Texas Department of Criminal Justice Texas Department of Public Safety Director Steven McCraw And Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton v. Matthew Bovee, 01-20-00311-CV

Matthew Bovee pleaded guilty to injury to a child, was sentenced to 10 years, and was released on parole in December 2019 subject to periodic evaluations under Parole Board Directive 148.300 to determine need for sex‑offender conditions.
In January 2020 Bovee sued TDCJ, DPS Director McCraw, and AG Paxton in Travis County seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that Directive 148.300 violates due process, (2) prospective injunctive relief preventing imposition of sex‑offender conditions, and (3) damages for having been evaluated under the Directive.
TDCJ filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing the suit attacks a final felony conviction and must be brought to the Court of Criminal Appeals via Article 11.07 habeas; Bovee invoked Gov’t Code § 2001.038 (judicial review of agency rules) and general jurisdiction for damages.
The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction and issued a temporary injunction enjoining sex‑offender registration/therapy requirements for Bovee.
While the appeal was pending, Bovee was discharged from parole; the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s orders as to the declaratory judgment and injunction as moot, dismissed those appeals, but affirmed denial of the plea as to Bovee’s money‑damages claims and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Are the trial court’s orders denying dismissal of declaratory claim and granting injunction reviewable or moot?	Bovee: relief was necessary to prevent imposition of sex‑offender conditions.	TDCJ: Bovee was discharged; no live controversy; appeal moot; capable‑of‑repetition exception not met.	Vacated/dismissed as moot; capable‑of‑repetition exception not shown.
2) Must Bovee’s money‑damages claims be brought as Article 11.07 habeas in the Court of Criminal Appeals (i.e., do they seek relief that would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction)?	Bovee: claims challenge Parole Board procedure and seek damages, not relief from conviction, so district court has jurisdiction.	TDCJ: claims attack parole conditions and thus final conviction; exclusive habeas jurisdiction applies.	Affirmed denial of plea re damages: damages claims do not necessarily invalidate conviction because no sex‑offender condition was actually imposed.

City of Krum v. Rice, 543 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. 2017) (mootness and standing principles; must dismiss when no live controversy)
Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) (elements of "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception)
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (habeas is required for claims seeking relief that would affect duration of confinement)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (damages claims implying invalidity of conviction are barred until conviction is invalidated)
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (court cannot assume plaintiff will commit future crimes for repetition‑of‑issue purpose)
Board of Pardons & Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (Article 11.07 provides exclusive means to challenge a final felony conviction)
Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Transitional Planning Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166 (5th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing challenges to fact/duration of confinement from challenges to conditions)
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (prospective injunctive relief may proceed even when declaratory/damages claims would implicate habeas/Heck bar)