Taylor Scott v. Gino Morena Enterprises, 888 F.3d 1101

Scott worked for GME beginning April 2011 and alleges sexual harassment and retaliation by two managers after she rejected advances. She resigned after alleged retaliatory conduct in December 2013.
Scott filed an administrative charge with California DFEH on November 13, 2013; DFEH issued a FEHA right-to-sue letter on November 25, 2013 and dual-filed the charge with the EEOC.
Scott filed a second DFEH charge (through counsel) on November 17, 2014 alleging post-charge retaliation; DFEH issued a second right-to-sue letter that day.
Scott sought and received an EEOC right-to-sue notice on June 3, 2015 (stating EEOC terminated processing and the Title VII lawsuit must be filed within 90 days of receipt).
The district court granted summary judgment for GME, holding Scott’s Title VII claims time-barred and that equitable tolling did not apply; Scott appealed.
The Ninth Circuit framed the principal legal question as whether the 90-day period in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) begins when the claimant becomes eligible for an EEOC right-to-sue notice (i.e., 180 days after filing) or when the claimant actually is given that EEOC notice.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the 90-day filing period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) begin?	Scott: 90 days begins when the EEOC actually gives the right-to-sue notice.	GME: 90 days begins when claimant becomes eligible (i.e., 180 days after filing / EEOC inaction).	The 90-day period begins when the EEOC gives the right-to-sue notice.
Are post-charge acts actionable when a later (untimely) administrative charge alleges them, or can they be covered by the first charge under continuing violations?	Scott: Post-charge retaliatory acts (e.g., sham warning) can be considered part of a continuing unlawful practice connected to the first charge.	GME: Acts alleged in the second (untimely) charge are time-barred and discrete acts are not saved by the earlier charge.	Discrete acts after the first charge are time-barred; but acts after the first charge may be actionable if they are part of a single hostile work environment (continuing violations doctrine).

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (distinguishes discrete acts from continuing hostile work environment; governs tolling/continuing violations)
Lynn v. W. Gillette, Inc., 564 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1977) (90‑day period begins upon receipt of a specific right‑to‑sue letter)
Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 624 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2010) (discusses when plaintiff may proceed without an EEOC letter; language about eligibility for a letter treated as non-controlling here)
Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) (a plaintiff entitled to an EEOC right‑to‑sue letter may proceed absent EEOC letter if a state agency letter was received)
Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258 (1993) (court will not infer odd accrual rules absent statutory indication)
Saulsbury v. Wismer & Becker, Inc., 644 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff may file suit within 180 days if EEOC issued a right‑to‑sue letter earlier)
E.E.O.C. v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1980) (delay and employer prejudice can bar EEOC actions under laches)