Texas Department of Public Safety v. Merardo Bonilla
509 S.W.3d 570
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- On Feb. 19, 2010, DPS Trooper Cesar Cruz, in a marked unit, pursued a speeding pickup that had cut him off, weaved through traffic, and ran a red light at Montana and Magruder in El Paso; Cruz entered the intersection and collided with Merardo Bonilla, who was injured.
- Cruz said he delayed stopping earlier for safety, then activated lights (but not siren) and proceeded through the intersection, stating he slowed and had a clear view; his EDR data and DPS accident report conflicted with his account (showing acceleration to 49 mph and a sight obstruction from a building).
- Bonilla produced DPS’s accident investigation (including EDR data) concluding Cruz failed to exercise due care; Cruz’s dash-cam was off and his statements about yielding and slowing were disputed.
- DPS moved to dismiss/for summary judgment asserting (1) emergency-response/sovereign immunity (requiring proof of no recklessness) and (2) official immunity (discretionary act, course-and-scope, good faith). The trial court denied summary judgment; the case reaches the appellate court after a prior remand from the Texas Supreme Court.
- The central legal question on remand: whether DPS’s summary-judgment evidence conclusively established the good-faith element of official immunity under the objective ‘‘need-risk’’ test, and if so whether Bonilla raised a genuine fact issue that no reasonable officer could have so believed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DPS proved Trooper Cruz acted in good faith (official immunity) under the objective need-risk test | Bonilla argued Cruz’s account is contradicted by EDR and the DPS investigation (sight obstruction, acceleration, no siren), so DPS did not meet its summary-judgment burden | DPS argued Cruz’s affidavit, report, and deposition constituted competent evidence that a reasonable officer under the same/similar circumstances could have believed pursuit through the intersection was warranted | Held: DPS failed to meet its initial burden—material factual disputes (view obstruction, whether Cruz slowed, EDR data, and absence of siren) preclude concluding as a matter of law that a reasonable officer could have believed pursuit was appropriate |
| Standard for evaluating movant’s proof of good faith at summary judgment | Bonilla emphasized contradictions render officer’s affidavit insufficient; urged corroboration policy-wise | DPS relied on Trooper’s affidavit/deposition/incident report as competent summary-judgment evidence; cited Supreme Court remand framing | Held: Movant must meet usual summary-judgment standard; movant bears burden to prove good faith and evidence is evaluated in light most favorable to non-movant—conflicts must be resolved for non-movant |
| Whether the Texas Supreme Court already resolved that DPS proved good faith | Bonilla said footnote 23 allows considering trooper affidavit competent but not dispositive; DPS argued the high court effectively found good faith already | DPS read the Supreme Court’s summary as endorsing its evidence; Bonilla read Supreme Court footnote as only addressing competence | Held: The court interprets the high court’s comments as addressing competence of evidence only; remand required application of correct standard—court concludes DPS did not prove good faith as a matter of law |
| Whether a corroboration requirement (beyond officer’s testimony) should be judicially imposed | Bonilla urged a corroboration requirement as policy to guard against self-serving officer testimony | DPS opposed inventing such a rule; relied on existing summary-judgment and discovery mechanisms | Held: Court declines to create a corroboration requirement; officer testimony may suffice but here conflicts in record defeat summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1994) (official-immunity framework for discretionary acts requiring good faith)
- DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1995) (derivative sovereign immunity when employee actions are immune)
- City of Beverly Hills v. Guevara, 904 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. 1995) (agency nonliability when employee protected by official immunity)
- Univ. of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. 2000) (need-risk test and requirement to consider alternative courses in good-faith analysis)
- Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1997) (clarifying need-risk factors and objective legal reasonableness)
- City of San Antonio v. Ytuarte, 229 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. 2007) (plaintiff must show no reasonable officer could have believed action justified once movant produces competent evidence)
- Texas Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (plea to jurisdiction based on evidentiary challenge analyzed under summary-judgment standards)
- Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2015) (Supreme Court remand clarifying correct good-faith standard and that movant’s evidence must be assessed under that standard)