Terry Bovee v. Claudia Broom, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20599

Terry Bovee sued his sister Claudia Broom under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that as a public school guidance counselor she criticized his parenting and called him a “bad father,” which allegedly alienated his children and violated his Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in familial relations.
The district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and labeled the dismissal "without prejudice." Bovee appealed.
The Seventh Circuit considered whether the dismissal was appealable and whether the case properly presented federal jurisdiction under §1331 and §1983.
The district court treated the claim as jurisdictional rather than resolving it on the merits; the Seventh Circuit explained the distinction between jurisdictional dismissals and merits dismissals under Bell v. Hood and related precedents.
The Seventh Circuit held that the complaint did invoke federal question jurisdiction (a §1983 claim) but that the claim failed to state a constitutional violation because defamation by a public employee, unaccompanied by adverse official action, does not violate due process under Paul v. Davis and Christensen.
The appellate court modified the district court’s dismissal to one on the merits, dismissed the suit with prejudice, and affirmed as modified.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court's "without prejudice" jurisdictional dismissal is appealable	Bovee: dismissal without prejudice is not final; appeal improper	Broom: appeal of jurisdictional dismissal is proper	Appeal is proper; jurisdictional dismissals are routinely appealable and this was a final resolution for federal court purposes
Whether failure to state a claim equates to lack of federal jurisdiction	Bovee: impliedly treated merits as jurisdictional; appeal argues jurisdictional defect	Broom: complaint arises under federal law (§1983), so jurisdiction exists	Jurisdiction existed because complaint pleaded a §1983 claim; Bell v. Hood and related cases distinguish merits from jurisdictional dismissals
Whether Bovee pleaded a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim under §1983	Bovee: defamation and parental alienation by a public employee infringed his liberty interest in familial relations	Broom: alleged conduct was only verbal criticism; no official adverse action — so no due-process violation	Held for defendant: defamation alone, absent adverse official action, does not constitute a constitutional violation under Paul and Christensen; claim fails to state a §1983 due-process claim
Proper disposition of the case	Bovee: sought relief on merits	Broom: case should be dismissed	Court modified dismissal to one on the merits and dismissed with prejudice; affirmed as modified

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (distinguishes merits dismissal from jurisdictional dismissal for federal-question jurisdiction)
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974) (federal courts may dismiss claims that are "wholly insubstantial" or "fictitious" for lack of jurisdiction)
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (defamation alone by government actors, without more, does not implicate a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest)
Christensen v. Boone County, 483 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2007) (reaffirms that intra-family defamation by a public employee does not give rise to a §1983 due-process claim)
Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2010) (discusses effects and meanings of dismissal "without prejudice")
In re IFC Credit Corp., 663 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (jurisdictional dismissal principles)
Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., 662 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2011) (criticizes counsel who ignore controlling precedent)