Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19324
| 4th Cir. | 2011Background
- Taylor, a Marine, was electrocuted on a Camp Fallujah Tank Ramp in July 2007 during maintenance by Marines and KBR technicians.
- Taylor sued KBR in the Eastern District of Virginia for common-law negligence; district court granted Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal on political-question and FTCA 'combat activities' grounds.
- Contract between Army and KBR required KBR to install, inspect, operate, repair, and maintain generators, with KBR responsible for safety under OSHA regulations.
- Tank Ramp power was through a dedicated generator, with backup power restricted by the Camp Mayor's Cell; there was no authorized backup power for the Tank Ramp.
- KBR indicated it would raise contributory negligence as a defense, which would require judicial review of military decisions; district court found such review would implicate sensitive military judgments.
- On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding political-question doctrine barred adjudication and mootness rendered FTCA preemption issue unnecessary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Taylor's claim presents a nonjusticiable political question | Taylor argues no military decisions need be judged to decide negligence. | KBR argues adjudication would require evaluating military decisions in combat theater. | Yes; political question doctrine bars merits. |
| Whether FTCA combat activities exception preempts the claim | Combat activities exception does not apply to Taylor's negligence against a private contractor. | FTCA preemption applies because contractor engaged in combat-related activities. | moot after political-question ruling; vacated as moot. |
| Whether KBR was sufficiently under military control to render the claim non-justiciable | KBR's defense could be evaluated without reweighing military control. | Military decisions controlled back-up power and work authorizations; admission would require court to second-guess military. | Contractor's control insufficient to avoid review; however, court still barred by political question. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271 (4th Cir.1991) (FTCA claims can be nonjusticiable when national defense decisions predominate)
- Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2009) (contractor under military orders; political-question bar)
- Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548 (5th Cir.2008) (mixed jurisdiction in contractor–military context; some claims not barred)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishes political-question roots)
- Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (six-factor test for political questions)
- Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271 (4th Cir.1991) (national-defense considerations in FTCA analysis)
- Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir.2009) (combatant activities preemption framework)
- Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir.2011) (federal preemption in contractor-warfare context)
- Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc., 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir.2011) (combatant-activities preemption considerations)