City of Lancaster v. Chambers

any period any portion million thereof for expected to The evidence FST $250,000 of time. profit beginning make a $500,000 legally to per year to is insufficient record, this there is no We hold First, evidence, elicits profits. show lost profits damages and Petition- evidence of lost testimony secretary ed from the of FST’s to an verdict on ers were entitled instructed treasurer, speculation. pure is There is and damages. reverse the nothing in the record to show how FST appeals and remand this matter to profits. amount of lost See determined the for consideration of Atherton, Second, at

Holt 84. points of error. FST’s additional nothing there is the record that relates the profits expected to total amount of FST beginning profits to the

make FST result of the transfer of retirement

lost as a to RAAI.

accounts lost mil

The evidence FST $36

lion in to RAAI and earned .75% assets in annual fees on such assets also is 1% LANCASTER, Lancaster The CITY OF legally profits. show lost insufficient Police Everett Powell and Jim Officers suggests this evidence that FST lost While my Miller, City of and the DeSoto $270,000 $360,000 in annual fees on the H. Ran DeSoto Police Officers William RAAI, transferred to this evidence accounts Bentley, Petitioners, som and C.P. profits legally insufficient to show lost could because there is no evidence FST expected retain all of those accounts Evelyn Chambers, Ken CHAMBERS Rather, any the uncon- period of time. Individually and as next friends of shows that the individual tradicted evidence Bradley Chambers, Respondents. could transfer their accounts account holders No. D-3331. manag to another trustee or retirement fund any evidence that FST er at time. Without Supreme of Texas. Court million expected could have to retain the $36 time, any length accounts for retirement Argued 1993. Oct. there is no evidence that FST could have Decided June expected profits on those accounts to earn any period of time. appeals’ reliance on the testi- The court expected

mony could have to retain that FST for the lifetime of the individual

the accounts support does not reversal

account holders First, judgment. this evi-

the trial court’s evidentiary any foundation

dence is without therefore, purely speculative and con- Second, considering

clusory. this evi- even

dence, expec- of the life there is no evidence

tancy the individual account holders.

Thus, again, no basis to determine there is expected could have length of time FST million in assets.

to retain the $36 retirement

Third, that the individu- is no evidence there representing mil- holders the $36

al account assets were still alive

lion retirement short, there is no evi-

the time of trial. kept would have $36

dence that FST early morning Sunday,

In the hours of August Bradley was rid- Chambers ing motorcycle of a the back driven through city Stiles Af- Scott DeSoto. allegedly light ter ran a red within Stiles Bentley, police view of Bent- DeSoto ley engaged emergency lights of the his Stiles, squad pursued ear and with them. board, away sped and a Chambers still high-speed began. Bentley soon chase was officers, joined by in- several fellow DeSoto Ransom, cluding monitoring the who up con- chase a back vehicle. The chase tinued on to Interstate where the DeSoto officers, assistance, radioing after for were joined by and the Lancaster Powell Miller of Ultimately, police police department. ten ve- jurisdictions joined hicles from five the chase. Pinker, All of the vehicles had their sirens and emer- Hogue, Eric W. Robert G. Randall gency lights on. testified that at Kucera, Gordon, Dallas, Chambers Wayne R. R. for chase, point during the which exceeded one petitioners. hour, police speeds per of 80-100 miles the Stutz, Weiner, Dallas, Thomas J. David R. feet, although closed to within 5-10 there was respondents. for testimony from of some pull away pur- Stiles continued to from the CORNYN, Justice, opinion delivered the ultimately attempted an suit. When Stiles PHILLIPS, C.J., Court, the in which and interstate, careening exit from the down the HIGHTOWER, HECHT, GONZALEZ, and ramp high speed, motor- exit at a rate of the GAMMAGE, Justices, and Justice ENOCH gas cycle sign pole crashed into a at a sta- join. tion, killing seriously injuring and Stiles Chambers, individually Evelyn Ken and Chambers. son, Bradley of their and as next friends individually parents, and as Chambers’ “Chambers”), (collectively sued Chambers son, brought next friends for their suit Lancaster, City police offi-

the Lancaster policemen Lancaster against the DeSoto and Miller, Jimmy cers Everett Powell and alleging against respective cities and DeSoto, and DeSoto officers (2) (1) negligence, and causes of action for Bentley, H. Ransom and C.P. William rights through civil violation of Chambers’ deprivation negligence law and common deadly and force” under the use of “excessive § rights 1983 in connection under U.S.C. § 1983. The officers and cities U.S.C. high-speed police Brad- “defendants”) with a chase which (collectively filed motions ley seriously injured. Chambers was Be- summary asserting, among other judgment immunity, in- (1) cause the doctrine of official things, they negligent were not as a (a) as an affirmative voked officers they duty matter of law because owed no defense, (b) important Chambers, continues to be an and actions not a their were jurisprudence, accident; we unsettled issue our proximate cause of the facts; applica- granted the cities’ and the officers’ under these were immune from suit granted Cham- cause of tion for writ of error. We failed to state a Chambers concerning grant- § trial court application for writ of error action under 1983.1 The bers’ rights because it also on both Chambers’ his under section 1983 ed claims, judg- take-nothing potentially dispositive is- and rendered important, raises ment. sues. § § 42 U.S.C.

1. All references 1983 are to caused which illegal conduct prove trial reversed exit from high-speed accident —Stiles’ negli- and remanded court’s con- resulting loss of highway with af- but claims, gence 843 S.W.2d an unforesee- motorcycle his § trol of summary judgment on firmed the —was ie., their negligence, of their able result at 152. claims. Id. regard for the with due to drive failure state law negligence and Remand A using the road. persons all for further to the trial court ty immuni issues as to whether question remains fact '' opinion, Sftdmgs with consistent cause of the proximate [defendants] judgment disposing affirm summary accident. claim, not on the but omitted). (citations Based at 148 grounds appeals. upon relied record, not enti- are the defendants on this on the basis tled a matter of law. negligent as they not were Negligence II. they contend that The defendants Immunity State Law Claims for of law be Official negligent as matter duty no Chambers and they owed to. cause immunity an affirmative Official proximate not the cause of their actions were Univ., A I Perry v. Texas & defense. argument, duty As to the the accident. Tex. 106, (Tex.App. Corpus Christi S.W.2d — 24(e) (Vernon 6701d, § art. Rev.Civ.Stat. n.r.e.). Thus, 1987, the burden writ ref'd 1977) provides that authorized drivers of all elements on the defendant to establish emergency duty “the to drive vehicles have Kennedy, 669 Montgomery v. the defense. regard safety per with due for of all (Tex.1984). 309, Government 310-11 S.W.2d added). (emphasis sons.” of that immunity to official employees are entitled duty encompasses Chambers. As to the arising performance from the from suit proximate argument, agree causation we with (2) (1) discretionary duties their faith appeals explained it when that: (3) acting within the long as are Travis, argument The same was made in Story, authority. Baker v. scope of their supreme and the court under those facts 639, (Tex.Civ.App. Antonio — San proximate held that could be a n.r.e.); 1981, Wyse Department writ ref'd cause of the in that accident case. We (Tex. 224, Safety, Pub. 733 S.W.2d believe that reasoning applies the same n.r.e.). 1986, App. writ ref'd — Waco noted, these facts. As the Travis proximate requires cause two elements: A. (1) fact, foreseeability. cause Discretionary v. Acts Ministerial “Cause in fact” means that act or omission bring was a substantial factor in held that be that, ing injury it, about the without cause the officers did not have discretion to no harm would regard have occurred. As in Tra drive their vehicles without due vis, summary judgment proof others, raises their actions could not motorcycle’s the inference that protected immunity. wreck official may part by po have been caused in disagree; S.W.2d at 149. the court’s failure to regard licemen’s drive with due focus should be on whether the officer is safety_ function, discretionary While crim- performing not on party inal of a conduct third can be a whether the officer has discretion to do an superseding rendering resulting cause allegedly wrongful discharging act while injuries actor, unforeseeable to the function. If official existed superseding criminal conduct is not a cramped cause sense used if it appeals, is a foreseeable result of the promise against person actor’s its Here, negligence. liability public sum- al civil [defendants’] officers would be mary judgment proof conclusively purpose does not hollow doctrine indeed. The of official protect regulations by peace is to public offi- officers involves the ex discretion.”). cers from civil for conduct that would ercise of their otherwise be actionable. contexts, held other our courts have Ministerial acts are those: exercising officers discretion prescribes [ w]here the law and defines the See, e.g., performing duties. while their performed precision duties to be with such 114, Dallas, Dent v. 729 S.W.2d certainty nothing as to leave to the n.r.e.) 1986, (Tex.App. writ ref'd — Dallas exercise of discretion or ... but discretionary (holding performing where the act to be done involves the suspect), deciding arrest act and how to judgment, exercise discretion or it is not denied, rt. ce merely to be deemed ministerial. (1988); Vasquez v. Her 99 L.Ed.2d 483 Simpson, Rains v. 50 Tex. nandez, (Tex.App.- (quoting Commissioner the General Land w.o.j.) (holding San Antonio writ dism’d (1849)). Smith, 5 Tex. If Office positioning himself next his that officer’s deliberation, personal an action involves deci gun firing then patrol car with drawn and judgment, discretionary; sion and it is ac force); deadly discretionary was a use of require tions which obedience to orders or (describing Wyse, at 227 investi 733 S.W.2d performance duty of a to which the actor peace gatory duties of officers as discretion choice, Wyse, no has are ministerial. 733 Hambrick, 593, v. 846 S.W.2d ary); Boozier S.W.2d at 227. 1993, (Tex.App. [1st Dist.] no 597 — Houston police operating Whether a officer a vehi (“When writ) police reports a officer the mis authority cle in the officer’s performs of another ... the officer a conduct performing discretionary a act or ministerial act.”). discretionary is an issue on which Texas courts have divergent reached Compare conclusions. not determine Although federal law does (Tex. Wood, 567, Eubanks v. 304 S.W.2d 570 discretionary are an officer’s actions whether n.r.e.) 1957, Civ.App. writ ref'd — Eastland law,2 nonetheless an state purposes (holding response officer’s to an immunity law is in of federal examination emergency call “does not involve matters law, the act Under structive. officer”) within his discretion as an and Hud discretionary pre as a question must be (Tex. 24, Maurry, dleston v. 841 S.W.2d 29 qualified immuni requisite to an extension of (ex 1992, App. w.o.j.) writ dism’d — Dallas 555, Jordan, F.2d ty. v. 918 See Streetman plaining that officers were not entitled to (5th Cir.1990) immunity (“Qualified 556 immunity pur because “their actions in the personal police officer from cloaks a suit did not involve matters within their dis not violate discretionary which do acts cretion”) City Mesquite, with Travis v. 830 law.”). Thus, those cases well-established (Tex.1992) J., 94, (Cornyn, con S.W.2d 103 immunity ato court extends which a federal to curring) (arguing that officers’ decision officer, necessarily determine police pursue high speed at was “an exercise of See, e.g., discretionary. disputed actions are discretion”) Barner, Carpenter 797 v. 635, 641, 107 Creighton, v. Anderson 1990, 99, (Tex.App. 101 writ S.W.2d — Waco 3039-40, 523 3034, L.Ed.2d 97 denied) discussion, (noting, without in search engaged entitled (holding officers by immunity county protected constable was Wadley, City 5 v. immunity); to Swint taillights stopped whose when he a vehicle Cir.1993) (holding officers Plummer, F.3d Edgar operating) and v. were not raid to im investigatory entitled 452, (Tex.App. involved 845 S.W.2d — Texarkana Horta, (holding at 15 offi munity); F.3d writ) (“The 1993, traffic enforcement of no law].”); 2, (1st [immunity Sullivan, under state Greiner poses of Cir. 2. See Horta v. 1993) (“[T]he reasoning F.Supp. Champlin, district court erred v. police actions were officers’ (D.Minn 1993) ("The qualified that because federal doctrine purposes ‘discretionary’ im for the brought apply claims un to does law, per they munity were also under federal law.”). [state] der pur forming 'discretionary functions’ care, statutorily-imposed standards of inexor pursuit roadblock enti cers involved immunity). ably leads to the conclusion that an officer tled if the officer is not entitled recently states that consid Several negligent. That formulation of the standard actions the issue have ered also held immunity’s very function. official frustrates high-speed chase police during a a perform with public If officials their duties See, discretionary. e.g., Pletan v. they immunity. negligence, do not need out Gaines, (Minn.1992) (holding 494 N.W.2d 38 complex policy reflected danger engaged in a police officers who immunity, if is to doctrine of official it suspect fleeing high-speed ous chase of anything, protects from suit mean officers suit); Youngblood from v. immune Chap negligently. if acted See even (Tenn.Ct.App. Clepper, 856 S.W.2d Gonzales, man S.W.2d 1993) (“In sense, offi one much of a (Tex.App. writ [14th Dist.] — Houston An conduct involved discretion. [sic] cer’s denied); Vasquez, 844 at 804 S.W.2d continuously officer must choose between negli (“[Qjuestions of the officer’s individual warnings and He must decide arrests. gence deciding ... are immaterial when problem passed a minor whether should performing officer was discre whether the up in order to concentrate on a more serious functions.”) tionary (citing Carpenter, 797 signal must decide one. He which vehicles 101). signal give. form of Discretion and what day.”) is a constant factor in a officer’s particular to pursue The decision Heald, (quoting Simon v. 359 A.2d fundamentally offi suspect will involve the Welby, (Del.Super.Ct.1976)); Bachmann discretion, must, in cer’s because the officer (Mo.App.1993) (holding instance, first elect to undertake whether regarding that officer’s decision route and Beyond the pursuit. initial decision to en all-points in speed responding to travel to chase, high pursuit in a in gage speed the discretionary).3 bulletin was volves the officer’s discretion on a number of Chambers contends that a Texas statute levels, including, which route should be fol addressing by the level an of care owed lowed, speed, back-up at what should vehicle, an operator emergency of mandates for, fleeing closely called and how should the holding an a that officer has no discretion to pursued. po vehicle be We hold that these regard due of all drive without engaging high-speed officer’s in chase lice a persons. This of issue formulation the discretionary a act. however, by adopted the appeals, begs question the of whether the officer is B. performing discretionary a The function. sufficiently specific

statutes at issue are not Good Faith so to leave no in choice to an officer the performance difficulty applying “good of these duties. ar- in the gument, immunity that an discretion of official officer is without faith” element has been Travis, acknowledged. in a previously to drive manner violates these which jurisdictions high- Although some While have held that a in the their conduct chase. in Travis speed chase does not an discre involve officer's pursuit guidelines to reference was made the of tion, Cramer, Tice v. see 133 N.J. 627 A.2d City Mesquite, (Cornyn, of the S.W.2d at 103 (1993) discretionary (noting that J., concurring), argue Chambers does not in this immunity limited exercised at discretion pursuit specific guidelines any of case that of highest government .policy levels of in matters municipalities inquiry involved affects our planning applicable pursuit or and is not in pursuit discretionary in into whether actions case); Brown, City Pinellas Park v. 604 So.2d fact, in or ministerial. Chambers concedes (Fla.1992) immunity (holding that "a his brief to high- did not shield officers involved in 25-mile officer has the discretion to decide whether speed traffic chase of violator because decisions initiate continue a chase.” operation officers to continue the chase were acts), discretionary al rather than 6701d, 24(c)(3) usually signifi art. 4. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. involved had their discretion (Vernon 1977). cantly by specific guidelines regulating curtailed J., McMillian, (Cornyn, concurring). S.W.2d at 104-05 son v. Cir.1991) test, following

Today adopt (quoting Malley Briggs, we which we 335, 341, 106 1092, 1096, a fair balance believe achieves between the S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (citations omitted). (1986)), competing respectively) hold interests stake. We good in in pursuit an officer acts faith case argue The defendants this test for if: controverted, good easily faith is too making officer, reasonably prudent under the immunity on official circumstances, same or similar could have contrary, claims difficult to obtain.6 To the immediately ap- believed that the need to our faith test sets elevated standard prehend suspect outweighed a clear proof seeking for the nonmovant to defeat public continuing of harm to risk response a claim of official to a pursuit.5 summary judgment, motion for while reason- ably accommodating competing interests substantially derived This test is from the hand, involved. On one there is emerged test that has under federal immuni- injustice, particularly in the ab- ty law for claims of faith, subjecting liability sence of bad § 1983 cases: required, by legal an officer who is Although the cases sometimes refer to the obligations position, of his dis- exercise qualified “good doctrine of faith” immuni- cretion; danger [and] ty, objective legal the test is one of reason- threat of such would deter his ableness, regard without to whether the willingness to execute his office with the government official involved acted with judgment required decisiveness and the subjective good faith. look to “[W]e public good. whether a official could have reasonable Rhodes, 232, 240, believed his or her conduct to be lawful Scheuer v. (1974). clearly light of established law and the 40 L.Ed.2d 90 On hand, possessed information the official at the the other the court must consider the Thus, quali- rights bystanders par time the conduct occurred.” or other innocent immunity protects plainly gross disregard if an fied “all but the ties officer acts public safety. incompetent knowingly or those who vio- late the law.” aspect The “could have believed” good City Wadley, Swint v. 5 F.3d 1441- faith test means that order to be of (11th Cir.1993) (quoting Hayes, summary judgment, an Hardin v. entitled to officer (11th Cir.1992), reasonably prove prudent and Cour must that a officer Despite similarity suggest following between this standard and a 6. The defendants the test: an test, general (1) negligence equivalence good no should be if: the officer officer acts in faith contin- implied. provides While art. the test for 670Id pursuit ued the in the course and operator guilty emergency is whether an vehicle work, (2) pursuit the and continuance of the ordinary gross negligence, it does not deter- pursuit prompted an observed violation immunity mine whether should be extended. See investigative regarding information of the law or 6701d, (Ver- 24(e) Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. (3) apprehend suspect, the and the the need to 1977) provisions (stating non that the article’s not, by proximity to or officers’ vehicles did duty consequences do not relate to of breach vehicle, fleeing suspect's ma- "coercion” of the duty: provisions protect of such such "nor shall suspect’s the crash. neuver the vehicle into consequences the driver from the of his reckless While we concede that this test could almost others”). disregard That art. always summary judgment, on there be resolved inferentially may rebut the 6701d be read to problems are numerous other with this formula- immunity operators defense of official collapses the the first element the tion' of issue: instances, emergency some col- vehicles in requirement immunity good into the faith inquiries, lapsing duty good the faith is a acting-within-the-scope-of-authority requirement; consequence legislature’s framing of the elements are redun- the test’s first second expres- statutory duty. But in the absence of an true, (2) (1) necessarily will dant —whenever legislative intent to abolish official sion of clear true; (3), an officer causes context, also be as to whether altogether immunity in this we hold that dispositive suspect’s to crash cannot be vehicle preclude appli- does a violation of art. 6701d not good negli- whether the officer acted in immunity of the issue of of the official doctrine to cation emergency operators. gent vehicle faith. immunity improp qualified on pursuit the should might that have believed er.”). It does not mean have been continued.7 prove that it would have officer has to test we create the do concede pursuit; nor stop the been unreasonable likely to resolved less today is somewhat reasonably all prove must stage than is summary judgment at the continued the prudent officers would have There are both substantive test. federal summary the officer’s pursuit. To controvert for this. procedural reasons faith, plaintiff judgment proof on reasonably show that a must do more than First, may immunity be conferred stop could have decided prudent officer stage at “no plaintiff must show that pursuit; right at finding that the constitutional court’s position person in the defendant’s reasonable v. clearly Elder not established. issue was thought the facts were such could have - -, -, 114 S.Ct. Holloway, City v. they justified acts.” Post defendant’s 1019, 1023, 127 (categoriz L.Ed.2d 344 (11th Lauderdale, F.3d Fort of law in which inquiry question as a ing the Cir.1993). Metropolitan v. Dade Sims Cf. right was whether the court determines (11th 1230, 1234-35 Cir. County, 972 F.2d established); Fitzgerald, clearly Harlow 1992); Malley Briggs, 475 U.S. see also 2727, 2738, 800, 818, 335, 341, 106 L.Ed.2d 271 (1982) (“On summary judgment, L.Ed.2d 396 “if (noting that officers of reasonable determine, may judge appropriately issue, disagree im competence could law, currently applicable but wheth munity recognized”).8 should be clearly established at er that law was occurred.”); Rodriguez v. time an action immunity guar law does not Even federal (S.D.Fla.1988) Tisch, F.Supp. issue at antee resolution of (“Because not state a plaintiffs’ claims do See, e.g., Presley v. summary judgment. law, summary clearly established violation City of Benbrook, 4 F.3d 410 & n. 5 time.”). appropriate at this No judgment is Cir.1993) (“Immunity’s against shield suit is legal question has analogous been threshold lost, course, officer defendants good faith test for written into a point, go to trial. At that if—and this is from nonconstitutional torts. big disputed issues of mate if—there remain immunity, jury, prop rial fact relative to obtaining Second, sum the relative ease of instructed, may question.... erly decide the system as com mary judgment the federal charge pattern jury exem The Fifth Circuit im system permits federal pared to Texas’ jury plifies how a would determine frequently munity to be resolved more issues immunity in excessive force and certain summary judgment. generally David See eases.”); Mazurkiewicz v. fourth amendment Liberato, Summary Judg Lynne Hittner & Auth., F.Supp. New York Transit 9, Texas, 78-94 35 S.TEX.L.REV. ments in (“The (S.D.N.Y.1993) 563, question of sum (contrasting with Texas federal jury for the in a civil excessive force is one mary judgment practice). one.”); this v. rights action such as Walton legal stan- 1331, articulation of a new Southfield, Given our Cir.1993) component of (“However, by good faith as a genuine ma dard which if issues of judged, must be we remand official fact exist as to whether the defendants terial pro- trial court for further this cause to the actually commit acts that would violate did opinion. summary ceedings consistent with clearly right, then established authority appropriate be- analogous Citation to federal to the abuse of 7. This standard is ap holdings utilized from the more standard of review flow not discretion cause these reviewing pellate certain trial cotut in the federal rules liberal courts, rulings: is shown if an abuse of discretion meaning appropriate but rather from reasonably could not have reached the trial court requirement in an objective of an reasonableness question. Landry Ins. v. Travelers the decision in Co., immunity analysis. 1970). 649, (Tex. employee acting scope C. within the of em- ployment if: Scope Authority A) inju- property damage, personal Finally, acting officialsmust within ry, operation or arises from death scope authority their order for a use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor- court to find them from immune suit. The equipment; driven appeals implies B) employee personally would be li- acting scope were not within the of their according able to the claimant to Texas authority authority because are without law.... regard drive without due § Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. 101.021 others. 843 (noting S.W.2d at 149 that fact added). (emphasis If the officers are im- issues as to whether the officers had acted suit, they mune “personally from are not negligently genuine created “a issue of mate according liable to the claimant to Texas rial fact as to whether the officers were remanding law.” As we are the issue of the ). acting authority” within their liability officers’ to the trial court for further scope authority misconceives proceedings under the new test for however, immunity, element of official today, faith that we have articulated the issue offieers-are-without-diseretion-to-drive-without-due-regard essentially repeats the of the cities’ is also remanded to the argume n trial court. disposed t of above.9 An official acts scope authority within the of her if she is III. discharging generally assigned the duties Here, § her. The 1983 Claim we hold that the defendant offi acting cers were within the of their any Section 1983 does not create authority: duty, each officer was on in a rights merely substantive but is “a method ear, squad pursuing suspect. vindicating rights elsewhere con Connor, 386, ferred.” Graham U.S. , 1870, 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 D. S.Ct. 394 McCollan, (quoting Baker v.

Immunity of Cities 3, n. n. (1979)). alleges in L.Ed.2d 433 Chambers municipality, political A aas subdivi original petition his first amended state, sion of the is not liable for the acts or force, deprived officers used excessive which employees conduct its officers or unless liberty process Chambers “of his without due municipality’s common law rights of law violation of secured waived the Texas Tort Claims Act Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the (“TTCA”). Nix, Cronen 611 S.W.2d 651 United States Constitution.” (Tex.Civ.App. writ [1st Dist.] — Houston n.r.e.), denied, ref 'd cert. (1981). appli 70 L.Ed.2d 112 A. provision provides, cable waiver of the TTCA Graham and pertinent part: Excessive Force Claims governmental

A unit in the state is liable for: law, deciding issues of federal When

1) property damage, personal injury, unique find role —as a we ourselves proximately by wrongful death caused on all other within of last resort issues jurisdiction appellate negligence act or omission or the of an our an intermediate —of Anderson, rejected veiy argu- into immuni- manner "would introduce Court rejected complexity rivaling when it the notion that an officer ty analysis ment we a that which necessarily operates outside of sufficiently daunting to deter us from tai- found authority acting unlawfully. officer’s loring of officials' the doctrine to the nature Anderson, 644-45, 483 U.S. at 107 S.Ct. at 3041- violated”). rights allegedly duties or of the (noting defining scope authority in this that omitted). (citations The at 151 court, in which the anticipating the manner if the that “even appeals concluded court of Supreme Court would decide United States not seize negligent ... did officers presented. the issue reasonable or exces- either Chambers with out, appeals pointed after As the petition [Chambers’] sive force.... Because their motions for sum- parties had filed no cause of affirmatively that demonstrates mary judgment the trial court but before rights, deprivation of civil exists for action motions, Supreme Court ruled on the granting ... not err in the trial court did Connor, in which it held decided Graham Id. summary judgment to these claims.” that: added). (emphasis at 152 enforcement officers claims that law [ A]ll presented is whether question deadly or not— have used excessive force— alleged as claims must be all excessive force arrest, investigatory of an the course violations, if no sei even Amendment Fourth citizen “seizure” of a free stop, or other occurred, Chambers has zure or whether analyzed Fourth under should be by alleging that claim cognizable a stated “reasonableness” stan Amendment and its force, a does not constitute excessive which dard, a “substantive due rather than under seizure, process? due violates substantive approach. process” a application its itself limits Graham Graham, at at 109 S.Ct. 490 U.S. Graham, at seizure. See original). determining (emphasis in After holding (limiting to “the course at 1871 S.Ct. [alleged] only “petition due- arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘sei anof process to seek relief [failed] violations and zure’”) added). The criti (emphasis Court Amendment,” 843 under the Fourth tendency of lower cized the “indiscriminate” appeals at found Cham applicable standards courts to use the a cause of action under bers failed to state “without con process due claims substantive § decided that 1988. The court application of sidering particular whether giving opportunity Chambers an to amend specific consti might implicate a more force pleadings pointless his would be because: by right governed a different tutional stand 393, 109 at 1870. If affirmatively petition If ... demon- ard.” particular application [does not] of force no cause of action exists or “the strates that barred, right recovery implicate specific a more constitutional plaintiffs then standard,” nothing in governed by a different proper. Under pro facts, implies that a substantive due only arguable claim for Graham these Fur claim not remain viable.10 deprivation that cess would [Chambers] constitutional ther, suggest party that a can illogical it is could raise was that of the use of excessive arising claim only bring excessive force thereby violating force viola a Fourth Amendment right Amendment from a seizure as Chambers’ Fourth tion, party had failed to yet also hold that the from unreasonable searches and freedom If, law, because no seizure state a claim for relief seizures. as a matter of under the case, particular facts. Without oc- occurred under the facts of this either no seizure Court, we explicit language from force used the officers more curred or the claims reasonable, unwilling all force to bar excessive then no Fourth Amend- constituting a seiz arising of conduct not out ment violation occurred. Finally, tendency "[i]n most criticizing the Court noted 10. In of the lower courts Eighth solely Amendment instances” will the Fourth to review excessive force claims under standard, appropriate constitutional process be the source of the substantive due the Court ex- Id. at right infringed an excessive force case. plained rejected that all that it "this notion exces- added). (emphasis While brought gov- at 1871 under 1983 are sive force claims hairs, Graham, split “most” does single generic we do not intend to erned standard.” clear, all, Implicitly, mean and it seems as numerous S.Ct. at 1870. 490 U.S. at then, Graham, (be single since courts have also concluded holds that no standard it Graham process due process the Court left room for a substantive or Fourth Amendment a substantive due standard) applies claims. excessive force claim. to all excessive force 660 California, Rochin v. originated Accordingly, judg we reverse the 342 U.S.

ure.11 (1952). 165, 205, appeals ment of the court of issue and 72 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed. 183 this ease, the Court voided a state criminal hold that a non-seizure Fourteenth Amend process on evidence ment substantive due claim of exces conviction based obtained the defendant’s stomach. The Ro- sive force survives Graham.12 pumping chin court held that substantive due process upholding summary judg erred grounds that sub rendered “conduct shocks the con- ment on the process force claim science” unconstitutional under the Due Pro- stantive due excessive Amendment.13 was barred. cess Clause the Fourteenth Graham, later, Thirty-seven years Chief Rehnquist Justice traced the evolution B. process applied to exces- substantive due Due Process Federal Substantive following claims in words: sive force If The federal doctrine of substantive due officer’s use force which justify process applies to could set- as it excessive force claims “shocks conscience” Graham, reading 11. We construe recent comments the Court as this court concludes that defen- inteipretation broadly. with our of Graham. consistent [Graham ] dants have read too - Oliver, -, -, Albright See v. U.S. 114 Supreme Court in did not hold that all Graham (1994) (noting 127 L.Ed.2d 114 prearrest excessive force claims are to be ana- only process that Graham bars substantive due lyzed exclusively under the Fourth Amend- particular provides amendment claims when plaintiffs ment. ... As the claim is not [sic] explicit pro- textual source of constitutional encompassed right, by some other enumerated tection). plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to state a sub- process claim under the Fourteenth stantive due interpreted courts 12. A number of federal Amendment.”). See, e.g., in this manner. Sinaloa Lake Graham City Valley, Owners Ass’n v. Simi 882 F.2d Further, those which hold that excessive cases 1398, (9th Cir.1989) (Kozinski, J.) n. 13 1409 detainees, by pretrial force claims to whom (applying process substantive due test and hold- Eighth apply, does not are to be Amendment ing that Graham dictated use of the fourth analyzed process, under substantive due are con plaintiff alleges gov test "the amendment only requires a sistent with the idea that Graham ernmental abuse not covered another consti claim when that is the con Fourth Amendment denied, standard”), 1016, tutional cert. 494 U.S. right truly Brogsdale implicated. stitutional See 1317, (1990); 110 S.Ct. 108 L.Ed.2d 493 Pleas 1184, (D.C.Cir.1991) Barry, v. 926 F.2d Zamieski, 272, (6th Cir.) ant v. 895 F.2d 276 n. bring (holding pretrial sub detainees can (holding deadly “[d]espite in a force case that claim); process due Fields v. stantive ], phrasing presumably Graham [of broad Houston, 1183, (5th Cir. South 922 F.2d preserve imperative would fourteenth amend 1991) (same); Wiggins, Valencia v. 981 F.2d process analysis ment substantive due for those 1440, (5th Cir.) (finding "concept a free citizen his or instances in which is denied of ‘seizure’ in the Fourth Amendment is so right through her constitutional ... means other pretrial capacious detention or elastic as to cover arrest, than a law enforcement official's investi- denied, arrest”), three weeks after the initial cert. denied, seizure”), stop gatoiy cert. or other U.S. -, 2998, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 S.Ct. 851, 144, (1990); - 111 S.Ct. 112 L.Ed.2d 110 (1993). Cosme, 791, 906 F.2d Landol-Rivera Cruz (1st Cir.1990) ("We of exces assume claims n admittedly vague standard was some 13.This the context of a seizure still sive force outside Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 may analyzed process what clarified Johnson under substantive due denied, 1033, Northcutt, 719, (2d Cir.), principles.”); cert. 94 S.Ct. Wilson v. 987 F.2d ("The First, (11th Cir.1993) 462, (1973): and Ninth Sixth 38 L.Ed.2d 324 type Circuits have held that this of Fourteenth gains content from other The standard added Amendment claim survives Graham.... [Rochin) language opinion. The acts persuaded by reasoning of our sister circuits. than some fastidious must do more "offend such, we hold that a non-seizure Fourteenth As squeamishness private sentimentalism about process due claim of ex Amendment substantive combatting energetically;” they crime too Graham.”); survives Temkin v. cessive force such as “to offend even hardened must be Comm'rs, County 945 F.2d Frederick sensibilities,” 342 U.S. at 72 S.Ct. 1991) through (proceeding Cir. a substantive and "offen- force that is "brutal” or constitute process analysis on an excessive force claim due denied, dignity.” 342 U.S. at sive to human Graham), mentioning cert. without even U.S.-, S.Ct. at 210. 117 L.Ed.2d - 417 Johnson, Akron, (parallel (1992); at 1033 n. 6 citations F.Supp. Frye v. Town omitted). ("After (N.D.Ind.1991) carefully

661 conviction, by have Judge rulings of other circuits which ting a review aside criminal Glick, Friendly process issue reasoned Johnson v. examined the substantive due [in Cir.1973) (2d ], 1028 a police driving 481 F.2d correction misconduct in the of context similarly use force al officer’s of excessive further of the cor us convinced leaves give process rise must to a due violation the stan rectness of the ‘shocks conscience’ Judge Friendly § dard.”). actionable 1988. under guide factors

went on to set forth four determining in courts “whether the consti that the defendant offi We conclude by partic tutional line has crossed” a been did violate Chambers’ substantive cers four ular use of force—the same factors process rights due under the “shocks upon by the courts below in this relied Taylor, 782 In Cannon v. conscience” test. case.[14] (11th Cir.1986), example, F.2d 947 Graham, 490 109 1870. U.S. at S.Ct. at explained a case in court chase omitted). (citation engaged or which the never his siren officer lights that: developed, in As this standard Daniels v.

Williams, 327, 334, 474 106 S.Ct. person injured a in an automobile accident (1986), L.Ed.2d the Court held 88 662 grossly negligent, or caused even deprivation a must flow con- that such from a negligent, operation of motor vehicle “amounting negli- to more than mere duct duty has policeman acting a in the line of County Frederick gence.” Temkin v. no 1983 cause of action for violation section (4th Cir.1991) Comm’rs, F.2d right. of a federal Daniels, n. (citing 474 U.S. at 334 Davis, (citing to Paul v. Id. 3). recently, at 666-67 n. But more 1155, 1160, 47 L.Ed.2d Judge courts eschewed Friend- that to hold otherwise would (arguing ly’s variety of a of “four factors” favor “font of render Fourteenth Amendment a depending type of standards on the conduct superimposed See, Temkin, upon tort law be whatever e.g., involved. 945 F.2d at 722 already (“As systems may administered parties, all of the and the district court States”)). case, well, out, In this point as our sister circuits have (with pursuit high-speed involved in a their adopted ranging standards of care from lights engaged) wit- negligence’ and sirens after either ‘gross to ‘deliberate indifference’ nessing having of the law or been to ‘recklessness’ for section 1983 substantive violation pursuit. of process involving called assist None due claims conduct other driving vehicles.”); than the official Lan these are so “brutal” and “offensive of actions dol-Rivera, (applying involved dignity” F.2d at 796 a reck to human that the conduct Thus, summary judg- or callous standard in ana less indifference shocks conscience. shoot); lyzing against § officer’s claim decision Morales ment his Chambers Corrections, Department F.2d is warranted. (2d Cir.1988) (applying deliberate indiffer reasons, For we affirm the these allegations standard ence to inmate’s appeals disposing of Cham- stop fight failed to and be intervene claim, ground. on a bers’ but different inmates). tween Our review of relevant judgment of the court reverse leads us to the conclusion that in the eases law issue on the state misconduct, alleged driving context to the trial for further remand the case circuit courts have settled on the the federal opinion. with proceedings consistent alleged the conscience” standard “shocks process due deprivations substantive (“A Temkin, DOGGETT, J., notes his dissent 945 F.2d at

rights. See need for force that was tionship a court must look to such Judge Friendly explained between application used, the need and the amount of ^[3] the extent that: force, factors ^[2] the rela- ^[1] injury Johnson, very purpose of pline inflicted, faith effort maliciously ^[4] causing whether force at 1033. to maintain or restore disci- harm. sadistically applied SPECTOR, J., sitting. ENIS, Relator, James

ENOCH, Justice, concurring. suspect When a criminal makes the inten SMITH, The Honorable Shearn tional steps decision to take whatever Judge, Respondent. necessary capture by to avoid law enforce No. 94-0442. officers, ment give officers’ decision to proximate injuries chase cannot abe cause of Supreme Court of Texas. resulting from the reckless behavior Sept. suspect. tragedy Bradley It is a Cham passenger motorcycle bers was a on the driv Stiles,

en intentionally Scott who chose to capture by

avoid driving speeds approach

ing per 100 miles hour executing extremely risky exiting high maneuver of '

way view, slowing My without down.

though, police is that the decision of the

give legal chase is no cause for Scott Stiles recklessly, irresponsibly.

drive See Travis v. (Tex. Mesquite, 764 S.W.2d 576 1989) rev’d,

App. 830 S.W.2d 94 — Dallas (Tex.1992). However, this issue was re contrary by

solved to the this Court in Tra (Tex. City Mesquite,

vis v. 1992). important pa Because it is that the

rameters of in cases settled,

such as this be I concur in the

Court’s conclusion that there is a fact issue proximate Travis, cause as dictated I my

but remain with views on the matter.1 in Travis affirmed

summary judgment for the officers based on and, therefore, proximate

lack of cause did immunity question.

not reach the official I

agree disposition with this Court’s of this

issue. Enis, Austin,

Joe M. for relator. Jesse, Hugh McKenney, L. L. Joel Ed- Houston, Cogbum, Pybus, mund L. David L. respondent. PER CURIAM. Party

The Real in Interest’s motion for rehearing opinion is overruled. This Court’s stated, Co., 443, 447, 1. As Justice Brandéis "In most matters it Gas important applicable (Brandeis, J., is more rule of law dissenting). L.Ed. 815 right. be settled than that it be settled This is legislature may very protect well do more to commonly true even where the error is matter personal liability officers from for a crimi concern, provided of serious correction can be suspect's nal acts. reckless by legislation.” had Burnet Coronado Oil &

Case Details

Case Name: City of Lancaster v. Chambers

Court Name: Texas Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 15, 1994

Citation: 883 S.W.2d 650

Docket Number: D-3331

Court Abbreviation: Tex.