Texas Department of Public Safety v. Bonilla
481 S.W.3d 640
| Tex. | 2015Background
- Trooper from Texas DPS ran a red light while pursuing a reportedly reckless, speeding vehicle; collision injured Merardo Bonilla.
- Bonilla sued DPS under the Texas Tort Claims Act, invoking the waiver of sovereign immunity.
- DPS moved for summary judgment and pleaded lack of jurisdiction, asserting official immunity for the trooper and the Act’s emergency-response exception.
- Trial court denied DPS’s motion; the court of appeals affirmed, finding DPS failed to conclusively prove the trooper’s good faith and that its evidence inadequately addressed consideration of alternatives.
- The Texas Supreme Court granted review due to a conflict over the proper good-faith standard for official immunity and whether DPS’s evidence addressed alternatives to pursuit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DPS conclusively proved trooper’s good faith for official immunity | Bonilla: a reasonably prudent officer could have decided the public risk of pursuit outweighed need to stop the speeding truck | DPS: good faith is shown if a reasonable officer could have believed pursuit was necessary given urgency and inability to identify driver | Court: reversed court of appeals — correct test asks whether any reasonable officer could have believed the actions justified (objective reasonableness); DPS’s evidence may suffice |
| Whether DPS’s summary-judgment evidence was incompetent for failing to show the trooper considered alternatives to pursuit | Bonilla: trooper’s affidavit did not establish he considered alternative courses of action, so proof of need/risk balancing is deficient | DPS: trooper’s statements about urgency, inability to identify driver, unsafe location, and immediate danger implicitly address alternatives; explicit “magic words” not required | Court: DPS’s evidence sufficiently addressed alternatives implicitly; court of appeals erred in requiring explicit identification of alternatives |
| Whether court of appeals applied correct legal standard for good faith | Bonilla: evidence shows a reasonable officer could have chosen differently, which precludes immunity | DPS: correct standard is whether a reasonably prudent officer could have believed actions were justified; not defeated by evidence that others might decide differently | Court: court of appeals used wrong standard (focused on whether other officers could differ); proper standard protects all but plainly incompetent or intentionally unlawful conduct |
| Whether remand required and jurisdictional plea issue | Bonilla: factual disputes remain warranting denial of immunity at summary judgment | DPS: some issues resolved in its favor; plea to jurisdiction on emergency exception not a meritorious review issue | Court: reversed court of appeals and remanded for reconsideration under correct legal standard; rejected further review of emergency-exception plea |
Key Cases Cited
- University of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2000) (summary-judgment proof must address need/risk factors but need not use specific words)
- City of San Antonio v. Ytuarte, 229 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. 2007) (good-faith official-immunity standard explained)
- Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1997) (articulates need/risk factors for emergency-response good faith)
- City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1994) (official immunity framework)
- Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. 2002) (application of reasonably prudent officer standard)