75 F. Supp. 3d 499
D.D.C.2014Background
- Richard N. Terry (pro se) sued FirstMerit Bank, N.A. after an Ohio state-court foreclosure decree on his property (Franklin County Case No. 13 CV 006485; judgment of foreclosure entered June 9, 2014).
- Terry filed the federal complaint on July 16, 2014, seeking to challenge or overturn the foreclosure judgment and alleging fraud/invalidity of the mortgage.
- FirstMerit moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim; the motion included an affidavit denying contacts with D.C.
- The Court informed Terry that jurisdictional facts outside the complaint could be considered and allowed him to submit affidavits; Terry filed an affidavit but did not meaningfully rebut jurisdictional arguments.
- The Court concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine because Terry was a party to the state judgment, his federal claims were inextricably intertwined with that judgment, and he filed after the state court’s final judgment.
- The Court also found no personal jurisdiction over FirstMerit under D.C. long-arm statutes or due process because the bank has its principal place of business in Ohio and had no alleged contacts with D.C.; dismissal was granted in full.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-matter jurisdiction — collateral attack on state judgment | Terry seeks federal relief to challenge/overturn Ohio foreclosure judgment (alleges fraud vitiates mortgage) | Rooker–Feldman bars lower federal review of state-court final judgments; federal court lacks jurisdiction | Dismissed: Rooker–Feldman applies; federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction |
| Timing/sequencing of claims | Federal suit filed to challenge foreclosure after judgment | State foreclosure judgment was final before federal suit; federal claims are not parallel | Dismissed: suit filed after final state judgment, satisfying Rooker–Feldman timing prong |
| Personal jurisdiction over FirstMerit | Terry asserts court has jurisdiction (vague allegations) | FirstMerit denies D.C. contacts; not domiciled or doing business in D.C.; no long-arm conduct | Dismissed as to personal jurisdiction: no general or specific jurisdiction; due process not satisfied |
| Venue/federal jurisdictional bases (diversity/federal question) | Implicit claim of federal jurisdiction by filing in federal court | FirstMerit argues no diversity or federal-question jurisdiction; abstention doctrines apply | Court did not reach merits; dismissed for Rooker–Feldman and lack of personal jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction)
- District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (establishes limits on lower federal court review of state-court judgments)
- Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (describes Rooker–Feldman doctrine and its limited application)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (distinguishes parallel state and federal proceedings for Rooker–Feldman analysis)
- Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (minimum contacts standard for personal jurisdiction)
- Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (purposeful availment and fair play in jurisdictional analysis)