Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether the Seventh Amendment guaranteed petitioner a right to a jury trial on both liability and amount of penalty in an action instituted by the Federal Government seeking civil penalties and injunc-tive relief under the Clean Water Act, 62 Stat. 1155, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et sea.
I — I
The Clean Water Act prohibits discharging, without a permit, dredged or fill material into “navigable waters,” including the wetlands adjacent to the waters. 33 U. S. C. §§1311, 1344, and 1362(7); 33 CFR §§323.2(a)(1)-(7) (1986). “Wetlands” are “swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.” 33 CFR § 323.2(c) (1986). The Government sued petitioner, a real estate developer, for dumping fill on wetlands on the island of Chincoteague, Virginia. The Government alleged in the original complaint that petitioner dumped fill on three sites: Ocean Breeze Mobile Homes Sites, Mire Pond Properties, and Eel Creek. The Government later amended the complaint to allege that petitioner also placed fill in a manmade waterway, named Fowling Gut Extended, on the Ocean Breeze property.
Section 1319 enumerates the remedies available under the Clean Water Act. Subsection (b) authorizes relief in the form of temporary or permanent injunctions. Subsection (d) provides that violators of certain sections of the Act “shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 per day” during the period of the violation. The Government sought in
Petitioner’s timely demand for a trial by jury was denied by the District Court. During the 15-day bench trial, petitioner did not dispute that he had placed fill at the locations alleged and did not deny his failure to obtain a permit. Petitioner contended, however, that the property in question did not constitute “wetlands.”
The District Court concluded that petitioner had illegally filled in wetland areas on all properties in question, but drastically reduced the amount of civil penalties sought by the Government. With respect to the Ocean Breeze Mobile Homes Sites, the court imposed a civil fine of $35,000, noting that petitioner had sold seven lots at a profit of $5,000 per lot.
The Court of Appeals affirmed over a dissent, rejecting petitioner’s argument that, under the Seventh Amendment, he was entitled to a jury trial.
In Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n,
II
The Seventh Amendment provides that, “[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”
To determine whether a statutory action is more similar to cases that were tried in courts of law than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty, the Court must examine both the nature of the action and of the remedy sought. First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. See, e. g., Pernell v. Southall Realty,
A
Petitioner analogizes this Government suit under § 1319(d) to an action in debt within the jurisdiction of English courts of law. Prior to the enactment of the Seventh Amendment, English courts had held that a civil penalty suit was a particular species of an action in debt that was within the jurisdiction of the courts of law. See, e. g., Atcheson v. Everitt, 1 Cowper 382, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142 (K. B. 1776) (characterizing civil penalty suit as a type of action in debt); Calcraft v. Gibbs, 5 T. R. 19, 101 Eng. Rep. 11 (K. B. 1792) (granting new jury trial in an action in debt for a civil penalty).
After the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, federal courts followed this English common law in treating the civil penalty suit as a particular type of an action in debt, requiring a jury trial. . See, e. g., United States v. Mundell,
It was against this historical background that the Court in Hepner v. United States,
“The objection made in behalf of the defendant, that an affirmative answer to the question certified could be used so as to destroy the constitutional right of trial by jury, is without merit and need not be discussed. The defendant was, of course, entitled to have a jury summoned in this case, but that right was subject to the condition, fundamental in the conduct of civil actions, that the court may withdraw a case from the jury and direct a verdict, according to the law if the evidence is uncon-tradicted and raises only a question of law.”213 U. S., at 115 (emphasis added).
In United States v. Regan,
“While the defendant was entitled to have the issues tried before a jury, this right did not arise from Article III of the Constitution or from the Sixth Amendment, for both relate to prosecutions which are strictly criminal in their nature, but it derives out of the fact that in a civil*420 action of debt involving more than twenty dollars a jury trial is demandable.”232 U. S., at 47 (citation omitted).
In the instant case, the Government sought penalties of over $22 million for violation of the Clean Water Act and obtained a judgment in the sum of $325,000. This action is clearly analogous to the 18th-century action in debt, and federal courts have rightly assumed that the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial.
The Government argues, however, that — rather than an action in debt — the closer historical analog is an action to abate a public nuisance. In 18th-century English law, a public nuisance was “an act or omission ‘which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty’s subjects.’” W. Prosser, Law of Torts 583 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter Prosser) (footnote omitted). The Government argues that the present suit is analogous to two species of public nuisances. One is the suit of the sovereign in the English courts of equity for a “purprestare” to enjoin or order the repair of an enclosure or obstruction of public waterways; the other is the suit of the sovereign to enjoin “offensive trades and manufactures” that polluted the environment. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 167.
It is true that the subject matter of this Clean Water Act suit — the placement of fill into navigable waters — resembles these two species of public nuisance. Whether, as the Government argues, a public nuisance action is a better analogy than an action in debt is debatable. But we need not decide the question. As Pernell v. Southall Realty,
We need not rest our conclusion on what has been called an “abstruse historical” search for the nearest 18th-century analog. See Ross v. Bernhard,
A civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law. Remedies intended to punish culpable individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation or restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law, not courts of equity. See, e. g., Curtis v. Loether, supra, at 197 (punitive damages remedy is legal, not equitable, relief); Ross v. Bernhard, supra, at 536 (treble-damages remedy for securities violation is a penalty, which constitutes legal relief).
The punitive nature of the relief sought in this present case is made apparent by a comparison with the relief sought in an action to abate a public nuisance. A public nuisance action was a classic example of the kind of suit that relied on the injunctive relief provided by courts in equity. Prosser 603. “Injunctive relief [for enjoining a public nuisance at the request of the Government] is traditionally given by equity upon a showing of [peril to health and safety].” Steelworkers v. United States,
The Government contends, however, that a suit enforcing civil penalties under the Clean Water Act is similar to an action for disgorgement of improper profits, traditionally considered an equitable remedy. It bases this characterization upon evidence that the District Court determined the amount of the penalties by multiplying the number of lots sold by petitioner by the profit earned per lot. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. An action for disgorgement of improper profits is, however, a poor analogy. Such an action is a remedy only for restitution — a more limited form of penalty than a civil fine. Restitution is limited to “restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant.” Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
The Government next contends that, even if the civil penalties under § 1319(d) are deemed legal in character, a jury trial is not required. A court in equity was empowered to provide monetary awards that were incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief. The Government therefore argues that its claim under § 1319(b), which authorizes injunc-tive relief, provides jurisdiction for monetary relief in equity. Brief for United States 38. This argument has at least three flaws. First, while a court in equity may award monetary restitution as an adjunct to injunctive relief, it may not enforce civil penalties. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., supra, at 399. Second, the Government was aware when it filed suit that relief would be limited primarily to civil penalties, since petitioner had already sold most of the properties at issue. App. 110, 119. A potential penalty of $22 million
Finally, the Government was free to seek an equitable remedy in addition to, or independent of, legal relief. Section 1319 does not intertwine equitable relief with the imposition of civil penalties. Instead each kind of relief is separably authorized in a separate and distinct statutory provision. Subsection (b), providing injunctive relief, is independent of subsection (d), which provides only for civil penalties. In such a situation, if a “legal claim is joined with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on the legal claim, including all issues common to both claims, remains intact. The right cannot be abridged by characterizing the legal claim as ‘incidental’ to the equitable relief sought.” Curtis v. Loether,
I — I I — I I — I
The remaining issue is whether petitioner additionally has a Seventh Amendment right to a jury assessment of the civil penalties. At the time this case was tried, § 1319(d) did not explicitly state whether juries or trial judges were to fix the civil penalties. The legislative history of the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Water Act shows, however, that Congress intended that trial judges perform the highly discretionary calculations necessary to award civil penalties after liability is found. 123 Cong. Rec. 39190-39191 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie citing letter from EPA Assistant Administrators of Enforcement of Dec. 14, 1977) (“[Pjenalties assessed by judges should be sufficiently higher than penalties to which the Agency would have agreed in settlement to encourage violators to settle”). We must decide therefore whether Congress can, consistent with the Seventh Amendment, authorize judges to assess civil penalties.
The Seventh Amendment is silent on the question whether a jury must determine the remedy in a trial in which it must
Congress’ assignment of the determination of the amount of civil penalties to trial judges therefore does not infringe on
IV
We conclude that the Seventh Amendment required that petitioner’s demand for a jury trial be granted to determine his liability, but that the trial court and not the jury should determine the amount of penalty, if any. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Notes
Additionally, the Government alleged that petitioner’s dumping of fill in Fowling Gut Extended violated another statute, the Rivers and Harbors Act, which prohibits the placement of fill in navigable waters without the authorization of the Secretary of the Army. 33 U. S. C. §403. Petitioner does not base his Seventh Amendment claim on the Government’s prosecution under this statute, which provides for injunctive relief but not for civil penalties.
The Government’s complaint alleged violations involving over 1 million square feet of land. The Government obtained injunctive relief, however, relating to only 6,000 square feet. Brief for Petitioner 5.
Before initiating the inquiry into the applicability of the Seventh Amendment, “[w]e recognize, of course, the ‘cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided.’ ” Curtis v. Loether,
The Court has also considered the practical limitations of a jury trial and its functional compatibility with proceedings outside of traditional courts of law in holding that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings. See, e. g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n,
Public nuisances included “interferences with the public health, as in the ease of a hogpen, the keeping of diseased animals, or a malarial pond; with the public safety, as in the case of the storage of explosives, the shooting of fireworks in the streets, harboring a vicious dog, or the practice of medicine by one not qualified; with public morals, as in the case of houses of prostitution, illegal liquor establishments, gambling houses, indecent exhibitions, bullfights, unlicensed prize fights, or public profanity; with the publice [sic] peace, as by loud and disturbing noises, or an opera performance which threatens to cause a riot; with the public comfort, as in the case of bad odors, smoke, dust and vibration; with public convenience, as by obstructing a highway or a navigable stream, or creating a condition which makes travel unsafe or highly disagreeable, or the collection of an inconvenient crowd; and in addition, such unclassified offenses as eavesdropping on a jury, or being a common scold.” Prosser 583-585 (footnotes omitted).
The Government contends that both the cause of action and the remedy must be legal in nature before the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial attaches. It divides the Clean Water Act action for civil penalties into a cause of action and a remedy, and analyzes each component as if the other were irrelevant. Thus, the Government proposes that a public nuisance action is the better historical analog for the cause of action, and that
The Government distinguishes this suit from other actions to collect a statutory penalty on the basis that the statutory penalty here is not fixed or readily calculable from a fixed formula. We do not find this distinction to be significant. The more important characteristic of the remedy of civil penalties is that it exacts punishment — a kind of remedy available only in courts of law. Thus, the remedy of civil penalties is similar to the remedy of punitive damages, another legal remedy that is not a fixed fine. See, e. g., Curtis v. Loether, supra, at 189-190 (defendant entitled to jury trial in an action based on a statute authorizing actual damages and punitive damages of not more than $1,000).
When Congress enacted the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act, it endorsed the EPA’s then-existing penalty calculation policy. 123 Cong.
Nothing in the Amendment’s language suggests that the right to a jury trial extends to the remedy phase of a civil trial. Instead, the language “defines the kind of cases for which jury trial is preserved, namely ‘suits at common law.’” Colgrove v. Battin,
Concurrence Opinion
with whom Justice Stevens joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the Court’s disposition, and Parts I and II of its opinion. I do not join Part III because in my view the right to trial by jury on whether a civil penalty of unspecified amount is assessable also involves a right to trial by jury on what the amount should be. The fact that the Legislature could elect to fix the amount of penalty has nothing to do with whether, if it chooses not to do so, that element comes within the jury-trial guarantee. Congress could, I suppose, create a private cause of action by one individual against another for a fixed amount of damages, but it surely does not follow that if it creates such a cause of action without prescribing the amount of damages, that issue could be taken from the jury.
I would reverse and remand for jury determination of both issues.