Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital of Denton, Marc Wilson, M.D., and Alliance ob/gyn Specialists, Pllc D/B/A ob/gyn Specialists, Pllc v. D.A. and M.A., Individually and as Next Friends of A.A., a Minor, 569 S.W.3d 126

Baby A.A. suffered brachial plexus injuries during delivery at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital of Denton after shoulder dystocia and forceps/arm extraction maneuvers.
Parents sued the delivering physician, his practice, and the hospital alleging negligent maneuvers caused the injury.
Defendant (Dr. Wilson) moved for partial summary judgment invoking Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.153, arguing the claim arises from emergency medical care in a hospital obstetrical unit and thus requires proof of willful and wanton negligence.
Trial court granted partial summary judgment, concluding the maneuvers were emergency medical care and the heightened willful-and-wanton standard applied.
The court of appeals reversed, reading § 74.153 to require the "immediately following" limitation for obstetrical-unit care (i.e., protection applies only when care in the OB unit immediately follows ER evaluation), creating a split about the scope of the statutory modifier.
The Texas Supreme Court granted review to decide whether § 74.153’s "immediately following" phrase modifies only "surgical suite" or also the emergency-department and obstetrical-unit references.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Family)	Defendant's Argument (Wilson)	Held
Whether Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.153 requires willful-and-wanton negligence for claims arising from emergency care in an obstetrical unit when the patient was not evaluated/treated in the ER immediately before	§ 74.153’s "immediately following" phrase modifies the whole series, so its protection applies to OB-unit care only if it immediately follows ER evaluation/treatment	The phrase modifies only "surgical suite"; § 74.153 applies to emergency care in an obstetrical unit regardless of prior ER evaluation/treatment	The Court held the modifier applies only to "surgical suite." § 74.153 requires willful-and-wanton proof for emergency care in an obstetrical unit even if there was no immediately prior ER evaluation/treatment; trial court summary judgment reinstated

DeQueen v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010) (statutory-construction and ambiguity standard)
Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294 (Tex. 2016) (use of punctuation and extrinsic aids in statutory interpretation)
Rodriguez v. Fort Worth Transp. Auth., 547 S.W.3d 830 (Tex. 2018) (ordinary meaning and context govern construction)
Ludwig v. State, 931 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (comma absence can create ambiguity in modifier scope)
United States v. Pritchett, 470 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (postpositive modifier applies only to subset of listed items)
Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (list separation and modifier scope)