Tanzin v. Tanvir
592 U.S. 43
SCOTUS2020Background
- Respondents (Muslim travelers) allege FBI agents placed them on the No Fly List in retaliation for refusing to act as informants for their religious communities. They claim economic harms (wasted tickets, lost income).
- Respondents sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), seeking (a) injunctive relief (official-capacity) to remove them from the No Fly List and (b) money damages (individual-capacity) against federal agents.
- DHS later allowed the respondents to fly, mooting the injunctive claims; the district court then dismissed the individual-capacity damages claims, holding RFRA does not authorize monetary relief.
- The Second Circuit reversed, holding RFRA’s remedies provision and its definition of “government” authorize money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities.
- Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Second Circuit: RFRA permits, when appropriate, damages against federal officials sued in their individual capacities.
- The Court recognized that officials may raise qualified immunity as a defense; sovereign-immunity concerns (Sossamon) did not bar individual-capacity damages here.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RFRA permits money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities | RFRA defines “government” to include officials and allows “appropriate relief,” which includes damages | Relief against an official’s personal assets is not relief "against a government;" RFRA shouldn’t be read to authorize individual-capacity damages | Yes. RFRA’s text and definition of “government” encompass suits for damages against officials in their individual capacities |
| Whether RFRA’s statutory definition of “government” controls over ordinary meaning | The explicit RFRA definition that includes officials governs interpretation | The ordinary meaning of “government” refers to the United States, not officials personally | The Court enforces RFRA’s explicit definition, which treats officials as “persons” against whom relief may run |
| Whether the phrase “appropriate relief” includes monetary damages | “Appropriate relief” is open-ended and, in context, includes damages (historical and §1983 practice) | Reliance on Sossamon/sovereign-immunity principles counsel against reading damages into “appropriate relief” | Yes. Historical practice and §1983 analogies show damages are an appropriate remedy; Sossamon (sovereign immunity) is inapplicable to suits against individuals |
| Availability of defenses (qualified immunity / separation-of-powers concerns) | Qualified immunity is a proper defense and protects officials unless law was clearly established | Damages could intrude on separation of powers or require judicial creation of a new presumption against damages | Court recognizes qualified immunity is available to officials; separation-of-powers concerns do not prohibit statutory damages remedies |
Key Cases Cited
- Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (holding neutral, generally applicable laws need not satisfy strict scrutiny for free exercise)
- Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (interpreting "appropriate relief" in RLUIPA and discussing sovereign-immunity limits)
- Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (discussing personal-capacity suits under civil-rights statutes)
- Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (distinguishing official- and individual-capacity suits and execution of relief)
- City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (holding RFRA could not be applied to the States)
- Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (recognizing availability of damages under §1983 for certain violations)
- Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (discussing damages and qualified immunity under §1983)