Tamosaitis v. URS Inc.
781 F.3d 468
9th Cir.2014Background
- Dr. Walter Tamosaitis, a URS Energy & Construction, Inc. (URS E & C) employee assigned to the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) project, raised technical safety concerns (the “M3 mixing issue”) and sought more time to resolve them; Bechtel (the prime contractor) pushed to close the issue sooner.
- After circulating a list of concerns and emailing consultants, Tamosaitis was removed from the WTP project on Bechtel’s urging and reassigned by URS to a non‑supervisory offsite position; he later lost bonuses and supervisory duties.
- Tamosaitis filed an ERA (42 U.S.C. § 5851) administrative complaint with DOL‑OSHA naming “URS Inc.”; URS entities responded and clarified that URS Energy & Construction, Inc. was the employer on the subcontract.
- After amendments (adding DOE and later naming URS Corp. and URS E & C) and one year of agency inaction, Tamosaitis filed in federal court under the §5851(b)(4) opt‑out provision and sought a jury trial; the district court dismissed DOE, granted summary judgment for URS Corp. and URS E & C (and struck the jury demand).
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of DOE and URS Corp. for failure to satisfy the one‑year administrative notice requirement, reversed summary judgment for URS E & C (finding triable issues on contributing‑factor causation and adverse action), and held there is a constitutional right to a jury trial for money damages under the ERA opt‑out action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the ERA opt‑out one‑year exhaustion period run separately for each respondent named in the administrative complaint? | Tamosaitis argued his overall agency filing satisfied exhaustion for defendants he later sued. | URS/DOE argued adding defendants restarts the one‑year clock; must wait one year after naming each respondent. | The court held exhaustion is respondent‑specific: a respondent must have had notice and an opportunity to participate in the agency process for one year before suit. |
| Was URS E & C adequately named in the original OSHA complaint despite using the name “URS Inc.”? | Tamosaitis argued the agency and URS entities understood he meant URS E & C and URS E & C participated, so notice was adequate. | URS Corp. argued it was not the employer/respondent and that amendment changed the respondent. | The court held URS E & C was adequately identified (agency received and addressed URS E & C’s position), so exhaustion was satisfied as to URS E & C; URS Corp. was not adequately named and was dismissed. |
| Can URS E & C be liable where a contractor (Bechtel) with retaliatory motive pressed for removal? (causation and adverse action) | Tamosaitis argued Bechtel’s retaliatory demand, URS E & C’s knowledge/acquiescence, and resulting transfer/ loss of duties/bonuses make protected activity a contributing factor. | URS E & C argued Bechtel alone made the decision and contractual obligations compelled removal, so URS E & C did not take adverse action for retaliatory reasons. | The court found triable issues: emails show Bechtel’s retaliatory motive and URS E & C’s compliance; protected activity can be a contributing factor when employer ratifies/acquiesces to a customer’s retaliatory request. Summary judgment for URS E & C was reversed. |
| Is there a right to a jury trial for ERA §5851(b)(4) opt‑out actions seeking money damages? | Tamosaitis argued the claim sounds in tort, seeks compensatory damages (legal relief), and thus triggers the Seventh Amendment right to jury. | Defendants argued statutory silence and the public‑right/administrative enforcement context allow nonjury adjudication; monetary relief is incidental/equitable. | The court held there is a constitutional right to a jury trial for money damages in district court under the ERA opt‑out provision because the claim and damages are legal in nature; the administrative origin does not eliminate the jury right once in federal court. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mackowiak v. Univ. Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1984) (ERA protects workers from retaliation based on safety/quality concerns)
- DeFord v. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983) (purpose of whistleblower protections to preserve information channels)
- Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (rationale for exhaustion: allow agency correction and record development)
- City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (statutory “action at law” is not alone conclusive for a statutory jury right analysis)
- Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998) (analysis of when statutory suits seeking legal relief require jury trial)
- Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (statutory language and incorporated procedures can indicate a jury right)
- Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (distinguishing public‑rights administrative adjudication from Seventh Amendment jury right in federal courts)
- Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (Seventh Amendment analysis requires examining nature of remedy sought)
- Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (an employer cannot justify discriminatory action based on a customer’s discriminatory preference)