where an order is made it will be executed without fear as to consequences. I shall follow your instructions and act - with more than usual caution. I have already consulted with the United States attorney, J. T. Carey, Esq., as to the advisability of making application to you, at the time the Terrys are tried upon criminal charges, for me to select two or more detectives to assist in the case, and also assist me'in protecting Justice Field while in my district. I wish the judges to feel secure, and for this purpose will see to it that their every wish is promptly obeyed. I notice your remarks in • regard to the publicity of your letter, and will obey your request. I shall only be too happy to receive any suggestions from you at any time.-
“ The opinion among the better class of citizens here is very bitter against the Terrys, though, of course, they have theii friends, and, unfortunatély, among that class it is necessary to watch.-
“Your most obedient servant, J. C. Franks,
“ U. 8. Marshal Northern Mist, of Cal.”
“ San Francisco, Cal., May 7, 1889.
“Hon. W. H. H. Miller,
“U. S. Attorney General, Washington, D. C..
“Dear Sir: Marshal Franks exhibited to me yoitr letter bearing date the 27th ult., addressed to him upon the subject*50 >f using due caution by way of protecting Justice Field and the federal judges here in the discharge of their duties in. matters in' which the Terrys are interested. I noted your suggestion with a great degree of pleasure, not because our marshal is at all disposed to leave anything undone within his authority or power to do, 'but because it encouraged him to know and feel that the Head of our Department was in full sympathy with the efforts being made to protect the judges and vindicate the dignity-of our courts.
“ I write merely to suggest that there is just reason, in the light of. the past and the threats made by Judge and Mrs. Terry against Justice Field and Judge Sawyer, to apprehend personal violence at any moment and at any place, as well in court as out of court, and that while due caution has always been taken by the marshal when either Judge or Mrs. Terry is about the building in which the courts are held, he has not felt it within his authority to guard either Judge Sawyer or Justice Field against harm when away from the appraisers’ building.
“Discretion dictates, however, that a protection,should be thrown about them at other times and places, when proceedings are being had before them in which the Terrys are interested, and I verily believe, -in view of the direful threats made against Justice Field, that he will be in great danger at all times while here.
“ Mr. Franks is a prudent, cool, and courageous officer, who will not abuse any authority granted him. I would therefore suggest that he be authorized in his discretion to retain one.ór more deputies, at such times as he may deem necessary, for the purposes suggested. That publicity may not be given to the matter, it is important that the deputies whom he may select be not known as such, and that efficient service may be assured for the purposes indicated, it seems to me that' they .should be strangers to the Terrys.
“ The Terrys are unable to appreciate that an officer should perform his official duty when that duty in any way requires his’efforts to be directed against them. The marshal, his deputies, and myself suffer daily indignities and insults from Mrs.*51 Terry, in court and out of court, committed in the presence of her husband and without interference-upon his part. I do not purpose being deterred from any duty, nor do I purpose being intimidated in the least degree from doing my whole duty in the premises, but I shall feel doubly assured in being able to do so knowing that our marshal has your kind wishes and encouragoxnent in doing everything needed to protect the officers of the court in the discharge of their duties.
“ This, of course, is not intended for the public files of your office, nor will it be on file in my office. Prudence dictates great caution on the part of the officials who may be called upon to have anything to do in the premises,' and I deem it to be of the greatest importance that the suggestions back and forth be confidential.
“ I shall write you further upon the subject of these cases in a few days.
“I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,
“ John T. Oarky,
“ TJ. S. Attorney?’
“Department of Justice,
“Washington, D. C., May 27, 1889.
“ J. C. Franks, Esq., United States Marshal, San Francisco, Cal.
“ Sir : Referring to former correspondence of the depart-' ment relating to a possible disorder in the session of the approaching term of court, owing to the small number of bailiffs under your control to preserve order, you are directed to employ certain special deputies at a per diem of five dollars.. ¡iayable out of the appropriation for fees and expenses of marshals, to be submitted to the court as a separate account from your other accounts against the government for approval, under section SJ6, Revised Statutes, as an extraordinary expense, that the same may be forwarded to this Department in order to secure executive action and approval.
“ Yery respectfully, W. If. II. Miller, -
“ Attorney General?’
It appears from the uncohtradicted evidence, in the!case that while the sleeping-car, in which were Justice'Field and Mr. Neagle, stopped a moment in the early morning at Fresno, Terry apd wife got on the train; The fact that they were on the train became known to Neagle, and he. held a conversation with the, conductor as to what peace officers could be found at Lathrop, where the train stopped for breakfast, and the conductor was requested to telegraph to the proper Officers of that place to have, a constable or some peace officer on the ground when the train should arrive,'anticipating that there might-be violence attempted by Terry upon. Judge Field. It is sufficient, to say that this resulted iii no available aid to assist in keeping the peace. When the train arrived, Neagle informed Judge Field of the presence of Terry on the train, and advised him to. remain and take his breakfast in the car. This the Judge refused-to do, and he and Neagle got out of the car arid went into the dining-room, and took seats Reside each other iti the place assigned them-bv the person in charge, of- the breakfast-room, and very shortly after this Terry and wife' came into the room; and Mrs. Terry, recognizing Judge Field, turned and left jn great haste, while Terry passed beyond where Judge Field and Neagle were and took his seat at another table. It was-afterwards ascertained that Mrs. Terry went to the car, and took from it a,, satchel in which was a revolver. Before she returned to the eating-room, Terry arose, from his seat, and, passing, around-the table in such a way as brought him behind Judge Field,' who did not see him or notice him, came
Mrs. Terry entered the room with the satchel, in her hand just after Terry sank to the' floor. She rushed up to' the place where he was, threw herself upon his body, made loud \exclamations and moans, and commenced inviting the spectators to avenge her wrong upon Field and Neagle. She appeared to be carried away by passion, and in a very earnest manner charged that Field and Neagle had murdered her husband intentionally, and shortly afterwards she appealed to the persons present to examine the. body of Terry'to see that he had no weapons. This she did once or twice. The satchel which she had, being taken from her, was found to ’contain a revolver.
These are the material circumstances produced in evidence before the Circuit Court on the hearing of this habeas corpus case.. It is but a short sketch of a history which is given in over five hundred- pages in the record, but we think'it is sufficient. to enable us to apply the law of the case to the question before us. "Without a more minute discussion of this testimony, it produces upon us the conviction of a settled purpose on the part of Terry and his wife, amounting'to a conspiracy, to murder Justice Field. And we are quite sure that if Neagle had been merely a brother or a friend of Judge Field, travelling with him, and aware of all the previous relations of Terry to the Judge, — as he was, — of his bitter animosity, his declared purpose to have revenge even to the point..
But such a justification would be a proper subject for consideration on a trial of the case for murder in the courts of the State of California, and there exists no authority in the courts of the United States to discharge the prisoner'while held in custody by the State authorities for this offence, unless there be found in aid of the defence of the prisoner some element of power and authority asserted under the government1 of the United States.
This element is said to be found in the facts that Mr. Justice Field, when attacked, was in the immediate discharge of his duty as judge of the Circuit Courts of the United States within California;Shat the assault upon him grew out of the animosity of Terry and wife, arising out of the previous discharge of his duty as circuit justice in the case for which they were committed for contempt of court; and'" that the deputy marshal of the United States, who killed Terry in defence of Field’s life, was charged with a duty under the law of the United States to protect Field from the violence which Terry was inflicting, and which was Intended • to lead to.Field’s death.
To the inquiry whether this proposition is sustained by law and the facts which we have recited, we now address ourselves.
Mr. Justice Field was a member of the Supreme Court of the United States, and had been a member of that court for over a quarter of a century, during which he had become venerable for Ins age and for his long and valuable service in that court. The business of the Supreme Court has become so exacting that for many years past the justices of it have been compelled to remain for the larger part of the year in Washington City, from whatever part of the country they may have been appointed. The term for each year, including the necessary travel and preparations to attend at its beginning, has generally lasted from eight to nine months.
But the justices of this court have imposed upon them other duties, the most important of which arise out of the fact that they are ¡also judges of the Circuit Courts of the United States.
“The-chief justice and associate justices of the Supreme Court shall be allotted among the circuits by an order of the court, and a new allotment shall be made whenever it becomes necessary or convenient by reason of the alteration of any circuit, or of' the new appointment of a chief justice or associate justice, or otherwise.”
Section 610 declares that it “shall be the duty of the-chief justice, and of each justice of the Supreme Court, to attend.at least one term of the.Circuit Court, in each district of the circuit to which he. is. allotted during every period of two years.”
Although this enactment does not require in terms that the justices shall go to their circuits more than once in two years, .the effect of it is to compel most of them to do this, because-there are so many districts in many of the circuits that it -is impossible for the circuit justice to reach them all in one year, and the result of this is that he goes to some of them in one_ year, and to others in the next year, thus requiring an attendance in the circuit every year,
The justices of the Supreme Court have been members of the Circuit Courts of the United States ever since the organization of the government, and their attendance on the circuit.' and appearance, at the., places where the courts are held has-always been thought to be a matter of importance. In order to enable him to perform this duty, Mr. Justice Field had to travel each year from Washington City, near the Atlantic coast, to San Francisco, on the Pacific coast. In doing this lie was as much in the discharge of a duty imposed upon him by law as he was while sitting in court and trying causes. There are many duties which the judge performs outside of the court-room where he sits to pronounce judgment or to pre- " side over a trial. The statutes of the United States, and the established practice of the courts, require that the judge .perform a very large share of his judicial labors at what is called “ chambers.” This chamber work is as important, as - necessary, as much a discharge of his official duty as that perfor-med
So it is impossible for a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, who is compelled by the obligations of duty to be so much in Washington City, to discharge his duties of attendance on the Circuit Courts as prescribed by section 610, without travelling in the usual and most convenient modes of doing it to the place where the court is to be held. This duty is as much an obligation imposed by the law as if it had said in words “the justices of the .Supreme Court shall go from Washington City to the place where their terms are held every year.”
Justice Field had not only left Washington and travelled the three thousand miles or more which were necessary to reach his circuit, but he had entered upon the duties of that circuit, had held the court at San Francisco for some time; and, taking a short leave of that court, had gone down to Los Angeles, another place where a court was to be held, and sat as a judge there for several days, b earing cases and rendering decisions. It was in the necessary act of returning from Los Angeles to San Francisco, by the usual mode of travel between the two places, where his court was still in session, and where he was required to be, that he was assaulted by Terry in the manner which we have already described. ■
The occurrence which we are called uponjo consider was of so extraordinary a character that it is not to be expected that many cases can be found to cite as authority upon the subject.
In the case of United States v. The Schooner Little Charles,
In the case of United States v. Gleason, 1 Wool. C. C. 128, 132, the prisoner was indicted for the murder of two enrolling officers who were charged with the duty of arresting deserters, or those who had been" drafted into the service and had failed to attend. These, men, it was said, had visited the-region of country where they were murdered, ánd,' having failed of accomplishing their purpose of arresting the deserters,- were on their return to their home when they were killed,' and the court was asked to instruct the jury- that under these circumstances they were not engaged in the duty of arresting the deserters .named. “ It is claimed by the couhoel for the defendant,” says the report, “that if the parties killed had been so engaged, and had come to that neighborhood with the purpose of arresting the supposed deserters, but at the moment .of the assault had abandoned the purpose. of making the arrests at that time, and were returning to headquarters at Gfrinnell, with a view to making other arrangements for arrest at another time, they were not so engaged as to bring the case within the law.” But the court held that this was not a sound construction of the statute, and “ that if the parties killed had come into that neighborhood with intent to arrest the deserters named, and had been employed by the proper officer for that service, and were, in the proper prosecution of that purpose, returning to Grinnell with a view to making other arrangements to discharge. this duty, they were still engaged in arresting the deserters, within the meaning of the statute. It is not necessary,” said the court, “ that the party killed should be engaged in the immediate act of arrest, but it is sufficient if he be employed in and about that business when assaulted. The purpose of the law is to protect the-life of the person so employed,, and this protection continues so
We have no doubt that Mr. Justice Field when attacked by Terry was engaged in the discharge of his duties as Circuit Justice of the Ninth Circuit, and was entitled to all the protection under those circumstances which the law could give him.
It is urged, however, that there exists no statute authorizing any such protection as that which Neagle was instructed to give Judge Field in the present case, and indeed no protection whatever against a vindictive or malicious assault growing out of the. faithful discharge of his official duties; and that the language of section 153 of the Revised Statutes, that the party seeking the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus must in this connection show that he is “in custody for an act done'or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States,” makes it necessary that upon this occasion it should be shown that the act for which Neagle is imprisoned was done by virtue of an act of Congress. It is not supposed that any special act of Congress exists which authorizes the marshals or deputy marshals of the United States in express terms to accompany the judges of the Supreme Court through their circuits, and act as a body-guard to them, to defend them against malicious assaults against their persons. But we are of opinion that this view of‘ the statute is an unwarranted restriction of the meaning of a law designed to extend in a liberal manner the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus to persons imprisoned for the performance of their duty. And we are satisfied that if it was the duty of Neagle, under the circumstances, a duty which could only arise under the laws of the United States, to defend Mr. Justice Field from a murderous attack upon him, he brings himself within the meaning of the section we have recited. This view of the subject is confirmed by the alternative provision, that he must be .in custody “for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof, or is in custody, in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States.”
It has in modern times become apparent that the physical-health of . the' community is more efficiently promoted' by hygienic and preventive- means, than by the skill which is applied to the -cure of disease after it has become fully developed. So also the law, which is intended to prevent crime, in its general spread among the community, by regulations, police organization, and otherwise, which are adapted for the' protection of the lives and property of citizens, for the dispersion' of- mobs, for the arrest of thieves and assassins, for the watch which is kept over the community, as well as over this class of people, is more efficient than punishment of crimes after they have been committed. . .
If a person in the situation of Judge Field could have no other guarantee of his personal safety, while engaged in the conscientious discharge of a disagreeable duty, than the fact that if he was murdered his murderer would be subject to the laws of a State and by those laws could be punished, the security would be very insufficient. The plan wffich Terry and ■wife had in mind of insulting him and assaulting huh-and drawing him into a defensive physical contest, in the course of which they would slay him, shows the little value of such remedies. Ve do not believe that the government of the-United States is thus inefficient, o • that its Constitution and laws have left the high officers of the government so defence^ less and unprotected.
The views expressed by this court through Mr. Justice
“Somewhat akin to the argument which has been considered is the objection that the deputy marshals authorized ' by the act of Congress to be,created and to attend the elections are authorized to keep the peace; and that this is a duty which belongs to the state authorities alone. It is argued that the preservation of peace and good order in society is not'within the powers confided to the government of the United States, but belongs exclusively to the States. Here again we are met-with the theory that the government of the United States does not reskupon the-soil and territory of the country. We think that this theory is founded on an entire misconception of the nature and powers of that government. We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle, that the government of the United States may, by means of physi-' cal force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This .necessarily involves the' power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the pbwer to keep the peace to that extent. . This power to enforce .its laws and to execute its functions in all places does not derogate from the power of the State ,to execute its laws at the same time and in the same*61 places. The one does not exclude the other, except where both cannot be executed at the same time. In that case’ the words of the Constitution itself show which is to yield., ‘ This Constitution, and all' laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.’ . . . • Without the concurrent sovereignty referred to, the national government would be nothing but an advisory government. Its executive power would be absolutely nullified. Why do we have marshals at all, if they cannot physically lay their hands on persons and things in the performance of their proper duties? What functions-can they perform, if they cannot use force ? In executing the processes of, the courts, must they call on the nearest constable for protection ? must they rely on him to use the requisite compulsion, and to keep the-peace,-whilst, they are soliciting and entreating the parties and bystanders to allow the law to take its course ? This is the necessary. consequence of the positions that are assumed. If we indulge in such impracticable views as these, and keep on refining and rerefining, we shall drive the national government out of the United States, and relegate it to the District of Columbia, or perhaps to some foreign soil. We shall bring it back to a condition of greater helplessness than that of the old confederation. ... It must execute its powers, or it is no government! ,It must execute them on the land as well as On the sea, on things as well as on persons: And, to do this, it must necessarily have power to command obedience, preserve order, and keep the peace; and no person or power in this land has the right to resist or question its authority, so long as it keeps within the bounds of its jurisdiction.”
At the same term of the court, in the case of Tennessee v. Davis,
To cite all the cases in which this principle of the supremacy of the government of the United States, in the exercise of all the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, is maintained, would be an endless task. We have selected these as being the most forcible expressions of the views of the court, having a direct reference to the nature of the case before us.
Where, then, are we to look for the protectiofi which we
The legislative branch of the government can only protect the judicial officers by the enactment of laws for that purpose, and the argument we are now combating assumes' that 'no such law has been passed by Congress.
If we turn to the executive department of the government, we find a very different condition of affairs. The Constitution, section 3, Article 2, declares that the ’President “ shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” and' he is provided with the means of fulfilling this obligation by his authority to commission all the officers of the United States, and, by ancj with the advice and consent of the' Senate, to appoint the most important of them and to fill vacancies. His is declared to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. The duties which are thus imposed upon •him he is further enabled to perform by the recognition in the Constitution, and the creation by acts of Congress, of executive departments, which have varied in number from four or' five to seven or eight, the heads of which are familiarly called, cabinet ministers. These aid him in the performance of the
Is this duty limited to the enforcement of acts of Congress or of treaties of the Cnited States according to their empress terms, or does it include the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution ?
One of the most remarkable episodes in the history of óur .foreign relations, and which has become an attractive historical incident, is the case of Martin Koszta, a native of Hungary, who, though not fully a naturalized citizen of the United States, had in due form of law made his declaration of • intention to become a citizen. While in Smyrna he was seized by command of the Austrian consul general at that place, and carried on board the Hussar, an Austrian vessel’ where he was held-in close confinement. Captain Ingraham, .in command of the American sloop of war St. Louis, arriving in port at that critical period, and ascertaining that Koszta had with him his naturalization papers, demanded his surrender to him, and was compelled to train his guns upon the Austrian vessel before his demands were complied with. It was, however, tt> prevent bloodshed, agreed that Koszta should be placed in the hands of the French consul subject to the result of diplomatic negotiations between Austria and the United States. The celebrated correspondence between Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, and Chevalier Hülsemann, the Austrian minister at Washington, which arose out of this affair and resulted in the release and restoration to liberty of Koszta, attracted a great deal of public attention, and the position assumed by Mr. Marcy met the approval of the country and of Congress, who votéd a gold medal to Captain Ingraham for his conduct in the. affair. Upon what act of Congress then existing can any one lay his finger in support of the action of our government in this matter ?
The United States is the owner of millions of acres of valuable public land, and has been the owner of much more which it has sold. Some of these lands owe a large part of their value to the forests which grow upon them. These forests are liable to depredations by people living in the neighborhood, known as timber thieves, who make a living by cutting and selling such timber, and who are trespassers. But until quite recently, even if there be one now, there was no statute authorizing any preventive measures for the protection of this valuable public property. Has the President no authority to place guards upon the public territory to protect its timber ? No authority to seize the timber when cut and found upon the 'ground? Has he ho power to take any measures to protect this vast domain? Fortunately we find this question answered by this court in the case of Wells v. Nickles,
One of the cases in this court in which this question was presented in the most imposing form is that of United States v. San Jacinto Tin Company,
We cannot doubt the power of the President to take measures for the protection of a judge of one of the courts of the United States, who, Avhile in the discharge of the duties of his office, is threatened Avith a personal attack Avhich may probably result in his death, and Ave think it clear that where this protection is to be afforded through the civil power, the Department of Justice is the proper one to set in motion the necessary means of protection. The correspondence already recited in this opinion betAveen the marshal of the Northern District of California, and the Attorney General, and the district attorney of the United States for that district, although prescribing no Arery specific mode of affording this
But there is positive law investing the marshals and their deputies with powers which not only justify what Marshal Neagle did in this matter, but which imposed it upon him as a duty. In chapter fourteen of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which is devoted to the appointment and duties of the district attorneys, marshals, and clerks of the courts of the United States, section 788 declares:
“The marshals and their deputies shall have, in each State, the same powers, in executing the laws of the United States, as the sheriffs and their deputies in such State may have, by law, in executing the laws thereof.”
If, therefore, a sheriff of the State of California was authorized to do in regard to the laws of California what Neagle did, that is, if he was authorized to keep the peace, to protect a judge from assault and murder, then Neagle was authorized .to do the same thing in reference to the laws of the United States.
Section 4176 of the Political Code of California reads as follows:
“ The sheriff must:
“First. Preserve the peace.
“ Second. Arrest and. take before the nearest magistrate for examination all persons who attempt to commit or have committed a public offence.
“ Third. Prevent and suppress all affrays, breaches of the peace, riots and insurrections, which may come to his knowledge.....”
And the Penal Code of California declares (section 197) that homicide is justifiable w'hen committed by any person “ when resisting any attempt to murder any person or to commit a felony or -to do some great' bodily injury upon any person; ” or “ when committed in defence of habitation, property or person ..gainst one who manifestly intends or endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a felony.”
But all these questions being conceded, it is urged against the. relief sought by this writ of habeas corpus, that the question of the guilt of the prisoner of the crime of murder is a question to be determined by the laws of California, and to be decided by its- courts, and that there exists no power in the government of the United States' to take away the prisoner from ■ the custody of the proper authorities of the State of California and carry him before a judge of the court of the' United States, and release him without á trial by jury accord
The enactments now found in the Revised Statutes of the United States on the subject of the writ of habeas corpus are the result of a long course of legislation forced upon Congress by the attempt of the States of the Union to exercise the power of imprisonment over officers and other persons asserting rights under the federal government or foreign govern.ments, which the States’ denied. The original act of Congress on the subject of the writ of habeas corpus, by its 14th section, authorized the judges and the courts of the United States, in the case of prisoners in jstil or in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or committed for trial before some court of the same, or when necessary to be brought into court to testify, to issue the writ, and the judge or court before whom they were brought was directed to make inquiry into the cause of commitment. 1 Stat. 81, c. 20, § 14. This did not present the question, or, at least, it gave rise to no question whibh came before the courts, as- to releasing by this writ parties held in custody under the laws of the States. But when, during the controversy growing out of the nullifi- . cation laws of South Carolina, officers of the United States were arrested and imprisoned for the performance of their duties in collecting the revenue of the United States in that State, and held by the state authorities, it became necessary for the Congress of the United States to take some action for their relief. Accordingly the act of Congress of March 2, 1833, 4 Stat. 634, c. 57, § 7, among other remedies for such condition.of affairs, provided, by its 7th section, that the federal judges should'grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner in jail or confinement, where he should be committed or confined on or by any authority or law, for any act
The next extension of the circumstances on which a writ of habeas corpus might issue by the federal judges arose out’of the celebrated McLeod Case, in which McLeod, charged with murder, in a state court of New York, had pleaded that he was a British subject, and that what he had done was under and by the authority of his government, and should be a matter of international adjustment, and that he was not subject to be tried by a court of New York under the laws of that State. The federal government acknowledged .the force of this reasoning, and undertook to obtain from the government of the State of New York the release of the prisoner, but failed. lie was, however, tried and acquitted, and afterwards released by the State of New York. This led to an extension of the powers of the federal judges under the writ of habeas corpus, by the act of August 29, 1842, 5 Stat. 539, c. 257, entitled “ An act to provide further remedial justice in the courts of the United States.” It conferred upon them the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus in all cases where the prisoner claimed that the act for which he was held in custody was done under the sanction of any foreign power, and where the validity and effect of this plea depended upon the law of nations. In advocating the bill, which afterwards became- a law, on this subject, Senator Berrien, who introduced it into the Senate, observed: “ The object was to allow, a foreigner, prosecuted in one of the States of the Union for an offence committed in that State, but which he pleads has been committed under authority of his own sovereign or the authority . of the law of nations, to be brought up on that issue before the only competent judicial power to decide upon matters involved in foreign relations or the law of nations. The plea must show that it has reference to the laws or treaties of the United States or' the law of nations, and showing this, the writ of habeas corpus is awarded to try that issue. If it shall appear that the accused has a bar on the plea alleged, it is right and proper that he should not be delayed in prison -awaiting the
The next extension of the powers of the court under the writ of habeas corpus was the act of February 5, 1867, .14 Stat. 385, c. 28, and this contains the broad ground of the présent Revised Statutes, under which the relief is sought in the case before us, and includes all cases of restraint of liberty in violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States, and declares that “the said court or judge shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case-, by hearing testimony and the arguments of the parties interested, and if it shall appear that the petitioner is deprived of his or her liberty in contravention of the Constitution or laws of the United States, he or she shall forthwith be discharged and set at liberty.”
It would seem as if the argument might close here. If the duty of the United States to protect its officers from violence, even to death, in discharge of the duties, which its laws impose upon them, be established, and Congress has made tbé writ of habeas corpus one of the means by which this protection is made. efficient, and if the facts of this case show that the prisoner was acting both under the authority of law, and the directions of his superior officers of the Department of Justice, we can see no reason why this writ should not be made to serve its purpose in the present case.
We have already cited such decisions of this court as are most important and directly in point, and there is a series of cases decided by the Circuit .and District Courts to the same purport. Several of these arose out of proceedings under the fugitive slave law, in which the marshal of the United States, while engaged in apprehending the fugitive slave with a view to returning him to his master in another State, was arrested by the.authorities of the State. In many of these cases they made application to the judges of the United States for relief
In Ex parte Jenkins,
This same matter was up again when the fugitive slave,' Thomas, had the marshal arrested in a civil suit for an alleged assault and battery. He was carried before Judge Kane' on another writ of habeas corpus and again released.
Many other decisions by the Circuit and. District Courts, to the same purport, are to be found, among them the following: Ex parte Robinson,
Similar language was used by Mr. Choate in the Senate of. the United States upon the passage of the act of 1842. He said: “ If you have the power- to interpose after judgment, you have the power to do so before. If you can reverse a judgment, you can anticipate its rendition. If, within the Constitution, your judicial power extends to.these cases or these controversies, whether you take hold of the case or controversy at one stage or another, is totally immaterial. The single question submitted to the national tribunal, the question whether, under the statute adopting the law of nations, the prisoner is entitled to the exemption or immunity he claims, may as well be extracted from the entire case, and presented and decided in those tribunals before any judgment in the state court, as for it to be revised afterwards on a writ of error. Either way, they pass on no other question. Either
The same answer is given, in the present case. To the object tion made in argument, that the prisoner is discharged by this writ from the power of the state court to try him for the whole offence, the reply is, that if the prisoner is held in the. state court to answer for an act which he was authorized' to do by the law of the United States, which it was his duty to do as marshal of the United States, and if in .doing that act he did no more than, what was necessary and proper for him to do, he cannot be guilty of a crime under the law of the State of California. When these things are shown, it is established that he is innocent of any crime against the laws of the State, or of any other authority whatever. There is no occasion for any further trial in the state court, or in any court. The Circuit Court of the United States was as competent to ascertain these facts as any other tribunal, and it was not at all necessary that a jury should be impanelled to render a verdict on them. It is the exercise of a power common under all. systems of criminal jurisprudence. There must always be a preliminary examination by a committing magistrate, or some similar authority, as to whether there is an offence to be submitted to a jury, and if this is submitted in the first instance to a grand jury, that is still not the right of trial by jury which is insisted on in the present argument.
We have thus given, in this case, a most attentive consideration to all tne questions of law and fact which we have thought to be properly involved in it. We have felt it to be our duty to examine into the facts with a completeness justified by the importance of the case, as well as from the duty imposed upon us by the statute, which we think requires of us to place ourselves, as far as possible, in the place of the Circuit Court and to examine the testimony and the arguments in it, arid to' dispose of the party as law and justice require.
The result at which we have arrived upon this examination is, that in the protection of the person and the life of Mr. Justice Field while in the discharge of his official duties,
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Cou/rt authorizing his discharge from the custody of the sheriff ' of 8cm Joaquin Country.
Dissenting Opinion
(with whom concurred. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller) dissenting.
The Chief J ustice and' myself are unable to assent to the conclusion reached by the majority of the court.
. Our dissent is not based, on any conviction as to the guilt or innocence of the appellee. The. view which we take renders that question immaterial to the inquiry presented by this appeal. That inquiry is, whether the appellee, Neagle, shall in this ex parte proceeding be .discharged and delivered from any trial or further inquiry in any court, state or federal, for wThat he has been accused of in the forms prescribed by the constitution and laws of the State in which the act in question was committed. Upon that issue we hold to the principle announced by this court 'in the case of Ex parte Crouch,
Many of the propositions, advanced in behalf of the appellee and urged with impressive force we do not challenge. We do not question, for instance, the soundness of the elaborate discussion of the history of the office and function of the writ of habeas-corpus, its operation under and by virtue of section-753 of the Revised Statutes, or the propriety of -its use in the manner and for the purposes for which it has been used, in any case where the prisoner is under arrest by a State for an act done “in pursuance of a law of the United States.” Nor do we contend that. any objection arises to such use of the writ, and based merely on that fact, in cases where no provision is made by the federal law for the trial and conviction of the accused. Nor do we question the general propositions, that the federal government established by the Constitution is absolutely sovereign over every foot of soil, and over every personj within the national territory, within the sphere of ao-' tion assigned to it; and that within that sphere its constitution, and laws are the supreme law of the land,' and its proper instrumentalities of government can be subjected to no restraint, .and can be held to no accountability whatever. Nor, again, do we dispute the proposition that whatever is necessarily ini-.
■ The recognition by this court, including ourselves, of their soundness does not in the least elucidate the case; for they lie outside of the true controversy. The ground on which we dissent, and which in and by itself seems to be fatal to the case of the appellee, is this; That in treating section 753 of the Revised Statutes as an act of authority for this particular use of the writ a wholly inadmissible construction is placed on the word “law,” as used in that statute, and a wholly inadmissible application is made of the clause “ in custody in violation of the Constitution ... of the United States.”
It will not be necessary to consider these two propositions separately, .for .they are called into this case as practically one.
' The section referred to is as follows:
“The Writ of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to a .prisoner in jail, unless where, he is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof; oris in custody in violation o£ the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States,” etc.
' It is not contended in behalf of the appellee that the writ of habeas corpus could be used, as here it is, in any case, without authority of a statute. In Ex parte Bollman,
It is not contended that there is any statute other than those now found in the Revised Statutes of the United States. Nor is it contended that in those statutes there is any authority for the- use here made of the Avrit other than what is embraced in the clauses above quoted. The issue, as stated above, is thus narrowed to the proper force to be attributed to those clauses.
It is stated as the vital position in appellee’s case, that it is not
The practical importance of the distinction between the rights and liabilities of a person in his private character, and the authority and immunity of the same person, in his official capacity,-is clearly pointed out and illustrated in United States v. Kirby,
Now, we agree, taking the facts of the case as they are shown by the record, that the personal protection of Mr. Justice Field, as a private citizen, even to the death of Terry, was .not only the right, but was also the duty of Neagle and of any other bystander. And wq maintain that for the exercise of that right or duty he is answerable to the courts of the State of California, and • to them alone. But we deny that upon the facts of this record, he, as deputy marshal Neagle, or as private citizen Neagle, had any duty imposed on him' by the laws of'the United States growing out of the official character of Judge Field'as a Circuit Justice. We deny that anywhere in this transaction, accepting throughout the hppellee’s version of the facts, he occupied in law any position other than what would have been occupied by any other person who should have interfered* in the same manner, in any other assault of the same character, between any two other persons in that room. In short, we think that there was nothing whatever in fact of an official character in the transaction, whatever may have been the appellee’s view of his alleged official duties and powers and, therefore, we think that the courts of the' United States have in the present-state of our legislation no jurisdiction whatever in the premises, and that the appellee should have been remanded to the custody.of the sheriff.
. The contention of the appellee, however, is that it was his official duty as United States marshal to protect the justice; and that for so doing, in discharge of this duty, “ which could only arise under the laws of the United States,” his detention by the state courts brings -the case within section 753 of the Revised Statutes, as aforesaid.
We shall therefore address ourselves as briefly as is consistent with the gravity of the question' involved, to a considera-' tion of the justice of that claim. We must, however, call attention again to the formal, and. deliberate admission that it is not pretended that there is any single specific statute making it, in so many words, Neagle’s-duty to protect the justice. The position assumed is, and jg, whollv. that the authority
The Attorney General of the United States has appeared in this case for the appellee, in behalf of the government; and in order that the grounds upon which the government relies in support of its claim against the State of California that Neaglei should be discharged on this writ may fully, appear, it is proper to give some of his most important propositions in his own language. He maintains that “ it was the duty of the judiciary, having been thus protected by the executive, department, to sit in judgment upon and to vindicate the officer of the executive department, if innocent,'in the discharge of his duty, because such authority in the federal judiciary is essential in principle to the existence of the nation.” “¥e insist that, by the Constitution of the United States, .a government was created possessed of all the powers necessary to existence as an independent nation; that these powers were distributed .in three great constitutional departments, and that each of these departments is, by that Constitution, invested with all of those governmental powers naturally belonging to such department which have not been expressly withheld by the terms of the Constitution. In other words, that Congress is invested' not only with expressed but with implied legislative powers ; that the judiciary is invested not- only with, expressed powers granted in the. Constitution as its share of the government, but with all the judicial powers which have not been ex-, pressly withheld from it; and that the. President; in like manner, by the very fact that he is made the chief executive of the nation, aqd is charged to. protect, preserve, and defend' the Constitution,, and to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, is invested with necessary and implied executive powers which neither of the other branches of the government can either take away or abridge; that many .of these powers pertaining to each brah'ch of the government are self-executing, and in no way dependent, except as . to .the ways' and means, upon legislation.”
“(The Constitution provides that before- the President ;enters.;*82 upon the execution of his office he shall .take an oath — I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” And he asks: “ Has this clause no significance ? Does it. hot,'by necessary implication, invest the President with self-executing powers; that is, powers independent of statute?”
In reply to these propositions, we have this to say: We recognize that the powers of the government, “ within. its sphere,” as defined by the Constitution, and interpreted by the .well-settled principles which have resulted from a century of wise and patriotic analysis, are supreme; that these supreme powers extend to the protection of itself and all of its agencies, as well as to the preservation and’ the perpetuation,of its usefulness ; and that these powers may be found not only in the express authorities conferred by the Constitution, but also in necessary and proper implications. But -while that is' all true, it is also true that the powers must be exercised, not only by the organs, but also in conformity with the modes, prescribed by the Constitution itself. These great federal powers, whose existence in all their, plenitude and energy is incontestable, are not autocratic. and lawless; they are organized powers, committed by the people to the hands of their servants for their own government, and .distributed among the legislative, executive, and .judicial departments; they are not •extra the Constitution, for, in and by that Constitution, and in and by it alone, the United States, as a great democratic federal republic, was called into existence, and' finds its continued existence possible. In that instrument is fdund not only the answer to .the general-line of argument pursued in this-case, but also to the, specific question propounded by the Attorney General in respect to the President’s oath, and its implications.
The President is sworn to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.” That oath has great significance. The sections which follow that prescribing the oath (secs. 2 and 3 of Aft. 2) prescribe the duties and fix the powers of the President. But one very prominent feature of the Constitution
- This clause is that which contains the germ of all the implication of powers under the Constitution. It'is that which has built up the Congress of the' United States into the most august and imposing legislative assembly in the world; and which has secured vigor to the practical operations of the government, and at the same time tended largely to preserve the equilibrium of its various powers among its co-ordinate departments, as partitioned by that instrument. And that clause alone, conclusively refutes the assertion of the Attorney General, that it was “the duty of the executive department of the United States to guard and protect, at any hazard, the life of Mr. Justice. Field in the discharge of his duty, because such protection is essential to the existence of the government.” Waiving the question of the essentiality "of any such protection to the existence of, the government, the manifest answer is, that the protection needed and to be given must proceed not from the President, but primarily from Congress. Again, while it is the President’s duty 4 to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it is not his duty to make laws or a law of the. United States. The laws he is to see executed are manifestly those containéd in the Constitution, and those enacted by Congress, whose duty it is to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers of those tribunals. In fact, for the President to- have undertaken to make any law. of the United States pertinent to this matter would have been to. invade the domain of power expressly committed by the .Constitution exclusively to Congress. That body -was -perfectly able to pass such laws as it should deem expedient in reference to such matter; indeed, it has passed such laws in reference -to
For these reasons the letters of the Attorney General to Marshal Franks, granting that they did import what is. claimed, .and granting that the Attorney General was to all intents and purposes, pro hao vice, the President, invested. Néagle with no special powers whatever.. They were, if-so construed, Without authority of law, and Neagle was thep, and, there a simple deputy marshal, — no more and no less.
■ To illustrate the large sphere of powers self-executing and independent of statutes claimed to be vested in the executive, reference- is made to the continually recurring cases of the President’s interference for the protection of our foreign-born and naturalized citizens on a visit to their native country; and. we are cited, as-a striking instance of the exercise of such power, to the case of‘Martin Kozsta, who, though not fully a-naturalized citizen of -the United States, had in due form of law made his declaration of intention to become a citizen, and who, whilst at Smyrna, was • seized by order of an Austrian official arid confined on board an Austrian vessel, and who, being afterwards delivered up to Captain Ingraham, com-, manding an American war vessel, in compliance with a demand, backed by. a demonstration of force, on the part of that officer, was placed in the hands of French consul subject: to.negotiations between the .American arid Austrian govérnmerits, .resulting in the- famous correspondence between the American. Secretary of- State, Mr. Marcy, and .the Chevalier Hiilsemann, representing the Austrian government, and the restoration of Kozsta to freedom.. ¥e are asked: — Upon-what express statute of Congress then existing can this act of the government be justified ? .
¥e answer, that such action of the government was justi-i fied because it pertained to the foreign relations of the United; States, in respect to which the federal .government is' the ex-;
That authority the Constitution vests expressly and cónelu-, sively in the treaty-making power — the President and Senate — by one simple and comprehensive grant: “He [the president] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds ■ of the' senators present concur.” This broad grant makes enumeration of particular powers unnecessary. All other delegations of powers in reference to the international relations of this country are carefully and specifically enumerated and assigned, one by one, to their designated departments. In reply, therefore, to the question, what law expressly justifies such'' action', we answei', the organic law, the Constitution, which expressly commits all matters pertaining to our diplomatic negotiations, to the treaty-making power.
• Other cases are referred to in illustration of the same point; but the one which it is alleged presents that principle in the-most imposing form is that of United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co.,
Equally conclusive is the answer which the Constitution makes to the assertion that by .the Constitution the judiciary is invested, not only with the express powers granted in the Constitution as its share of the government, but with all the judicial powers which have not been expressly withheld, from it. It may be found in the clause which declares that “ The Congress shall have power . . •. to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; ” and in that which declares it shall make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into -execution the powers of those tribunals. The correlation between those clauses is manifest and unmistakable. If Congress can and must, by .the very terms of the Constitution, make all laws proper for carrying into execution all the powers of any department of the government, and if it can create the Circuit Court, expand its powers, abridge them, and abolish the court at will, how can it be that that court, at the least, shall have any implied powers derived from the Constitution and independent of the statutes % And yet, in this transaction, it must be remembered that Mr. Justice Field is only claimed to be the representative of that .court.
Not only do the foregoing views seem to us to be the- logical and unavoidable results of original and independent studies of the Constitution, but they are also sustained and enforced by. a long series of judicial recognitions and assertions.
In McGulloch v. Maryland,
In United States v. Reese,
In Strauder v. West Virginia,
' Cooley, in his work on “ Constitutional Limitations,” collates from .the numerous adjudications of this court, cited by-him, the following principles: “So far as that instrument [the Constitution] apportions powers to the national judiciary, it must be understood, for the most part, as simply authorizing Congress to pass the necessary legislation for the exercise of ■those powers by the federal courts, and not as directly, of its own force, vesting them with that authority. The Constitution does not, of its own force, give to natiQnal courts jurisdiction of the several cases which it enumerates, but an act of Congress is essential, first, to create courts, and afterwards to apportion the jurisdiction among them. The exceptions are of those few cases of which the Constitution confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court by name. And although the courts of the United States administer the common law in many cases, they do not derive authority from the common law to take cognizance of and punish offences ' against the government.. Offences against the nation are defined and their punishment prescribed by acts of Congress.” In a note to this paragraph he says : “ Demurrer to an indictment for a libel upon the President and Congress. By the court: ‘ The only quéstfón which this case presents is, whether the Circuit Courts can exercise a common law jurisdiction in .criminal cases. •. -. . The general acquiescence, of legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition. The course of reasoning which leads tó this conclusion is'simple, obvious, and admits of but little illustration. The powers' of the general government are made up of concessions •'from. i/he several States; whatever is not expressly given to
In Tennessee v. Davis,
It would seem plain, therefore, that if the Constitution means anything, and if these judicial utterances, extending as they do over a period of eighty years, and embracing a variety of interests, mean anything, they mean that the power to provide and prescribe the laws necessary to effectuate the governmental and official powers of the United States and its officers is vested in Congress.
The gravamgn of this case is in the assertion tnat Neagle slew Terry in pursuance of'a law of the United States. He who claims- to have committed a homicide by authority must show the authority. If he claims the authority of law, then what law ? And if a law, how came it to be a law ? Somehbw and somewhere it must have had an origin. Is it a law because of the existence of a special and private authority issued frbm. one of the executive departments? So in. almost- these,words
If it be said that Congress has the power to make such laws, yet in the absence of statutes from that source other departments may act in the premises ; or if it be said that the possession of that power by the government does not negative the existence of similar powers in other departments of the government; the response that these powers are plainly not concurrent, but are exclusive, can. be made in the language, of Mr. Justice Story, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
If it be said that that case had reference to the interference of a State with congressional powers, whilst in-the case -at bar- no such question is involved, the. answer is that the difference is favorable and not adverse to the theory of this opinion. The principle is the same; and if that principle can be applied, as applied it was, to the denial to a state' legislature of the powers previously enjoyed over matters originally appertaining to it, a multo fortiori will it apply to the exclusion' of two coordinate departments of the same government from powers which they never possessed.
As before stated, if the killing of Terry was done “ in pursu
Sec. 1, Art. I, provides that “ All legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House'of Representatives.” The second paragraph of Art. YI provides that “ the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the- supreme law of the land.” Now, what is it that constitutes the supreme laws, of which so much is said in this case? How distinctly, how plainly and how fully the Constitution answers! The Constitution itself, the treaties, and the laws made in pursuance of the Constitution. Made by whom ? By Congress, manifestly. The two clauses already quoted give the power of legislation in the most sweeping terms. It alone has power to make any law. Anything purporting to be a law not enacted by Congress- would not be “in pursuance of” any provision of the Constitution.
Thus we are driven to look for the source of this asserted law to some legislation of Congress — legislation made under either its éxpress constitutional authority, or under its properly implied authority, it is immaterial which; and there is none of either class. " •
The authority is sought to be traced here through the self-preservative power of the federal judiciary implied from the Constitution; and then'through the obligation of the execu
Since then the Constitution did not, by its own direct provisions, regulate this matter, but committed it to the hands of Congress with full powers iii the premises; it is only by the enactment of some law. of Congress that the appellee can show that-he is in custody “in violation of the Constitution.” As previously remarked, the two propositions are, as to this case, essentially one. Turning again to the statute under which the writ is sued out, we find that the. clause relied on is that- which makes the writ applicable where the person “ is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States.” The question then arises, What sort of law ? What does^the expression import ? Is it not plain that it means just what the same expression all through the Constitution imports %
' If that instrument, which is the fountain of. the federal power, be consulted, it will be found that in it and the amendments thereto the word law, in either its singular form or its plural, laws, is used forty-two times. ' Of these instances of that use sixteen are where the word is used in reference to the jurisprudence of the States, and of the law of nations, or where they' are merely terms of description — such as “ courts of law,” leases in law and equity,” etc. Of the other instances of its use, and which all have reference to that' body of rules which constitute the jurisprudence distinctly of the United States, there are only three cases in which it is not manifest that the word is used as equivalent to “statutes,” “ enactments of the Congress; ” and it is clear in those three instances the word is used also as equivalent to “statutes.” The following are examples:
“ The Congress may, at ..any time, ly law, make or alter such regulations, [in regard to the election of Senators and Representatives].” Art. I, sec. 4,
“ Every bill . . . shall, before it become a law, be presented,” etc.- ■ ■ Art.-1, sec. 1.
*93 “Congress shall have power ... to establish . . uniform, laws on the subject of bankruptcies,” etc. Art. I, sec. 8.
“Congress shall have .power ... to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper,” etc. Art. I, sec! 8.
“No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.” Art. I, sec. 9.
“ Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” 1st Amendment.
It would be tedious, and it is unnecessary, to set them all forth. They all have the same manifest meaning of “ statutes,” except three, and in those three instances the words do not mean anything other than statutes. We think it plain that the expression, “a law of the United States,” as used in section 753 of the Revised Statutes, mean just what the similar expression means all through the Constitution, — and that is a statute of the United States. Tennessee v. Davis,
Of the decisions of this court cited as authority to sustain the order discharging the appellee, Ex parte Siebold,
In Tennessee v. Davis, the case was removed from a state court to the Circuit Court of the United States, under the express provisions of section 643 of the Revised Statutes. The homicide, for which the petitioner was prosecuted, was committed by him while executing his duties, as a revenue officer, in pursuance of the express requirements of the revenue laws, and in defence of his own life, upon a party offering unlawful resistance. So far from running counter to the position we are seeking to maintain, we think the principle there laid down, on the point we are now discussing, is in accord with that position. The.language of the court, through Mr. Justice Strong, who delivered its opinion, is as follows: “ Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the right, or privilege, or claim or protection, or defence of the party, in whole or in part, by whom they are asserted. Story on the Constitution, sec. 1647;
Whilst it is true that the opinions in both of those cases assert in the strongest and most impressive language the supremacy of the government of the United States in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, w'e regard them also as a vindication of Congress as the law-making department of the government, as the depository of the implied and constructed powers of the government; or, as Mr. Chief-Justice Marshall expresses it, of tlie power to legislate upon that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the Constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble.
As the Siebold Case and Tennessee v. Davis have been referred to as the most important and directly in point in support of the opposite view, we do not deem it necessary to give an extended examination of the series of cases decided by the Circuit and District Courts cited to the same purport. Ex parte Jenlcins,
This was so in Ex parte Jenkins. The United States marshal, was arrested on a warrant issued by a state magistrate while he was executing a warrant issued under said law of-Congress. He was brought before the Circuit Court of the United States. for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, on a writ of habeas corpus, and was discharged upon the ground that the fugitive slave law, having been enacted in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States,-was paramount to the law: of Pennsylvania in conflict with it, and that the marshal, being in custody for an’ act done in pursuance of that law of Congress, and in execution of process under it, was entitled to his discharge. It is so manifest that that case was within the provision of section 753 of the Revised Statutes that further comment is unnecessary; and the same may be said of all- of the other decisions of the circuit and district courts. In every one of them the party discharged was in custody either for an act done in pursuance of an express statute of Congress, or in the execution of a decree, order, or process of a conrt, or the custody was in violation of the Constitution of the United States.
¥e stated at the outset of these remarks that we raised no question upon the discussion of the history of ’the legislation .of Congress upon the subject of the writ of habeas corpus. "We think, however, it is pertinent in this connection to inquire what w:as the necessity for any such legislation at all if the theory contended for as to the sufficiency of the self-executing powers of the executive and judicial departments of the government to protect all the agencies and instrumentalities of the federal government is correct. Why could- not President. Jackson, in 1833, as the head of the executive department, invésted with the power and charged with the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed and to defend the Consti- ’
It is claimed that such a law is found in section 787 of the Revised Statutes, which is as follows:
“ It shall be the duty of the marshal of each' district to attend the district and circuit courts when sitting .therein, and to execute, throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United States; and he shall have power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty.”
It is contended that the duty imposed upon the' marshal of each district by this section is not satisfied by a mere formal attendance upon the judges while on the bench; but that it extends to the whole term of the courts while in session, and can fairly be construed as requiring him to attend the judge while on his way from one court to another, to- perform his
Great as the crime of Terry was in his assault upon Mr.. Justice Field, so far from its being'a crime against the court, it .was not even a contempt of court, and could not have received adequate punishment as such. Section 725 of' the Revised Statutes limits contempt to cases of misbehavior in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.
It is claimed that the law needed for appellee’s case can be found in section 788 of the Revised Statutes.' That section is as follows: “ The marshals and their deputies shall have, in each State, the same powers, in executing the laws of the United States, as the sheriffs and their deputies in such State may have, by law, in executing the laws thereof.”
It is then argued that by the Code of California the sheriff has extensive powers as a conservator of the peace, the statutes to that effeot being quoted in extenso; that he also has certain additional common law powers and. obligations to protect the judges and to personally attend them on their visits co that State; that, therefore, no statutory authority of the United States for the attendance on Mr.. Justice Field bv Neagle, and for Neagle’s personal presence on the scene Was-necessary; .and that that statute constituted'Neagle a peace officer to keep the peace of the United States. This line óf argument seems to us wholly untenable.
By -way of preliminary remark it may be well to say, that so far as the simple fact of Neagle’s attendance on Mr. Justice-Field, and the fact of his personal presence, are concerned, no authority, statutory or otherwise, was needed. He had a right to be. th.ere ; and being there, no matter how or why, if it be
We áre not unmindful of the fact that in the foregoing remarks we have not discussed the bearings of this decision .upon the autonomy.of the States, in divesting them of what was once regarded as their exólusive jurisdiction over crimes committed within their own territory, against their own laws, and in enabling a federal judge or court, by an order in. a habeas corpus proceeding, to deprive a State of its' power to maintain its own public order, or to protect the security of society and the lives of its own citizens, whenever the amenability to its courts of a federal officer or employé or agent is sought to be enforced. We have not entered upon that question, because, as. arising here, its suggestion is sufficient, and its consideration might involve the extent to which legislation in that direction may constitutionally go, which could only lie properly determined when directly presented, by the recotd in a case before the court of adjudication.
For these reasons, as briefly stated as possible, we think the judgment of the court below should be reversed and the prisoner remanded to the custody of the sheriff of San Joaqum County, California; and we are the less reluctant to express this conclusion, because we cannot permit ourselves to dóuíbt ■that the authorities of the State of California are competéiit and willing-to..do justice; and that even if the appellee hhd been indicted, and had gone to trial upon this record, tffid and his country would have given him a good deliverance.